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CENTRAL EURASIA



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Chemical Weapons Disposition Examined

934A0658A Moscow TRUD in Russian 20 Jan 93 p 3

[Interview with S.B. Batsanov, ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary and representative of Russia to the Paris disarmament conference, by TRUD correspondent Vyacheslav Prokofyev in Paris; date not given: "Chemical Weapons: Cheaper To Destroy than To Store"]

[Text] After the Convention on Banning the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Employment of Chemical Weapons and their Destruction was signed in Paris, 127 countries of the world unanimously let it be known that the international community had decided in earnest and forever to outlaw a whole class of weapons of mass destruction. Our correspondent in France asked S.B. Batsanov, ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary and Russia's representative to the disarmament conference, to summarize the results of this unusual event.

"The Paris conference, in my view, is an unprecedented event," he said. "It is singular even in the fact that it prohibits and eliminates one of the types of weapons of mass destruction. This has already occurred in history—we recall the convention on biological weapons. The uniqueness of this convention is that it is the first global agreement on disarmament, and, moreover, it is quite radical, possessing a powerful mechanism for implementation, which includes both an international organization established for this purpose and a heretofore unheard of regime of openness and control.

"The Paris document contains the most revolutionary means of monitoring that has ever been devised by collective reason. The question concerns inspections on request at any point and at any time on the territory of a state that has become a member of the convention, with no right of refusal. Of course, with certain procedural restrictions directed at the protection of information that does not relate to the essence of the convention. And that it was possible to do this on a multilateral level that encompasses not only Europe, where the idea of inspections has already been accepted, but practically the whole world, is a very major achievement which goes beyond the scope of the agreement."

[Prokofyev] Sergey Borisovich, judging by everything the stipulation in the convention that proposes that all chemical weapons be destroyed over 10 years, and in exceptional cases 15 years, concerns Russia directly, is that not so?

[Batsanov] Initially, the 10-year period was coordinated—without any exceptions. Afterwards, at our request, an opportunity was provided to extend this period to 15 years. But this request was made in connection with the fact that problems emerged for us with the destruction of chemical weapons. We were met halfway, and there was concurrence with the reasons that were sincerely put forth by Russia. I think that just several years ago it would hardly have been realistic to revise this provision, which was already coordinated and recorded in the draft convention. We were able to do this now. In any case, it is necessary to get rid of chemical weapons without any bureaucratic procrastination.

[Prokofyev] Nevertheless, some in the West doubt the sincerity of our readiness to put an end to chemical weapons. References have been made here of late to the statement of scientist V. Mirzoyanov, who claims that the development of chemical weapons is continuing in Russia...

[Batsanov] This information requires verification. For example, I have no doubts as to the sincerity of the political leadership. The convention that we signed, not without internal vacillations, and these occurred in certain phases of its development, does not allow the countries to conduct themselves insincerely by virtue of the system of monitoring laid down in it. It is also impossible to disregard the fact that the chemical weapons stockpiles that we built up in considerable amounts will consume enormous sums of money as time goes on: Either to maintain them in combat readiness, or, at worst, for their storage and to ensure safety.

[Prokofyev] Does this mean that it will be cheaper to destroy them than to store them?

[Batsanov] In the final analysis, undoubtedly. Although, of course, this also is not an inexpensive undertaking.

[Prokofyev] A group of countries, particularly Arab countries, refused to join the convention...

[Batsanov] It would be more correct to say that they decided in Paris not to sign the convention. This does not mean that they have insurmountable complaints about the contents of the convention. They proceed from a concept of linking chemical and nuclear disarmament within the framework of the Near East region. They would like to use the fact of concluding negotiations on the convention and its presentation for signature in order somehow to force Israel to move along the path of acceptance of a nonnuclear status.

KGB Funeral Draws Former, Current 'Illegals Directorate' Chiefs*934C0743A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 13 Jan 93 p 4*

[Unattributed report: "But the Secrets Did Not Die With Her"]

[Text] According to an RIA [Russian Information Agency] report, the legendary Soviet intelligence agent Leontina Cohen, a.k.a. Helen Kroger, a Pole by birth, died on New Year's eve. RIA received this information from a Russian external intelligence officer who requested anonymity. Together with her husband Morris Cohen (Peter Kroger), during the war and postwar years Leontina Cohen collected information for the Soviet Union on the development of the atomic bomb in the United States, and then on arms development programs in England. On 13 March 1961, in the notorious Portland case in England, they were sentenced to 20 years in prison. Eight years later Leontina and Morris Cohen were exchanged for British Secret Service agent Brook, and on 25 October 1969 arrived in the Soviet Union.

Her funeral was attended by former chiefs of the intelligence service illegals directorate Vadim Kirpichenko and Yuriy Drozdov, as well as by its current chief. "Military-strategic parity in the nuclear area was achieved to a great extent due to the efforts of Leontina and her husband," said a member of the Russian Federation External Intelligence Service. "Generations of Russians owe them their life: their ingenuity, purposefulness, and desire to preserve peace on the planet helped to prevent a nuclear war."

Activist on Ex-KGB Staffers, Conferences on KGB Past Activities*934C0743B Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 Jan 93 Morning Edition p 5*

[Article by Sergey Grigoryants: "Where Is the KGB Going?"]

[Text] Former Polish Prime Minister Jaroszewicz bore little resemblance to former General Secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party Dubcek—neither at the time he was in power nor recently, when he was already retired. It was only in 1992 that their names started to be mentioned together frequently: Both died a sudden death (Dubcek after a car crash; Jaroszewicz and his wife were brutally murdered in their own home) immediately after they had both agreed to testify in Russia's Constitutional Court case on the banning of the CPSU. Besides the date of death, there was undoubtedly something else they had in common: They knew a lot.

Well, coincidences do happen, an unprejudiced reader will say, and will be absolutely right; nevertheless, Zdenek Mlynar, also a well-informed person, perhaps reasoned differently and refused Galina Starovoytova's invitation to attend that same trial in Moscow. Actually, these are relatively distant affairs; closer to home, in

Moscow, Starovoytova herself believed that a potential reason for her sudden removal from the post of President Yeltsin's adviser was a remark doubting the reliability of the Russian special service carelessly made to the president in the presence of strangers.

"Some are closely tied to Sterligov; others look up to Zyuganov; still others set up commercial structures, without being too choosy about being in the company of criminals," a recently high-ranking KGB official remarked a few days ago, "it is not easy these days to figure this place out."

Nor was it easy to figure it out in the past: After all, the KGB in all its current four incarnations (the Russian Federation Ministry of Security, the External Intelligence Service, the Federal Agency for Government Communications and Information, and the [Main] Protection Administration), as well as under the multitude of various names throughout its very long (three-quarters of a century!) history, always carried out its activities inside the country—and frequently, as is known, against its own people—under the cover of strict secrecy. Point one of its regulations, which have not been changed for a long time, stipulates precisely that.

As is known, the Russian intelligentsia has always been the main object of attention on the part of "competent organs"; thus, it is quite natural that the Congress of Russian Intelligentsia that took place on 27-28 November decided, together with the Glasnost Foundation, to hold a number of research conferences on the topic "The KGB—Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow."

The gigantic covert organization, which has in its ranks hundreds of thousands of the most active members of society, has at its disposal an enormous amount of property, hundreds of buildings and tens of thousands of other offices, modern equipment, armaments, and, if one is to believe its leadership, has very unclear goals, cannot fail to cause concern in Russian society and cannot fail to exert serious influence on the present and the future of the country. This is why in the "yesterday, today, and tomorrow" triad the emphasis was placed on the middle part: What is the KGB today and what is the special services' vision of the future of our country? The history of the "glorious organs" will be presented only to the extent needed to understand the present.

The changes taking place in society inevitably affected the special services community in Russia. Their composition did not change substantially, of course; it is also not very likely that the outlook and sympathies of its officers have changed; nevertheless, there is little doubt that the new conditions have produced new priorities.

For instance, there has been a dramatic increase in the direct participation of former and current KGB officers in various commercial organizations. It was only five years ago that active reserve officers were being implanted in all kinds of structures with the purpose of monitoring them—frequently in violation of the law. They are now joined by an increasing number of notable

special service officers, this time at their own initiative (as "physical persons"), setting up commercial enterprises or becoming executive directors of already existing ones.

Two interesting factors immediately come into play: first, not only do these commercial groups (including some very shady ones) have at their disposal state-of-the-art technical means to conduct surveillance, eavesdropping, etc. of their competitors and even government organizations—operational information gathered by government special services also ends up in private hands.

The second point is even more interesting, however. As is known, the KGB has always been not merely a very closed organization—it carefully cultivated a special atmosphere of corporate and family ties. Naturally, these horizontal ties remain in existence to this day, among the new members of commercial structures. Rumor has it that there are no vertical ties as yet. Could they emerge in the future, and how great is the network of already existing ties; what influence do they have on the situation in the country? These are just the very first questions that come to mind when one thinks about the changes taking place in Russian special services. Of course, one would like to have the answers to these and many other questions.

Since there are many such questions, and since the special services had penetrated and remain in place in all parts of the Russian state and society, the plan is to hold not one but at least four conferences. It is envisaged that the February conference will feature four specialized discussions: the KGB and religion; the KGB and East European and immediate neighboring countries; the KGB and problems of entry into and exit from Russia; the feasibility of state and public control over the KGB.

There will be a compendium published on each of these topics that will summarize the materials available in each area.

Subsequent conferences will include committees on the relationship between the special services and the mass media, the economy, medical science, public organizations, interethnic relations, the army (excluding the sphere of military secrets), archives, and many others. The third conference envisages a special, initially not closely related, direction proposed by one of the organizational committee members, Vyacheslav Ivanov. The topic of discussion (although we are predominantly concerned with domestic problems) will be an issue widely discussed in Western Europe and the United States: mutual reductions in intelligence activities, and laying down some framework of decency in this regard, without which a true atmosphere of trust in the world is simply not possible. Many Western politicians believe that uncontrollable intelligence activities are as dangerous as nuclear arms; that in the end this borders on terrorism and leads to the moral degradation of society; and that, like strategic arms, this needs to become a subject of international restrictions. I must say that with the exception of the Sakharov Congress, I probably cannot

recall such a remarkable, representative, and by-and-large capable organizational committee. It includes dissidents and statesmen, Supreme Soviet deputies and writers, journalists and scientists. It is currently comprised of 25 people: Ales Adamovich, Sergey Alekseyev, Genrikh Altunyan, Karishal Asanov, Vasil Bykov, Andrey Vorobyev, Pavel Gutiontov, Gennadiy Zhavoronkov, Tatyana Zaslavskaya, Nina Katerli, Yuriy Karyakin, Sergey Kovalyev, Yuriy Levada, Yuriy Orlov, Valentin Oskotskiy, Lagle Parek, Lev Ponomarev, Abdumannob Pulatov, Grigoriy Pomerants, Vasilii Selyunin, Galina Starovoytova, Yuriy Samodurov, Sergey Tushenkov, Anatoliy Shabad, Aleksandr Yakovlev, and Reverend Gleb Yakunin. It is important to list all the committee members in order to understand who is joining forces at this difficult time and why, and the diversity of people who have set themselves the same task.

Even more diverse, of course, will be the list of conference participants, which will also include representatives of all security services (past and present), prosecutors, scientists, public figures—people who truly stand on different sides of the barricade. It is not the organizational committee's purpose to express only its own opinion of the KGB: The conference should provide a forum for the confrontation of a wide variety of opinions and as a result assemble an objective and, to the extent possible, complete picture.

Still, the main task of our conferences is not research or accumulation of information on the activities of secret services. All this, including the process of preparation for the conference, is only a means towards accomplishing the main task—overcoming the fear, the all-encompassing paralyzing convulsion that has fettered all of us in our social development and prevents us from taking a step forward. We do not have to go far to produce examples. During conference preparations Aleksandr Yakovlev related how at the time he was a Politburo member both he and his colleagues used to rush to adopt without discussion whatever the KGB leadership presented: "Who knows what is on their mind and what they are capable of." The last chairman of the RSFSR KGB, Viktor Ivanenko, speaking of the law on security—this time Russia's—made this remark about ministers and deputies: "Of course they realize that not everything in it is the way it should be, but generally they are afraid to argue." Actually, at the intelligentsia congress as well, when the topic of the KGB came up, the audience at first reacted guardedly, froze in surprise—and, let us be frank, fear—but nevertheless made a decision to go ahead with the conferences.

We believe that this should be a model for societal behavior, especially considering that not everything is all that sweet for members of the special services, either. On one hand, everybody understands that in the memorable 1991 they were just an inch away from having the Lubyanka demolished and mob rule take over in a most brutal way. No machine guns would have helped, that is for certain; on the contrary, if anything it would have made the massacre even worse. On the other hand,

orders have been issued again in their own community regarding criminal direct contacts with known agents of enemy special services—and of course we all remember all too well who in the USSR and Russia used to be called agents of special services. Honestly, a law on vetting which, on one hand, would limit the special services' influence on the state apparatus, while on the other provide certain safety guarantees for the activities of the "former" in other endeavors, seems so much more attractive than a game of Russian roulette, where the bet is always a life—one's own or someone else's.

Sergey Ivanovich Grigoryants (born in 1941) is a well-known human rights activist. He studied at the Department of Journalism of Moscow State University, from which he was expelled in 1968 at the insistence of the KGB. Twice—from 1975 to 1980 and from 1983 to 1987—he served prison terms for political activities. In 1982-1983 he published the information bulletin "V" which reported on violations of human rights in the USSR. He was rehabilitated in 1992. He is currently a publisher and editor in chief of the Glasnost Information Agency.

Unions Appeal for Russian-Ukrainian Cooperation on Economy

934A0634A Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA* in Russian
15 Jan 93 p 1

[Unattributed item: "Time for Thought? There Is None Left"]

[Text] **Appeal of the unions of industrialists and entrepreneurs of Russia and Ukraine to the presidents and prime ministers of the Russian Federation and Ukraine.**

We appeal to you, the leaders of our countries, with an insistent request to initiate concrete and decisive measures to restore business economic relations, resolve the severe economic crisis in Russia and Ukraine, and halt the drop in production and the decline in the living standard of the people.

There is not a single person in our countries today who is not feeling the disastrous consequences of the break in economic and financial ties, the friction between banking systems and the customs war. One of the advantages of economic life—specialization and cooperation in production, is being destroyed in the pursuit of illusory political goals. Without them the industrial potential is condemned to isolation and ruin.

To industrialists and entrepreneurs that is alien and unacceptable. We know very well that there can be no victors in such a contentious situation. It greatly harms our people.

In the dramatic situation that has been created we are appealing with the demand for wisdom and foresight and the creation of real mechanisms for economic integration ensuring fulfillment of bilateral economic agreements. We are referring to:

Restoration of disrupted economic ties between Russian and Ukrainian enterprises;

Agreement on coordinated actions to solve the energy crisis;

Fastest possible restoration of banking systems to a viable state, ensuring mutual payments;

Elimination of artificial obstacles in licensing, setting of quotas in deliveries, and customs barriers;

Restoration of shipments of products under subcontracting arrangements.

Without this many of the still operating enterprises will grind to a halt, conveyers will be stilled, blast furnaces will be extinguished, and transportation will be paralyzed. Agriculture and food production will be deprived of their technical and material base. It is not difficult to imagine the consequences. Even today the mood of labor collectives is turning rather ugly.

You were elected by two great nations and bear responsibility for their fate. It is time to reject attempts to

determine who is more important. Today there is still time. Tomorrow, it may be too late.

The strength of our great nations was always nurtured by close fraternal relations and traditions. Therefore the call of individual circles for hostility, and a military, particularly a nuclear, confrontation is clear provocation by political adventurers.

Every sovereign state, every nation, has the right to choose its own path of development. National wealth, however, is always created with the hands of the toilers, while heads of state and governments are obligated to promote that. Industrialists and entrepreneurs, for their part, are prepared to set an example of constructive cooperation to the good of our nations.

Ukraine 'Dissatisfied' With Oil Agreement

934K0032A Moscow *NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA*
in Russian 16 Jan 93 pp 1, 3

[Reports by Vitaliy Portnikov and Vera Kuznetsova: "Russian-Ukrainian Relations Against the Background of the Oil Crisis: Western Creditors Have Come to Moscow To Receive Their Debts"]

[Text] The long journeyings (on account of the weather) of the aircraft of Leonid Kravchuk, president of Ukraine, around Moscow's airports (the airplane initially at emptied to land at Vnukovo-2, then was redirected to Sheremetyevo, and ultimately found an opportunity to land at Domodedovo) reflect, as it were, the complex line of development of Russian-Ukrainian relations, which may be changed by the meeting of the presidents of the two countries in the Kremlin. It was hard to say how successful the meeting of Boris Yeltsin and Leonid Kravchuk could be. Kravchuk spoke quite optimistically with the journalists who greeted him, but it was already clear that Kravchuk was going to the Kremlin to negotiate very serious matters. And that the views of the Ukrainian president differed inordinately from those of his Moscow partners. Thus, as distinct from Russia, which has been attempting of late to act as the convener of the countries of the Commonwealth into some new confederal formation (a guarantee of this could be the CIS Charter to be signed at the coming meeting of leaders of the Commonwealth in Minsk), the president of Ukraine proposed the signing of two documents, which would regulate the status of countries which are members of the Commonwealth (these documents, as Kravchuk intends, differ appreciably from the quite rigid provisions of the charter).

Kravchuk was clearly dissatisfied with the results of the negotiations between Prime Minister Leonid Kuchma and Viktor Chernomyrdin. He was probably hoping for an agreement with President Boris Yeltsin concerning supplies of energy to Ukraine—mainly for an increase in the oil quota. This purely economic matter could influence the political accord between the leaders of the two countries. The delegations, on the other hand, discussed the text of a communique between Russia and Ukraine,

but this solemn text will very much depend on the verbal agreement of the leaders and on the other documents prepared for this meeting.

[Signed] Vitaliy Portnikov

Face-to-face negotiations between the presidents of Ukraine and Russia, Leonid Kravchuk and Boris Yeltsin, began at 1430 yesterday in the Kremlin's Catherine Room. After this round, the presidents appeared with long faces. Several minutes later an enlarged meeting of the delegations of the two republics, which include the prime ministers, defense ministers, and foreign ministers of both sides, began.

In the package of documents prepared for this meeting the main ones may be termed the accords on supplies from Russia of oil to Ukraine (Ukraine claimed 40 million tonnes, but, as far as is known, Russia can supply only one-fourth) and also on the legitimization of Ukraine's nonnuclear status (it is a question of Ukraine's ratification of the START I Treaty). As was learned from the president of Russia's press office, the parties had by 1700 gathered to sign merely the joint communique, which contains no precise agreements on these two issues.

Yesterday, on the other hand, Presidents Yeltsin and Kravchuk signed an order on the appointment of Vice Admiral Eduard Baltin, head of a department of the Navy General Staff Academy, as commander of the joint Black Sea Fleet.

It was suddenly learned yesterday that the chairmen of the London and Paris clubs of creditors had come to Moscow for settlement of the question of payment of the foreign debt by Ukraine and Russia—former republics of the USSR. As Vice Premier Aleksandr Shokhin said, two hours after the signing of the documents by Yeltsin and Kravchuk, the government delegations would be negotiating the mechanism of adjustment of responsibility for the USSR's external debt. Shokhin explained: "Ukraine advocates separate service of its foreign debt. This suits us. But it is doubtful whether this will suit the London and Paris clubs. We would like, therefore, to have a meeting together with them and hear their opinion. It has not as yet been possible to reach agreement on succession in terms of the foreign debt. There is a second version of a solution of the problem, which would suit Russia—when Ukraine transfers to our republic the rights to administer the foreign debt payments."

One further sensation of the day was the joint agreement signed by the premiers of Ukraine and Russia, Viktor Chernomyrdin and Leonid Kuchma, on oil. Chernomyrdin termed as the ceiling of Russia's present possibilities 20 million tonnes of oil which it could make available to Ukraine. Boris Yeltsin added to this that if Ukraine helped Russia revitalize certain moribund wells, the entire oil from them would go to Kiev. But none of these efforts are satisfactory to Ukraine.

Boris Yeltsin announced on this evening one further sensational fact: Inasmuch as the question of oil was the most difficult at the negotiations, he explained that so complex a situation had arisen on account of the fact that the Government of Russia was anticipating a decline in the production of oil of 45 million tonnes.

In the joint communique signed by the presidents of the two republics Ukraine confirmed its former political statements on its nonnuclear status. In addition, it promised to subscribe to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and in the next few months to ratify the START I Treaty. Ukraine supported the START II Treaty also.

[Signed] Vera Kuznetsova

Conference To Probe Role of Security Bodies

PM2201150193 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI
in Russian 20 Jan 93 p 2

[Interview with Sergey Grigoryants, chairman of the "Glasnost" Foundation and chairman of the organizing committee of conference on "The KGB: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow," by Viktor Romanchin; place, date not given: "Is the KGB Alive and Well?"—first three paragraphs are ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI introduction]

[Text] The KGB, that powerful secret organization, was for many decades a symbol of the former Union's secret power over its citizens. At times it seemed that our every step and every shift in our thoughts immediately became known to it...

Times have changed, as has the organization's name; it has become more open, but has it changed in essence? What is hidden behind the iron curtain? The conference "The KGB: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow," which the Congress of the Russian Intelligentsia and the "Glasnost" Foundation are holding, will help to answer these questions.

Our correspondent met with Sergey Grigoryants, the well known defender of human rights, chairman of the "Glasnost" Foundation, and chairman of the conference's organizing committee.

[Grigoryants] The Congress of the Russian Intelligentsia and the "Glasnost" Foundation made a joint decision to hold this conference. What interests us is not so much this powerful, secret structure's past as how the secret services live and what they do today. This is the main object of our investigation. Turning to the KGB's past activities should really help us to understand better to what degree our future depends on this organization. But this does not mean that we will basically be digging out facts which show unsavory aspects of the secret services' activities. Our task is to do something else—to attempt to understand one of the most influential organizations and one of the most important state mechanisms with a great influence on society.

We will have to investigate many topics of current interest. Therefore the conference will take place in several stages. The first stage will examine such issues as "The KGB and Religion," "The KGB and Eastern Europe," "Opportunities for the Government and Society To Exercise Control Over the KGB," and "The KGB: Entering and Leaving Russia and Other Foreign States."

The second stage in May will shed light on more complex issues: "The KGB and the Mass Media," "The KGB and the Economy," and "The KGB and Public Organizations." We plan to hold the last conference in December.

Among the people we are trying to get to participate in the conference are former and current leaders and staffers of the security bodies. Ivanenko and Kalugin have given their consent to take part in the discussion, and Bakatin may also participate. Negotiations have taken place and we already have the consent of representatives of the former Union republics to take part in the conference. The present Estonian minister of internal affairs and representatives of the Ukrainian security services will come to the conference. Representatives of the Central Asian states who in their time suffered at the hands of the security bodies have also been included in the conference's organizing committee.

We hope that the present leaders of the Security Ministry will also not refuse to take part in the discussion.

[Romanchin] What is the conference's aim and what result do you expect to obtain?

[Grigoryants] I have already said that the conference is investigatory in nature. It is important to understand correctly who and what we are dealing with. The result will be to make the organization more open. This is a result in which I hope not only society but also the security bodies themselves have an interest.

The KGB really is changing at the moment, and not only in name. Having said that, it cannot be said with certainty that the security bodies are changing in the precise manner about which there is such assiduous propaganda in the mass media. At the moment a process of the weakening of state power is under way, but you cannot be sure that a parallel process of the weakening of security bodies is also under way. This organization, in our view, on the contrary, is becoming more autonomous and less controllable. All these serious problem should also become the subject of a painstaking investigation.

[Romanchin] Is the timing of the conference linked to a sense that we are at a dangerous time?

[Grigoryants] You are absolutely right. We are in a great hurry to hold the first stage of the conference, we are trying to begin it as soon as possible. It is necessary to attract the closest attention to this organization. While it has undergone a name change, its basis remains unchanged: This is still a secret organization active on its own country's territory.

What is more, in recent times the danger has appeared that new, hard-to-control structures capable of resolving on an informal basis serious problems which are important to the country as a whole will be created from former staffers of the security bodies. These people have immense financial and organizational potential. When leaving the bodies they as a rule try to retain not only their service identity cards but also their official weapons. They are hundreds of thousands of society's most active members, and their aims are not clear to us. It is very likely that their interests do not coincide with those of the rest of society.

[Romanchin] Will the conference be able to exert a significant influence on the security bodies' future work?

[Grigoryants] We are not setting ourselves such a general target. Our task is to investigate the secret services' activities and to make many aspects of their work public knowledge. Security forces should exist as a mechanism under the law. They should not have a terrible and mystical aura.

You cannot say that these bodies are completely unnecessary. Having said that, this organization must not be oppressive and all-embracing. For example, the entire third department of the czarist secret service [okhrana] contained 52 people for the whole of Russia, and funds were allocated for the hire of one secret agent. This naturally bears no comparison to the present structure of the security bodies. There should also be real mechanisms for exerting control over this monster.

Russian Aid to Tkvarcheli Residents

934A0661A Moscow TRUD in Russian 21 Jan 93 p 1

[Article by Igor Chernov: "Will the Residents of Tkvarcheli Be Saved?"]

[Text] Work was begun in Sochi yesterday by a governmental commission that will coordinate the actions of all services engaged in a large-scale humanitarian operation to save the residents of the Abkhazian city of Tkvarcheli. The commission is headed by B. Shamov, deputy chairman of the state committee of Russia on emergency situations.

As has already been reported, Tkvarcheli has been blockaded. All roads to this mining city are blocked by Georgian guardsmen, but Tkvarcheli itself is being held by Abkhaz people's volunteers. After the start of the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict, the population of the city grew by several times. Thousands of refugees made their way here from villages of the Abkhazia rayons of Ochamchirskiy and Gulripshskiy rayons. According to data of the Supreme Soviet of Abkhazia, there are now more than 40,000 people in Tkvarcheli, mainly women, old men, and children. With the arrival of winter, a critical

situation developed in the city—there are no lights, water, and heat. But what is most important, there is no food. Until 14 December, Russian helicopters brought food products into Tkvarcheli, but after an Mi-8 helicopter with refugees was shot down in the area of the village of Lata, flights to Tkvarcheli were stopped. True, in the first days of January, one helicopter got through to the besieged city, but it was literally attacked by a crowd yearning to get out of this hell, and the helicopter was broken. The other day, one more attempt was made to fly into Tkvarcheli: The helicopter came under fire and made a forced landing...

In short, if at least part of the population is not moved out of Tkvarcheli in the next few days, people will die of starvation. And they are already dying. As I was informed by Nodar Khashba, the deputy chairman of the government of Abkhazia, more than 30 residents of Tkvarcheli have died from starvation...

On 19 January, a directive of the Russian Government came out concerning rendering humanitarian assistance to the population of the blockaded Abkhazian city. As was reported at the first meeting of the governmental

commission, a load of humanitarian assistance (flour, canned food, various cereals, sugar, and other products) was delivered to Sochi. Several tonnes of foodstuffs will be transported to Tkvarcheli on Mi-8 and Mi-6 helicopters that are marked with red crosses on the sides. These same helicopters will fly out about 5,000 refugees from Tkvarcheli.

However, the operation has been delayed for an indefinite time. A pertinent note from Georgia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in which the Georgian side is supposed to give guarantees for the safe movement of helicopters over the territory controlled by its troops, had not yet arrived during the day yesterday. Boris Pastukhov, the deputy minister of foreign affairs of Russia, worked on the coordination of all questions in Tbilisi. It is known that he met with Eduard Shevardnadze and received a verbal OK from the head of Georgia to conduct the humanitarian operation. Now, everyone is waiting for written confirmation of the Georgian leader's words.

And last. The action planned for the next few days to save the residents of Tkvarcheli will take place under the aegis of the United Nations Organization.

POLITICAL AFFAIRS

Referendum Struggle Viewed

Yeltsin Begins Referendum Campaign

934C0726A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 12 Jan 93 p 1

[Article by Yevgeniy Krasnikov, with introduction by V.T., under the general heading: "Tactical Steps by Yeltsin Bring Forth Tendentious Interpretations: However, Things Are Not All That Simple Under the Stars of the Kremlin"]

[Text] A tendentious interpretation of the latest tactical steps taken by Boris Yeltsin, particularly the rearrangement of his entourage, clearly shines through in the version of the president's preparations for the spring referendum outlined below.

First of all, the role of Gennadiy Burbulis as the supposed head of the "headquarters" preparing for the referendum is clearly exaggerated. Quite reliable sources maintain that Burbulis has nothing whatsoever to do with either the "headquarters" (in which Mikhail Poltoranin is playing the lead for now) or the referendum. Burbulis seriously intends to establish the international research center "21st Century Strategy" on the basis of "RF Politics" soon, and he left Yeltsin on his own initiative (or mainly on his own initiative).

It is clear that just one scenario, that of confrontation with the Congress and the Supreme Soviet, whether on account of the referendum or other issues, cannot be unambiguously played out within the president's staff. This is also confirmed by the intention of the president to establish an institution of his special representatives for coordination with representative organs at the levels of both the Federation and the oblasts.

Of course, reforms in the president's team testify to a regrouping of the forces on the eve of forthcoming conflicts between the Supreme Soviet and the president, as well as those within the government (the latter are already occurring).

Nonetheless, the version being published is interesting because, as it interprets the events in a particular manner, it gives us an idea of the political struggle under the skies of the Kremlin.

The Last Argument of the President: Boris Yeltsin Begins a Campaign in Favor of the Referendum and Against the Congress

Version

Having decided not to dismiss legislative power and assert a presidential republic in December of last year, Boris Yeltsin and his closest comrades-in-arms nonetheless did not give up this intention. However, they are now trying to achieve the same objective in a "softer" and almost constitutional manner.

The "Yeltsinists" are pinning their main hopes on a constitutional referendum scheduled for April, which, in their opinion, should result in the dissolution of the Congress, the parliament, and the establishment of presidential rule in Russia "de facto," if not "de jure." All this follows quite evidently from material concerning the operation of the president's staff which was received by a NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA correspondent from representatives of the Union for the Rebirth of Russia (SVR) and verified in the Kremlin offices on high.

The material indicates that a "headquarters" has been fully formed by now in order to hold a referendum desirable for the president. Gennadiy Burbulis, who organized the efforts to elect Boris Yeltsin a people's deputy of the USSR and Russia in 1989 and 1990 is, of course, the unofficial chief of the headquarters.

In addition to Burbulis, Aleksey Golovkov, former chief of the government staff, Yuriy Boldyrev, chief of the Control and Auditing Directorate of the administration of the president, First Deputy Minister of Justice Vladimir Varov, Aleksandr Sobyenin, chief of the "RF Politics" center, Aleksandr Muzykantskiy, prefect of the Central District of Moscow, a number of employees of the president's staff, and his local representatives also belong to the headquarters.

The headquarters is housed on the third and fourth floors of the Control and Auditing Directorate in order to provide access to government communications. A number of premises in the Kremlin, and the buildings of the parliament, the government, and the State Legal Directorate have also been transferred to the headquarters. As materials intercepted by SVR intelligence, which the NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA correspondent had an opportunity to familiarize himself with, suggest, the "RF Politics" center will perform the "agitation and propaganda" functions for the headquarters. To this end, the center has been reinforced with Mikhail Poltoranin and Sergey Shakhrai. The headquarters will begin operations as early as this week. Its planned immediate undertakings include "getting a feel" for the positions of various parties and movements with regard to their attitude toward submitting to a referendum the "presidential wordings" on the dissolution of the Congress and the parliament. If the circumstances are quite favorable, Democratic Russia will shortly receive instructions from the headquarters to organize a demonstration in Moscow in support of the president and the referendum.

A series of articles on the vital necessity of the referendum should be published in leading newspapers through Mikhail Poltoranin's Federal Information Center. The expected slogan is "The Fate of the Referendum Is the Fate of Reforms."

It is proposed to eliminate the possible objections by the opponents of the referendum, to the effect that it may bring about a number of republics seceding from Russia, by way of publishing at the beginning of February an appeal by the heads of the republics of Russia and

autonomous entities in which they come out in favor of holding the referendum. The supporters of the president count on the heads of republics calling for a repeat election of the entire corps of deputies in the same document. In return for this service they have been promised a maximum of autonomy and independence from the center.

In January vigorous work on preparing the Constituent Assembly should also begin. A dual role is assigned to it: In the event Yeltsin wins the referendum it should pass a new, "presidential constitution." In the event of a referendum defeat or its failure, the Constituent Assembly should present a visible alternative to the "Red-and-Brownshirt" Congress which is ready to take power at any moment.

In other words, a different edition of "10 December" is now being prepared, and this time it should be sure fire. However, the difficulties along this path are many. For example, it is extremely important for "Yeltsinists" to strengthen their influence in three "coercive" ministries (the Ministries of Security, Defense, and Internal Affairs). To this end it is planned to carry out a partial purge in the ministries. In addition, it is planned to mount an extensive ideological effort in these ministries through radical deputies. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has not been ignored either. As the staff members of the Russian embassies in the United States and Germany report, they have been instructed to bring the necessary pressure to bear on Yeltsin in order to prevent Kozyrev's dismissal.

The dismissal of Yuriy Petrov from the post of head of the administration of the president provided clear-cut evidence that Yeltsin and his entourage are geared toward a "hard" scenario of events. As is known, Petrov prompted Yeltsin to seek a compromise with centrist forces. Besides, the leaders of the Civic Union tried to inform the president about their views and proposals concerning current political issues through Petrov. In addition, Petrov was "guilty" of trying to talk Yeltsin out of making his presentation on 10 December.

Certainly not only the president but also the parliament is preparing for a new round of struggle. Strange as it may be, Yeltsin himself noticeably strengthened parliament's position by signing the Russian-American START 2 treaty. After all, for this document to take effect it must be ratified by the Supreme Soviet. Therefore, the president, who had sought for so long to sign this agreement, will not dissolve the Supreme Soviet until that time.

This is why the deputies expect to delay discussion of the treaty as much as possible and postpone its ratification until the spring. However, the Eighth Congress of People's Deputies may become the main "secret" weapon of legislative power. As some parliamentary leaders believe, it should be held on the eve of the referendum, between 22 and 25 March, rather than in April, in order to rubberstamp the results of the referendum.

In this case the Congress, as the supreme power in the state, will confirm the only possible version of the theses for holding the referendum (they will obviously be of a most general and conflict-free nature), thus preventing the submission of the president's version concerning the dissolution of legislative power to the referendum.

Referendum Campaign Seen as Militarized

934C0726B Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 12 Jan 93 p 3

[Article by Tatyana Malkina and Vladimir Todres under the general heading "Tactical Steps by Yeltsin Bring Forth Tendentious Interpretations: However, Things Are Not All That Simple Under the Stars of the Kremlin"]

[Text]

The Last Argument of the President

It is interesting to what degree our reality is becoming militarized, given that as early as the beginning of January the intelligence service of the Union for the Rebirth of Russia intercepted government documents.

While we consider the vocabulary to be the responsibility of the SVR, which is well-versed in the science of style, we should nonetheless note a number of inaccuracies and point out some interpretations which are altogether without proof.

It may be due to either SVR intelligence agents being negligent, or the presidential headquarters already having its own counterintelligence. However, at the very least an "agitation and propaganda department" for the referendum, personified by the "RF Politics" center, does not exist. Unfortunately for the center, it has been neither "reinforced" with Shakhray and Poltoranin nor headed by Aleksey Sobyenin.

Yuriy Petrov, who, in the opinion of the SVR, has been punished by the uncompromising Yeltsin for his inclination to compromise, is now selflessly at work in his old office in the Kremlin (in the absence of his antipode Burbulis). Apparently, Petrov is trying to make up for the "black box" situation, which was awkward for the president.

In the process, unity in combat is not apparent in the echelons of executive power itself. While Boris Yeltsin continues to pledge allegiance to the radical course, Viktor Chernomyrdin prefers, just as NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA has warned, to remain "his own man," and view his current fief, the Cabinet of Ministers, as a large oil and gas complex. Aleksey Golovkov, chief of the government staff—the "shadow of Gennadiy Burbulis in the government"—was removed from Old Square on 10 December by a special edict. The name of the new chief is Vladimir Kvasov. For now, a quite impressive service record is his most remarkable feature: The last 20 years of his life have been associated with the Ministry of the Gas Industry in one way or another.

After working for more than 10 years in the Mostransgaz and Soyuztranspodzemgaz associations, Kvasov transferred to the staff of the USSR Council of Ministers in 1978, and headed the Secretariat of the government in 1991, under Nikolay Ryzhkov. Kvasov survived "Gaydar's time" in Chernomyrdin's Gazprom concern.

Muscovites Polled on Referendum Intentions

PM2001170993 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
19 Jan 93 p 4

[Report by Nugzar Betaneli, director of the Institute of the Sociology of Parliamentarianism: "Majority of Muscovites Intend To Take Part in Referendum"]

[Text] The independent Institute of the Sociology of Parliamentarianism has held a routine weekly poll of 1,000 Muscovites commissioned by ITA. Here is what a comparative analysis showed:

After the brief New Year lull Russia's domestic political life seems again to have started to develop according to the usual scenario: The economic crisis is deepening, the people are growing poorer, and politicians are discussing what kind of power Russia needs. But what about the people themselves? For instance, with whom do Muscovites link their hopes of Russia emerging from the economic crisis? There are no sensations here: Like last year, nearly 39 percent of those polled pin their hopes on no one and others find it hard to name anyone. One in five has hopes for the entrepreneurs, a further 21 percent have hopes for the Russian president, 14 percent for the country's government, 7 percent for the Supreme Soviet and Congress of People's Deputies, and the remaining 3-4 percent for political parties and movements, legal power, and the mass media. All these priorities, however, do not signify the opportunity for the one-sided strengthening of any one power, structure, or force.

Many people are dissatisfied with the activity of the legislative organs. The poll showed that today 8 percent of those polled are satisfied with the work of the Russian Supreme Soviet, 70 percent are dissatisfied, 9 percent know nothing about its activity, and 13 percent find it hard to say. But that does not mean that voters unanimously advocate weakening the institution of legislative power in the country. The poll showed that only 36 percent of Muscovites support the idea of strengthening presidential power in Russia and weakening the power of the Soviets, 21 percent do not support the idea, 7 percent know nothing about it, 9 percent are not worried at all by the problem, and 27 percent find it hard to say. There are several possible reasons for that. Today only 31 percent of Muscovites (on 10 December the figure was 40 percent) believe that B.N. Yeltsin will achieve success and lead Russia out of the crisis to new presidential elections in 1996 while 53 percent do not believe it (in December the figure was 44 percent) and 16 percent find it hard to say.

One more reason is that voters do not want to hand over power to any "single pair of hands" and none of the

present authorities enjoys unconditional trust: In the opinion of 87 percent of Muscovites there is a "dual morality" in Russia's political life whereby politicians say and promise one thing but think and do another, 2 percent disagree with this, and 11 percent find it hard to say.

A feature of present political life is that voters, to all appearances, do not want to lose control over the situation. Politicians are now discussing questions of the future referendum and 44 percent of Muscovites firmly intend to take part in the April nationwide discussion and a further 10 percent think that "they will most likely take part." At the same time 8 percent will "most likely" "not take part in the referendum" and 22 percent of those polled will certainly not take part while 16 percent find it hard to state their position.

In contrast to the all-Russian referendum, the possible election of the mayor of Moscow has fewer supporters: the number of those who believe it essential to elect a new mayor of Moscow has declined from 30 percent in September to 23 percent in January and the number of "opponents" of this idea has increased from 39 to 47 percent while 30 percent find it hard to say. If the elections are held then present Mayor Yu.M. Luzhkov has certain chances of winning. Today 26 percent of Muscovites (in September the figure was 15 percent, in October 19 percent) are prepared to vote for him while a further 26 percent would prefer to vote for some other candidate but do not yet know who. One percent of those polled intends to vote for specific candidates (nine names were cited), 21 percent do not intend to vote at all, and 26 percent find it hard to determine their position. Yu.M. Luzhkov's possible chances of being elected are confirmed by the fact that the present mayor's personal rating has increased from 28 percent in September to 34 percent in January.

Actually, the election situation could be further complicated by the "pile" of other unresolved problems. In the assessment of 14 percent of Muscovites today the Moscow City Hall is concerned most effectively for their living conditions. The capital's other organs of power and management have received fewer "votes": The Moscow City Soviet received 3 percent, the prefecture 1 percent, municipal districts 3 percent, while 6 percent of Muscovites believe they "are all equally concerned." But at the same time (take note!) 50 percent of those polled believe that "no one is concerned for Muscovites' living conditions."

Yeltsin-Rutskoy Relationship Viewed

MK1901152993 Moscow KOMMERSANT in Russian
No 2, 11-17 Jan 93 p 2

[Vladimir Kulistikov article under "Political Vector" rubric: "Will Aleksandr Rutskoy Succeed in Falling Out With Boris Yeltsin?"]

[Text] In the West the most serious political actions are talked about in the men's room, while in our country

(evidently because of the unsanitary condition of the latter) there is no better place for this than the Kremlin. The event of the week—the meeting between President Boris Yeltsin and Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoy—occurred there 12 January. It was preceded by a month-long rupture in relations between this pair. The president was unable to forgive his vice president both for his speeches at the Congress and his intimate conversation with Viktor Chernomyrdin regarding the government's composition, which prompted Yeltsin to curtail his trip to China. For a whole month the most gloomy forecasts have been discussed in Rutskoy's entourage. People have been saying that the vice president will be left without specific powers and that his brief to supervise the fight against crime and the leisurely pace of agrarian reform will be taken from him. Finally, people have suspected that a scandal with Rutskoy's name in the thick of it will break out (something criminal-commercial) and force the recalcitrant one to resign.

Maybe that is what would have happened had it not been for Sergey Shakhrai and Viktor Ilyushin. To spite those who believe that Yeltsin has no intelligent advisers left, they persuaded the president to curtail the second break in relations with the vice president (the first lasted from October 1991 through February 1992 and is associated with the Gennadiy Burbulis intrigue). They put persuasive arguments to Yeltsin, who is actively preparing for a possible clash at the extraordinary presidential and parliamentary elections: Why make an enemy? Is it not better to envelop the prodigal vice president in embraces and crush him thereby?

The arguments worked, and in the evening of the self-same 12 January Rutskoy arrived at an unofficial conference with Civic Union's leader and was, according to the impression of eyewitnesses, "treated with kindness and confused by it." The kindness sprang from the president's promise "to be together until the end," and, to ensure that the bitterness of the month-long disfavor was forgotten as quickly as possible, to meet weekly. Evidently the confusion stemmed from an understanding of several factors. First, that the kindness would not last longer than was necessary to the president. Furthermore, as long as it lasts it removes Rutskoy's freedom to maneuver (*perekryvayet vozdukh samomu Rutskomu*): No matter whether the elections take place this year or next year he will have to be Yeltsin's running-mate. And the Civic Union has to either find another leader instead of the loyal Rutskoy or reconcile itself to a role of being an eternal trace-horse (*pristyazhnaya*) in the presidential harness—along with the "Democratic Choice" shaft-horse (*korennik*). With which, incidentally, Yeltsin thought it necessary to consult regarding preparation for the referendum last Thursday [14 January]. In general, unless Rutskoy succeeds in falling out with the president, he will leave himself and his supporters without a political future.

But "without a future" does not mean "without money." The return of the president's kindness could turn into a sharp increase of lobbying potential for the Civic Union.

Rutskoy has already promised the Union's leaders a meeting that is quite legal in the new conditions with Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, who has long sympathized with them secretly. The opportunities of "going to the top" in this way will increase the gravitation toward the centrists on the part of entrepreneurs, who will not be tight-fisted with donations for the bloc's party coffers.

Meanwhile, new eyes in the anti-Yeltsin typhoon have been revealed in the Supreme Soviet, which started work last week. The desire of certain deputies displayed at the 14 January morning session to bring presidential Agit-prop Chief Mikhail Poltoranin to book for abusing the speaker and deputies showed that the president's intention to bring the entire might of the propaganda machine to bear on his adversaries did not go unnoticed. But the main trouble for Yeltsin is coming from foreign policy. Since most deputies acquired their university education from lectures on the international situation attended in workshop, field, or laboratory, each of them is fully entitled to consider himself a specialist in this sphere.

The START-2 Treaty has gotten through its dry run in parliamentary committees and commissions, and Ruslan Khasbulatov's threat to approve it only after meticulous study came true. Communists and patriots are feverishly counting warheads and tackling the little problem of what will reach the target more quickly: a U.S. submarine-launched missile or a Russian ground-launched missile. Whereas the pragmatists, who can still be encountered in various factions, complain that the "nuclear card"—the last card Russia has left—has been played too unskillfully; once again nothing has been obtained in return.

A lament over Russia's lost greatness also broke out this week concerning the events in Iraq. It is being claimed in diplomatic circles that the Americans informed the Russians of the strike against the indomitable Saddam only half an hour before the start of the second "Desert Storm." Of course, it can be tolerated when "my friend George" does something wrong, but here is the pity: It was this week that Moscow wanted to play its own game in the Persian Gulf region. Igor Melekhov, deputy chief of the Russian Foreign Ministry Near East Administration, was due to depart for Baghdad 17 January—to give a briefing on the situation and mediate in contacts with the West. But Washington did not want to play—and the game did not take place.

Saddam received a lesson but survived. Generally men with big mustaches—both heroes and villains—are stubborn and courageous people who thirst for struggle and victories. There are, as we saw for ourselves during the week, exceptions.

Congress Decree on Constitutional Stabilization Reviewed, Candidates for Prime Minister of Factions Named

934C0735A Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian
15 Dec 93 p 11

[Congress of People's Deputies decree: "On Stabilization of the Russian Federation Constitutional Order"]

[Text] Participating in the coordinating meeting of the three branches of power held on 12 December were Boris Yeltsin, Ruslan Khasbulatov, Valeriy Zorkin, Yegor Gaydar, Mikhail Nikolayev (president of Yakutiya), Viktor Stepanov (chairman of the Karelian Supreme Soviet), Yuriy Yarov (deputy chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet), Sergey Shakhrai (vice-premier), Yuriy Skokov (secretary of the Security Council), Nikolay Ryabov (chairman of the Supreme Soviet Council of the Republic), Vladimir Shorin (chairman of the Supreme Soviet Committee on Science and Public Education), Pavel Grachev (Minister of Defense), Yuriy Guskov (chairman of the Arkhangelskiy Oblast Soviet), Anatoly Tyazhlov (head of administration of Moscow Oblast), and Nikolay Travkin (Russian people's deputy). Based on the results of the meeting, the congress adopted the resolution, "On Stabilization of the Russian Federation Constitutional Order." The document, which was put to a roll call vote, was supported by 541 deputies, with 98 voting against it.

1. An all-Russian referendum on basic principles of the new constitution shall be scheduled for 11 April 1993. The Supreme Soviet shall be assigned the task of ratifying the text of the draft of the basic principles to be presented for referendum, coordinated with the president and the Constitutional Court. In case agreement is not reached on individual formulations, they shall be submitted for alternative voting. The draft shall be forwarded to the subjects of the federation. The Federative Agreement is subject to inclusion in the new constitution. The draft of the basic principles must be published no later than 31 March 1993.

2. Point 19, Article 109 of the constitution referring to stopping the action of presidential edicts and decrees by the Supreme Soviet; Article 110 referring to granting the right of legislative initiative to the Council of Ministers, and Article 121-6 of the constitution referring to immediate cessation of the powers and authorities of the president shall not become effective until the referendum is held.

3. The Supreme Soviet shall not accept for review any amendments submitted as a legislative initiative which violate the balance of legislative, executive and judicial power which has been established.

4. Prior to adoption of the new constitution, no elections of judges shall be held for the remaining vacancies within the Constitutional Court.

5. The decision of the congress regarding introduction of amendments to the law, "On the Referendum of the Russian Federation," shall be considered as no longer effective.

6. The paragraph in part II of the congress decree, "On Heads of Administration," referring to early cessation of the powers and authorities of the head of administration, shall not go into effect prior to elections of peoples deputies of the Soviets of the new convocation.

7. The President of Russia, on the basis of consultations with representatives of the subjects of the federation and the deputy factions, shall submit on 14 December 1992 to the congress for a ratings vote several candidates for the office of chairman of the Russian Council of Ministers. The president shall submit for approval by the congress one of the three candidacies which by the results of voting have received the greatest number of votes. If a candidate is not elected by the congress, the president shall appoint an acting chairman of the Council of Ministers for the period until the 8th Congress.

8. From the moment of adoption of the resolution, the appeal of the president and the appeal of the congress to the people of Russia lose their force.

9. None of the statutes in points 1-8 of the decree may act independently.

At the beginning of the morning session, the congress decree, "On the Status of Legality and the Struggle Against Crime and Corruption" was adopted, which contains, specifically, the following principles.

In the first half of 1993, the Supreme Soviet shall:

eliminate the contradictions in the existing legislation which may be used for illegal purposes;

establish responsibility for public appeals for violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the federation;

propose to the president prior to 1 February 1993 that he submit for review by the Supreme Soviet a report on the provision of security of the Russian Federation and measures for strengthening the fight against crime.

At the morning meeting, the congress adopted an appeal to the parliaments of the independent states—the former USSR republics.


The appeal contains a proposal to the parliaments of the states and to the Interparliamentary Assembly of the Commonwealth member states to review the question of creating a confederation or other form of association of independent states of Europe and Asia.

At the evening session, the congress adopted a resolution on the interpretation of individual principles of the decree on stabilization of the constitutional order, adopted on Saturday.

In the document adopted yesterday, it was noted that this interpretation is not directed toward a change in the meaning of the congress decree, "On Stabilization of the Russian Federation Constitutional Order."

Candidates nominated by factions to post of prime minister

Кандидатуры выдвинутые фракциями, на пост премьер-министров



примечание: фракция "Смена-Новая" политика" своего кандидата не выдвигала

Key: 1 - Yemelyanov; 2 - Kravchenko; 3 - Filippov; 4 - Chubays; 5 - Shakhrai; 6 - Shokhin; 7 - Shumeyko; 8 - Democratic Russia; 9 - Radical Democrats; 10 - Homeland ["Rodina"]; 11 - Left Center; 12 - Agreement for Progress; 13 - Gaydar; 14 - Skokov; 15 - Kalannikov; 16 - Non-party affiliated deputies; 17 - Khizha; 18 - Rossiya; 19 - Motherland ["Otechizna"]; 20 - Communists of Russia; 21 - Agrarian Union; 22 - Free Russia; 23 - Industrial Union; 24 - Petrov; 25 - Rutskey; 26 - Kostin; 27 - Chernomyrdin; 28 - Ispravnikov; 29 - Shcherbakov; 30 - Worker's Union; 31 - Civic Society; 32 - Note: the "Change—New Policy" faction did not nominate a candidate.

Civic Union Official on Union's Attitude Toward Government

934C0711A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 25 Dec 92 p 2

[Article by V. Lapitskiy, "Civic Union" Executive Committee Chairman: "Big Maneuvers: Regard for New Government Will Depend on Degree of Self-Reliance"]

[Text] The birth of a civil society... These words spoken by Nikolai Travkin, which resounded at a critical moment during the Seventh Congress of People's Deputies, were viewed by many with irony as an obvious exaggeration. In reality, such large-scale changes rarely come about instantly. However, there is no doubt that the congress and the events preceding it introduced entirely new features into, and opened up a whole new stage in our political life.

The appearance of, and the first steps taken by the "Civic Union" spurred the solidification of very large political blocs capable of determining the course of public life. In spite of its persisting amorphous nature, GS [Civic Union], "Democratic Choice," and "Russian Unity" have lent an element of organization and predictability to politics.

Within just a number of months "Civic Union" became a real force which prompted the regime to reckon with itself and enter into negotiations. When did something of this nature happen the last time in Russia? In actuality, it was from February to October of 1917. At all other times power has been absolute, with which there could be no equal partner. To demonstrate that a power is not absolute is an achievement which permits one to speak with confidence of the formation of a civil society.

GS's chief concern preceding the congress, and the topic of its negotiations with the government was the situation

in the economy. We came together to form "Civic Union" having been moved above all by the desire to support reform, as well as create a political basis for it. A major danger to reform, however, was seen in social conflicts, capable of completely destabilizing the situation, as well as in deaf resistance generated by a misunderstanding of governmental actions. As a means of avoiding this, we proposed adjusting the form, method, and pace of the transformations being pursued.

Initially, the economic concept seemed to be the primary stumbling block in mutual relations with the government. Yegor Gaydar and his companions-in-arms categorically rejected recommendations made by "Civic Union," and repeatedly gave them depreciatory marks. Also, at the same time the following was announced: GS is bluffing, and generally has no program. Their program is comprised of slogans alone, is highly professional, but totally inadmissible.

Marvelously, closer to the congress everything suddenly changed. About a week before the deadline to submit an anti-crisis government program to the Supreme Soviet, GS experts were invited to a joint work session. By the time the congress was convened they had prepared a fully agreeable variant, of which the GS text formed the basis. The government of monetarists that had sworn to never "forgo its principles," viewed the proposals to strengthen state regulation of the economy as though they were their own.

What was it? Sudden enlightenment? Not very likely. Another explanation, confirmed later by Yegor Gaydar, in his characteristic direct manner, was that the government did not intend to fulfill this program, but was only concerned about its admissibility before the Supreme Soviet and congress.

From this the question arose as to guarantees for the fulfillment of the anti-crisis program. It became clear, however, that only one security was reliable; changes in the cabinet make-up, and above all in the economic bloc of the latter.

Such were the beginnings of the "Civic Union's" notorious "personnel aspirations." This popular topic quickly overshadowed the substantive side of the story. No matter how deplorable, the legend was even believed in by those who created it. Yegor Gaydar thought he was also dealing with staunch contenders for ministerial positions, and that we had started the fuss over the program as a blind decoy. On the eve prior to the vote on his candidacy, he came to the "Civic Union" politsoviet [political council] and offered several secondary ministerial posts, obviously, seeing this as the primary object of our dreams.

Incidentally, about the ministerial posts. It would be hard to call one's readiness to sign any program only to preserve one's own post a highly ethical position. In spite of their personal pompous statements about a unified team and collective resignations, the ministers in Gaydar's cabinet were in no way rushing after their leader,

having demonstrated a rare perseverance in their beloved seats. Is it really for them to judge others for seeking ministerial positions!

Nonetheless, work on a joint program was in progress under the uninterrupted accompaniment of such accusations. The results of the meeting with the president, upon which we had placed great expectations, and in the course of which, it seemed, almost complete mutual understanding had been achieved, were repudiated the very next day. The rhetoric directed at "Civic Union" strengthened with each passing day. Near the end attempts to identify GS with the red-browns [communist fascists] had begun. Consultations conducted with the leaders of the "Russian Unity" deputy bloc were used as grounds for the latter.

Those making the remarks, however, "failed to notice" that for the two meetings with "Russian Unity" there were four with "Democratic Choice." We strove beforehand to settle conflicts that could possibly make work at the congress completely nonconstructive. I think that these contacts did turn out to be of some assistance.

Look closely at the results of the votes on major issues during the congress, keeping in mind that the opposition bloc, "Russian Unity" had approximately 350 votes at its disposal, and that "Democratic Choice" could count on 120-180. One can easily be sure that it was namely those center factions close to "Civic Union" that did not permit the issue of a presidential impeachment to be put on the agenda. These same factions also supported amendments to the Constitution, directed at forming a mechanism of cooperation between the executive and legislative powers, voted for Yegor Gaydar, and spoke out in support of the stability of a constitutional regime during the final dramatic days of the congress.

One may retort that in no way were all of these results triumphant. Yes, aside from our desires there was also a reality which we knew full well. Directly before the vote for Yegor Gaydar, Vladimir Novikov, and later Irina Vinogradova went to see the president and informed him that according to our calculations, Gaydar's candidacy did not have a chance. [As it later turned out, our prediction differed from the factual result by a total of three votes.] The president responded, "I have entirely different figures." Again one must look regrettably upon the blanket of fabricated information, such as that which envelops a supreme power...

The realities of the congress would have been entirely different had "Civic Union's" proposals been heeded back in October and November. We had then asked Boris Yeltsin and Yegor Gaydar to give us at least two weeks for normal preparatory work, to make personnel appointments in advance, and, of course, to give serious regard to the jointly designed program. Our partners, however, preferred the power of force (which, incidentally, did not prevent them from accusing GS from time to time of not fulfilling what it had agreed to).

From the start they were strongly bent on resistance, and as a result it showed through when, it would appear, there was no longer any formal reason for it. The president's address to the people was in complete discord

with the atmosphere of good will that had taken shape up until that moment at the congress.

The threat of directly turning to the people flew through the air almost constantly, and when even slightly forgotten, either Vyacheslav Kostikov would immediately remind of it, or "Democratic Russia" members, always ready for service. Their fire, however, was surprisingly off the mark, making one doubt the skill of those calling the shots.

Later it became quite visible how alike the Sixth and Seventh Congresses had been. Both then and now there had been an attempt to both succeed through fear, and to utterly surprise with an abrupt and unexpected move, (last time this was seen in the announcement of the resignation of the government). This technique did not produce any particular dividends then, and it produced even fewer now.

Of course, at first there had been a definite amount of confusion. However, when a little more than a hundred deputies had succeeded in walking out, it became clear that the president once again had been given the wrong figures. And after the General Prosecutor and the "strong" ministers appeared before the congress, it became apparent that there was a complete lack of preparedness for such a critical approach.

In this situation, "Civic Union's" chief task was to keep the pendulum from swinging the other way, and to prevent attempts at revenge that could rock the power structures, which already lacked the necessary solidity. Thus, Vice-President Aleksandr Rutskoy's address was of particular significance, as he managed to lay a small bridge between the legislative and executive powers, by means of which bilateral movement then began.

Up til now discussion was still going on regarding the terms of the compromise that was reached, moreover it seems that both sides feel they were by-passed. Such is how it is. The run-in at the congress damaged the regime as such, and once again it revealed the weaknesses of its existing institutions, while not allowing them to demonstrate their strengths.

At the congress we did not seek victory, but decisions ensuring our emergence from the crisis, as well as public consensus. Also, Victor Chernomyrdin became the prime-minister, a man who we like, and whose practical experience in government is no cause for doubt. However, can a great deal be accomplished by any premier under circumstances of sharpened confrontation and clashing ambitions, while depending upon decisions adopted under the influence of emotion?

GS's regard for the new government will depend not on personal preferences, but on the degree of the new government's self-reliance and on its adherence to a joint anti-crisis program. The primary result of the past big maneuvers for us can be summarized in the conclusion: The power crisis has reached such a large scale that it will

not be overcome with maneuvers. General elections, viewed earlier as a distant possibility, are now becoming a more urgent task.

The birth of a civil society... In our eyes it has begun. Concluding this process, however, will become possible only after multi-party elections that bring a public leader into the presidential post, that form a parliament structured according to party factions, and that create a government answerable to political forces.

After becoming acquainted with the new make-up of the Russian government the chairman of the "Civic Union" executive committee, Vasilii Lapitskiy announced that "Viktor Chernomyrdin was deprived of the right to influence the make-up of the government to a sufficient degree in order to implement his vision of economic reform and politics in the broadest sense of the word."

In the opinion of GS press secretary Lyudmila Semina, the appointment of Mikhail Fedotov, who represents the "Democratic Russia" movement, to the post of Minister of the Press, creates "an unequal situation in the future fight for votes through the mass media."

Zyuganov Interviewed on CP's Goals

934C0762A Moscow DEN in Russian
No 2, 10-16 Jan 93 p 2

[Interview with Gennadiy Zyuganov conducted by Aleksandr Prokhanov: "The Party of the People"]

[Text] [Prokhanov] The situation is changing rapidly. The dynamics of the processes taking place in society are simply crazy. The congress was just held, and a certain new hieroglyphic has hung up in the air, a psychological and ideological one, not fully interpreted, and yet everyone feels that something has changed. The level of increase in the catastrophe has changed, its course has changed, and in my opinion, the possible ways out of it have also changed. What kind of situation is this, and what are the ways out of it?

[Zyuganov] The essence of this new situation, it seems to me, may be characterized in three words: Collapse, fear, and hope.

The collapse of the liberal-cosmopolitical model of development, the collapse of the so-called "Gaydar" reforms, the collapse of the charismatic leader as represented by the president... At the same time, fear has increased—in almost everyone—about their possible future... But right here next to it there is also hope. It is associated with the new arrangement of political forces, with the fact that we have been able to bridle the extremists surrounding Yeltsin. They will never recover from the blow which they suffered on 10 December. The representative agencies of the state have gained strength. A new social-psychological atmosphere has also been formulated. The present authorities today can no longer fool the entire population of the country as they did before. Now they are forced to maneuver.

The following factors characterize the new balance of power. On one hand, it is obvious to everyone that "Demrossiya" has fallen apart, that it has rotted to its foundations, that its overblown leaders do not present any value to the nation and the state. On the other hand, there is an ongoing process of unification of the people's-patriotic forces. New leaders in politics, economic management, journalism, art, etc. are emerging from their ranks.

At the same time, we are living under conditions of an increasing new level of danger, which is unprecedented both in our country and in the world. There is the very strong knot of national cataclysms here, along with mass impoverishment and a colossal defeat of the rights of the strata which comprises the intellectual basis of society—the teachers, doctors, scientists, and cultural leaders.

Here is one of the latest examples: In the new prices, a round-trip ticket from Moscow to the Far East will cost 50,000-60,000 rubles (R). By current measure, this signifies an unprecedented break in social ties: One cannot go to visit close relatives, either for a wedding or a funeral.

It seems to me that the people's-patriotic forces have attained the opportunity, although rather unsteady at the present time, to implement the tactics of constructive cooperation, though very prudent and cautious cooperation. As long as President Yeltsin is in power, I am afraid, he will not give any pragmatist the opportunity to expand in full force and to realize his plans. The struggle for power at the top is continuing. Under these conditions, the birth of a strong and efficient party of the leftist persuasion is more current than ever before.

[Prokhanov] The will to resist is accumulating in the parties and organizations. If the nation had a strong party, the forms of struggle would evidently be much more acute and effective.

In this connection, we once again speak of the communist party, of the RCP [Russian Communist Party], which today is being rapidly constructed and is beginning to make itself known—for now through signals of the newly emerging structures, as well as through a certain wave of fears, hopes and concerns, which, with the rebirth of this party, is spilling into the social sphere.

In essence, the RCP is one of the main personages in the tragedy which has occurred. We saw how the disintegration of the USSR grew, and how the party could do nothing to stop it. The party, which became Gorbachev's "sacrificial goat," was unable to find within itself the organizational forces to cast off the top which oppressed it. The party was unable to find in itself the will for resistance, and I believe the next generation will blame the party not only for the GULAG [Correctional-Labor Camp Main Administration], for the unpreparedness for World War II, but also for the fact that, having assumed the responsibility for the fate of the country, it did not defend it, but allowed a catastrophe...

In recent years the party has experienced, in my opinion, two terrible shocks: The shock of Gorbachev's rule, and a blow to the back from Yeltsin, who forced it underground. And this entire huge supposed party became frightened, was subjected to psychological ostracism, and did not emit from its ranks a single hero.

And now, after two shocks, having lost its ideological and administrative centers, the party is nevertheless beginning to somehow rise up. It is once again coming out from under the snow.

How is the regeneration of the party proceeding, what constitutes the communist mosaic of the left flank of our patriots, and how will the micro-parties be built into an integral large RCP?

[Zyuganov] First about some of the details which became clear to me during the work of the Constitutional Court. The communist party in our country was a specific system of national-state administration. That is how it was formed for decades and, as any system of administration, had to be permanently reconstructed.

In essence the party had three levels. The first consisted of socio-political organizations with all the appropriate attributes. The secretary of the party organization never had more rights than the leader of the collective. At the level of the rayon, city and oblast—that was another matter. On one hand, the manager of an enterprise depended to a significant degree on the raykom [rayon committee] secretary, and on the other—the raykom secretary understood very well that he could not do anything without good economic managers. At the level of Moscow there was the Central Committee and the Politburo—that was the third level. The Politburo was an organ of state-political administration. The crime of Gorbachev and his followers was primarily in the fact that they destroyed the real system of state-political administration without creating anything to take its place.

When Kosygin began the transformations, it was clear to me, for example, that the party state should be changed for a Soviet state, but that this must be done gradually, creating the appropriate specific attributes of the state, a sort of mighty assembly where the nationalities, territories, conferences, etc. could be represented, so that this assembly would have an intellectual center and be capable of resolving all the vital questions.

In my opinion, the backbone of those who think pragmatically and realistically has been preserved in all the regions, and the very juridical right to resurrect the party on the basis of the primary organizations today gives a rare chance to quickly recreate our organization. For example, the party members know how to work, they have become accustomed to working in the organization, and they want to work. And in any case, this would be a very strong and powerful organization. The most powerful party in Russia is emerging on the left flank, since

the idea of social justice has been the basis of our existence, our collectivist, totalistic ideology, which has a thousand-year history.

The entire question consists of how to recreate the structures and to connect all these segments today. The organizing committee, which includes representatives of different parties, has already developed the regulations and the procedure for holding an extraordinary congress, which is to be held on 13-14 February of this year. Several groups have been formulated to deal with the program documents, the charter, and organizational-technical provision. And it is very encouraging that in an entire series of oblasts all the rayon segments have already been restored. For example, in Bryansk almost in every rayon there is an organization, and something similar to it in Smolensk Oblast and Krasnoyarsk Kray.

Today we need at least three elements—ideas, money, and cadres. I am sure that the workers will give funds for an organization which is defending their interests. I am also sure that among the intellectuals of Russia there are many who profess national sentiment, statehood, justice and patriotism, and that they will contribute their ideas to our common cause. As for the cadres, very much will depend on who will head up the party in the center as well as in the local areas.

[Prokhanov] In the last seven years, the democrats have managed to discredit the party idea, and the socialist one as well, since it is inalienable from the party idea.

Most likely, this new party which is surfacing will cease to be a strictly centralist organizational force. It has no ready model for future development. The communist contour has been eroded, the future is becoming ever more indeterminate and probable—and not only for us in Russia, but also for the entire world. And evidently this communist party will have before it not the blueprints for a universal future, but a certain real undermined social everyday life. And its efforts will be directed not toward overcoming this socium in the name of the developed contours and blueprints, but of expressing a careful attitude toward it. In this sense, it is interesting to learn your opinion as a person standing at the source of the "Word to the People," which has placed the beginning of the merging of ideological forms of the so-called "white" and "red," the national and international, the personal and the communist. You are one of the first to sense the current nature of the transformation of the orthodox communist party into a party of national interests.

[Zyuganov] It is not only and not so much the democrats who have discredited the party, as their leadership, the rare intra-party ignorance and in essence national-state traitorship.

Evidence of the deep-seated internal crisis in the party has become its voluntary rejection of the political struggle, and of responses to the burning challenges of the times. The dogmatism and toadiness of the so-called years of stagnation have been replaced by an even more

destructive ideology of the "new political thinking," and by verification of the apparent frankly cynical spiritual aggression against our country and the Russian people.

The party did not deeply interpret the technological breakthrough in economics and informatics, and in the management of complex systems. It did not react in a timely manner to the new geopolitical map of the world, to the deep-seated contradictions growing within the system of "man—society—nature."

In politics and the political sphere, the voluntaristic idealism of the Gorbachev-Yakovelev caste has triumphed, fueled by ambitious self-love, intrigue and unprecedented traitorship. Take a closer look at the greedy and pilferous "democratic" power. Even to someone who is uninformed, it is reminiscent of a political miscarriage, hastily conceived during the division of portfolios.

Back in 1987, my colleagues and I prepared materials on Central Asia, from which it followed that in Tajikistan there would occur that which, unfortunately, is going on there today. We also prepared materials on the Caucasus, urging a cautious approach, as well as materials on the Baltic. Yet all this was shelved or simply ignored. Only through ignorance can we explain the fact that they decided to turn a traditional society into a legal one of the Western type within a period of two or three years.

They decided to destroy the bicentric world order which was formed after the Potsdam Agreements in the name of "entering a new civilization," but in fact they gave rise to lawlessness over a huge territory, facilitating the birth of a criminal state of the Columbian-Balkan type with all its attributes—terrible corruption, banditism, unceasing conflicts, and squandering of the state wealth. Under these conditions, the newly emerging party must defend itself against a possible repetition of the errors which proved fateful for it as well as for the state.

I believe this defense must have two levels. On one hand, we must restore the organization where there will be clear-cut goals and tasks, effectively ordered structures and strict mechanisms for fulfilling the decisions which have been adopted. On the other—not everyone or the majority must necessarily be in the party, but every mature citizen who sympathizes with certain moral and ethical values and goals must have a real opportunity to be a participant in it. He may be simply a sympathizer, he may give appropriate aid, or he may participate in measures while remaining in state service and engaging, for example, in entrepreneurial activity. Therefore, the party must be more flexible in its structural-organizational essence.

When they say, "Yeltsin's course of reforms," I always try to explain that the market and democracy cannot be goals in themselves. The goals are well-being, national security, health, and intellect of the nation, as well as spiritual rebirth... I believe that the political-ideological basis of the new party must contain values which are deeply ingrained in the heart and soul of the residents of

Russia and in the Russian people. This is primarily national character as a form of organization of our entire life and activity, and justice as the basis of interaction of peoples and regions. And finally, there is the idea of Russian patriotism, since without love and respect for the Homeland and for the memory of our ancestors, not one political organization is capable of recreating itself today. This is why we believe that the communist party is a party of social-patriotic and national-spiritual rebirth of the qualities and traits inherent not only in the ideology, but also in the genetic principles of our society, our thousand-year history. I am convinced that very many people would support such a party.

The party has a future in Russia, but only if it is a party of honest, courageous people who think in the national interest and who act in the state interest, consistently expressing the interests of the workers. And the ideas of justice and human brotherhood are eternal. No one will be able to either prohibit them or bury them.

[Prokhanov] As I have understood, religious people will also be able to hold membership in this party. Entrepreneurs and representatives of Russian business will also find a place for themselves there. This will be a party which has set for itself the task of integrating our national space. It will not serve a class, the president, or some strata of society, but will become a party of state interests. But will it not be eroded by utopian postulates, because society is consolidated only in moments of trial, when different strata and groups begin to reject their interests, their group egoism, sacrificing them in the name of the whole, in the name of the nation and the state?

[Zyuganov] The main struggle today is going on not between the democrats and the communists, but between the liberal cosmopolitans and the party of national statehood. In fact, the present reality prompts the broadest social strata to unite around the left and right-wing opposition. The basis of this unification is ideology—justice, national character, statehood and patriotism.

As for the leftist movement on the whole, as always in troubled times, it too has produced its own leaders, its own bonapartes, its own orthodoxes, which have cycled on some definite idea that has made it of paramount importance. It would not be surprising if certain groups and leaders adopted a broad platform of social justice and national-state interests, and began to adhere to the old dogma, including also a strict class approach. It is believed that from the methodological standpoint the class approach will be used for social analysis. However, in order to unite the people under real conditions and to solve the problems of national salvation and survival, it must recede to the secondary plane.

[Prokhanov] Yes, but if the party which is being reborn aspires to an all-national universal and is ready to speak out in the interests of the people as a whole, it must logically come to the conclusion that it alone is enough

for society. If this is a party of entrepreneurs and workers, atheists and faithful, Tatars and Russians, technocrats and ecologists, then what do we need other parties for?

At the same time, such Messianism will demand of the party colossal effort in the scope of the entire nation, and will make it irreconcilable to all that lies beyond the limits of this task. Next to, for example, the Russian national parties which have been formed and which do not tolerate encroachments on their priorities. In contrapoint to the existing mighty structures, as for example the Zionist structure, which dominates in many spheres of current life, and the "democratic movement," which will not reconcile itself with the emergence of a strong new communist party.

[Zyuganov] Our political reorganization must correspond to the complexity of the national-state object, as well as to the historical traditions. I believe that today the programs of any of our parties must rest on the ideology of national-state existence of the great power, which over an expanse of 11 time zones unites over 130 nations and peoples with 44 religious confessions. It is within the framework of the system of these values that for one party one thing will be important, and for another—something else. However, I repeat, the basic values must be adopted as an axiom. Otherwise, schisms and enmity along national, territorial, religious and other indicators will be inevitable.

But this is the struggle of the transitional period, until the country stabilizes and its political outlook is finally formulated. Today, however, the main thing is unity of the forces capable of stopping general disintegration. This is why the party which we are creating must be a party of specific action in a specific period. Therefore, in developing its program, many believe that this program must be a very brief, clear variant designating the basic moral-ethical and political values, the system of specific goals and the technology for their achievement.

[Prokhanov] In the last year and a half, you have shown yourself to be a courageous, harsh and unswerving man, acting in extremely hostile political conditions. You are one of the few party leaders who did not hide, did not go underground, did not betray the ideals of the party, and did not go over to the side of the enemy, which we cannot say about many others...

But, as strange as it may seem, you have demonstrated remarkable plasticity: In essence you are the initiator of the "Word to the People," which laid the first foundation for unification of the left and right-wing opposition. You joined the Front for National Salvation, which united many of the poles and flanks. You are also the co-chairman of the Russian National Assembly. You stand in the center of the field for integrating practically all the all-people's movements and processes.

I believe that after the present group of radicals is removed from power and the course changed, other people will come to power, perhaps those associated with

the currently resurrecting RCP. After all, a most acute tendency toward revenge will emerge, since the democrats have caused so many troubles that the hatred toward them on the part of the people is colossal, and the probability of socio-political and individual revenge is great.

Is there hope that when people, say, of your type, head up the new party and fate gives you the dominant role in this party, will you be able to hold back the hand of the revanchist ready to throw the rock? After all, this socio-political revenge would be most ruinous. Not a single hair on the heads of the enemies must fall! Otherwise we will become like them and will repeat that very same despicable social behavior which they have demonstrated.

[Zyuganov] In my view, the tragedy of the "democrats" consists primarily in the fact that they acted like real revanchists: They settled accounts with everyone who was not suitable to them, and acted like an occupational government. Our "democrats," settling accounts after coming to power, strived to drive out literally all of the so-called "apparatchiks," the specialist-administrators. Yet we had leaders of the highest class in many of the services!

This revanchist attitude should in no case be repeated. We must come to an agreement on a series of principle positions. First of all, the country has entirely exhausted its capacities for new civil wars and new fratricide. This fact must primarily determine the type of our behavior. Secondly, the law must operate strictly, and only it should be the arbiter. Thirdly, each person has the right to his ideological system and the opportunity to express it in the mass media. This also must be strictly secured by law. Fourthly, in a country where there are over 130 nations and peoples, no one can speak of the priority of his nation. The priority of fraternity and respect for the individual must be supreme. Fifthly, everyone must understand that without the rebirth of Russia, without the rebirth of the Russian nation and its traditions, without support of its best qualities, there will be no general uplift... We can continue this list, but these are the main things.

I believe such a code of behavior must be formulated in the nearest time. It will be understandable and attractive to all. And the main thing: Freedom must be understood and reproduced primarily as the freedom of creativity, the opportunity to realize one's individual God-given potential. And each person who decides to apply his knowledge, his skill, who starts his own business, must know that all that is spiritual, beneficial, facilitating development and general well-being, will receive the priority and be supported by the state through programs, prices, the level of taxes, etc. Today, however, everything turns out just the opposite! Yet there should not be any social revenge or judgement.

[Prokhanov] In the past year, the most terrible thing for me was the cowardice which gripped a huge strata of the

population. Especially intolerable for me was and still remains the behavior of our military, our generals and marshalls, who were supposedly fed by us, for our money, who showed themselves in the Great Patriotic War as well as the younger ones in the Afghan wars. It seems to me that it is these people who must demonstrate their statehood. I am not saying that they should have brought divisions up to the "White House." No, but they could have raised their voice and expressed their will...

But no, the entire state establishment, including the generals and the major party leaders, became afraid, grew silent and vanished into nowhere. This renegade behavior and cowardice traumatized me most of all. And it is so much more heartening to see the growing resistance, for example, of the Cossacks in the Dneister region, their exploits and their sacrifices! This is what has instilled faith and energy. Or the February days, when our old men veterans went with their wounds, with their crutches, against those OMON [Special Purpose Militia Detachment] steel ranks! For me this meant that the people had not been broken! But for you, a politician, what was the most difficult, the saddest, in the last year, and what was the most heartening?

[Zyuganov] The saddest thing was disappointment in those of whom I had been quite sure, who even on the eve of 19 August had manifested consistency in opposing the destructive policy of Gorbachev, Yakovlev, Shevardnadze, and Yeltsin. Perhaps I myself was in a more profitable position, since I was never once persecuted for having my own point of view on many questions and for defending it.

It was painful to watch the processes taking place in our state and military structures. This situation reminded me of childhood impressions and films about war. I was amazed then how ten SS men could lead a column of military prisoners: Not old men and children, but healthy men, who were meekly going to the slaughter. Something similar to this was going on at the end of 1991, when, just as meek and confused, most of the population agreed to the unheard-of robbery called the "Gaydar reforms," when in a single night they dispossessed everyone, took away hard-earned savings, throwing it all to the wind, and shut down the best production lines and entire sectors.

I believe this was more than internal depression. Two types of qualitatively new weapons were skillfully used against the great power: Social-psychological programming and management of directed, weakly proceeding catastrophes.

But here is what was heartening. Whomever I spoke with, in whatever collectives which even yesterday were the most pro-democratic, no matter where I spoke, everywhere I received at least 80-85 percent support. In other words, the rational, healthy nucleus of the nation has been preserved. I hope that it will be able to save the country from total defeat. I also remember how in the

beginning of September during the talks, the best Western specialists believed that any day we would experience a total collapse—our economy would come to a standstill. However, this did not happen. We have not managed to sell off our property, our fixed production capital, worn as it is, but nevertheless ours, and our land. The cadres of economic managers have been retained, and the intellectual basis of society is intact. If we change the course and create a favorable situation, all these people will rise up and begin to work very energetically. We have the basis for rebirth and restoration of the Homeland.

Today we see an entire series of favorable tendencies. The left flank is gaining strength, especially organizationally. The people's-patriotic forces are uniting. The pragmatic wing of the economic managers and administrators is gaining weight, and without their word neither Yeltsin nor Chernomyrdin will be able to do anything today. Science and culture are making themselves known, developing new views, concepts, and ideologies.

I believe that we have withstood the blow of a terrible force, and today are creating a real basis for the rebirth of the nation by means of consolidation of all the healthy forces of society. Recently there were only a few of us who dared to address the "Word to the People," only six people who voted against disbanding the Union on 12 December 1991, but today...

[Prokhanov] I wish you success in your work. To victory!

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS

Shurchkov Discusses Industrial Policy Priorities

934A0663A Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*
in Russian 22 Jan 93, "Promyshlenny Vestnik"
supplement pp 3, 6

[Interview with Igor Shurchkov, chairman of the Russian Federation Committee for Industrial Policy, by Viktor Andriyanov; place and date not given: "Industry Is Not To Blame for Building According to One Set of Principles and Being Forced To Work According to Another"]

[Text] Questions from *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA* are answered by the chairman of the Russian Federation Committee for Industrial Policy, Igor Shurchkov.

Let us introduce our guest. Igor Olegovich Shurchkov was born in 1950 in the Kuban. In 1973 he graduated from the Moscow Institute of Electronic Equipment. He is a doctor of technical sciences, a professor, and an active member of the Academy of Engineering Sciences of Russia. After the institute he worked for 13 years in production and science—as an engineer, section and shop chief of the Mikron Plant, and chief of a scientific and production complex—as deputy head engineer of the Scientific Research Institute of Molecular Electronics. He headed the administration for scientific and

technical development in the Union ministries of communications and the communications equipment industry and the Telekom Concern, and he was general director of the department of means of communication of the Ministry of Industry of Russia. He is the author of several dozen inventions and a number of monographs.

[Andriyanov] Igor Olegovich, the first question is suggested by the very name of your committee. Does this mean that Russia is getting an industrial policy? In your view, was there such a policy with the cabinets of Kosygin, Ryzhkov, Pavlov, and Gaydar?

[Shurchkov] Thank you, as they say at news conferences, for your good question. An industrial policy has always existed; it is another matter how good this policy was, what its goals, priorities, and means of realization were, and what kinds of documents represented it.

When speaking about Kosygin and earlier times one must recall the program of industrialization, restoration of the destroyed war economy and, in parallel, conversion. Up to a certain point in time there was a course which forced everyone to construct a logic for their behavior. Formally, up until the approval of the concept of the structural policy for 1993 prepared by the Ministry of Economics of the Russian Federation and the program for deepening economic reforms of Gaydar's government, there really were no large documents on industrial policy. At the same time we know the line that was followed and its consequences.

Just recall the persistent appeals to raise the price of energy sources to the world level. What would this mean for our energy-intensive, metal-intensive industry? To roll a tonne of metal we expend 120 cubic meters of natural gas while abroad they use one-third of this amount. Increasing prices under these conditions would lead to a complete collapse of our economy.

[Andriyanov] How do you picture Russia's industrial policy?

[Shurchkov] In my view it is a complex combination of many trends and aspects of reality.

In the first place, it is the doctrine of the industrial policy and, on its basis, legitimately selected priorities. At first there should be an extremely limited number of priorities. Then they can be realized on the basis of a program-target approach which is oriented toward final economic, social, military-technical, ecological, and other results.

One of the first priorities today is the preservation and renewal of the scientific and technical and industrial (production) potential and infrastructure.

The military-industrial complex exists in all developed countries of the West. There is no need for us to make our military-industrial complex a bigger monster than theirs.

Many of the country's scientific and technical achievements and personnel are concentrated in the military-industrial complex. A good deal can and should be preserved, much should be updated, and certain things should be reduced and reoriented for socially significant purposes—in a word, it is necessary to conduct a structural rearrangement.

The second perspective: Today a large part of the power is being transferred from the center to the local areas. This fact was registered in the Federation Treaty, and subjects of the Federation were given certain rights for the first time after Kosygin.

[Andriyanov] Excuse me for interrupting you, Igor Olegovich. People say that the treaty can blow Russia apart...

[Shurchkov] The Federation Treaty did not and is not blowing Russia apart. It can be blown into 16, 20, or 80 small principalities by the deepening of the economic and political crisis, including through failures in the sphere of administration and also attempts to achieve unilateral advantages both by the federative center and by subjects of the Federation. We need a balance of interests and a civilized search for this.

It seems to me that one of the last bastions for actually preserving the Federation is an industrial policy which takes the interests of the regions into account.

The third thing is small-scale and private entrepreneurship. Until quite recently certain people worked with the giants of industry and others with small business. But they are on the same playing field, and small business should feel at home there. But so far it has only a small percentage. But the growth rates are real. That is a fact.

The fourth perspective is cooperation which is left over from the Union and the CEMA. The question is: What do we want to become? A country that is integrated into the world economy? That is one approach. Then we should not break up our associations, we should not fragment them. Imagine VAZ [Volga Automobile Plant] or Magnitka sliced into 10 microplants. Will the sum of them really be greater than a large complex? Never. But today the antimonopoly law dictates the logic of fragmentation, permitting enterprises to break up and prohibiting them from uniting.

So if we want to become a world power that is integrated into the world economy, we cannot take this approach. But if we are looking to our own little market...

[Andriyanov] ...With a bazaar-like focus...

[Shurchkov] Then there is no point in thinking that we will make any mark in the world.

The fifth aspect is stage-by-stage integration into the world division of labor, into cooperation and competition on world markets. Above all, high technologies and goods produced on their basis. And we would put an end

to Russia's role as a raw-material "amortizer" of technological strides in the world economy.

I have pointed out only five trends, but there really are more. We are now forming the concept of the industrial policy, including through the use of previous ideas presented to society.

[Andriyanov] How do you intend to realize them in practice?

[Shurchkov] To answer that question one has to know what is in the treasury.

[Andriyanov] I think nothing. They drove the economy into the ground. To bankruptcy. What sources can stop the decline? Stabilize the situation?

[Shurchkov] In principle, sources of domestic and foreign investments are known. We cannot refuse anything but we must soberly evaluate the possibilities and create conditions for attracting them and forming them. An important source is profit from a number of sectors of industry. This is promising—from a high added value, which means that we will have high technologies again.

But really the situation is very complicated.

Our population has been taken for all it is worth. State enterprises are in debt, they are not credit-worthy. And so far we cannot count on private ones.

[Andriyanov] Outside investments?

[Shurchkov] With this kind of social and political situation it would be naive to count on outside investments. That was one of the greatest mistakes in the financial policy of the previous government.

Look, our oil production has been decreasing for four years now. We have lost 200 million tonnes. A tonne of oil on the world market now costs \$120. Multiply that by 200 million and you get \$24 billion. This is a random game with the figures; we could lose not 50 but 45 or 60. But the overall result is predictable.

Think also about this fact. The country has not indexed fixed capital—the value of buildings and equipment. But here is what happened, for example, in Kostroma Oblast. They issued vouchers worth R 7.5 billion and the value of the fixed capital was 2.5 billion...

[Andriyanov] in prices of the beginning of the 1960's?

[Shurchkov] Of course. But what can they do now? These prices reflect nothing. If we decided to index them—by what factor? Twenty, 100? I recall how much I used to pay for a kilogram of sausage—2.20. Today you cannot get it for 300. This means we would have to index by a factor of 1,000. And this means increased amortization deductions, which are included in the price throughout the technological chain. A long wave of inflation is rolling in... And what Gaydar invested will be ascribed to

Chernomyrdin Incidentally, these are far from the only consequences of the activity of the previous government we will come up against.

It is just from the outside that the monetary approach seems progressive—in fact it has led to a breakdown of normal relations. The financial blood circulation has stopped. It has led to serious violations in the investment process. We need an economic policy of restoration of the investment complex, which was fundamentally undermined in 1991 and especially in 1992. The drive belt for economic growth should be high technologies. And at first it should be those sectors of industry which can rapidly create starting conditions for the restoration of the investment complex. Unpopular measures will have to be used as well—credit and monetary-financial emission.

[Andriyanov] Relying on the printing press?

[Shurchkov] I must say straightforwardly that the level of inflation in 1993 will be, say, 100 percent. Dear compatriots, let us tighten our belts. This is the only way we will be able to pass between the Scylla of complete bankruptcy of the enterprises and the Charybdis of hyperinflation.

We must say: Either convulsive contractions in the economy or inflation. A decline of the ruble, but a controlled, planned one. For which the government will make a certain commitment.

And another thing: With inflation of 100 percent, an income of 110 percent will have to be established in the savings banks. And then a person will not take his thousand to the store wanting to spend it as quickly as he can. Then interest in investment will be created.

[Andriyanov] But everything you are saying, Igor Olegovich, contradicts the principles the "Gaydar team" worshipped. Their approach ruled out price controls and wage controls. They counted on shock: If the people are left without any money they will go and do something.

[Shurchkov] I wish to say this: Russia and Switzerland, Poland and Germany—they are different worlds. They each have their own history, their own mentality. Our Eurasian melting pot is a world unto itself and no other country can compare to it. Even ideas of good and evil affect behavioral stereotypes. It is impossible simply to move and transplant anything from other structures into our world.

Finally, we must understand that value is created not by the person who resells things but by the one who creates them—the worker, the engineer.

[Andriyanov] Where will your committee begin?

[Shurchkov] Our main instruments are concrete programs intended for budget financing, preferred credit, and the attraction of foreign capital. Today we have formed 18 of these programs.

[Andriyanov] Name a couple of them.

[Shurchkov] All right. The program for the development of production and mechanisms for the timber industry complex. The innovation program "Technical equipment for the Russian North." You understand that on the one hand we have tank plants that are standing idle and on the other we have no normal transportation for the North... "Development of a raw material base for nonferrous metallurgy"...

[Andriyanov] Is the Udokan contract included in this program?

[Shurchkov] Of course. Along with the chairman of the Russian Federation Committee for Metallurgy, Oleg Nikolayevich Soskovets, we have managed to make changes in the conditions of the transaction to the additional advantage of Russia.

[Andriyanov] Which, precisely?

[Shurchkov] According to the original plan it was intended to ship all the ore to China for remelting. We retained the right to purchase a certain percentage of the copper back from China at world prices. There were also other unfair, not to say crushing, terms. Now they have been reworked in principle. The plant will be constructed in Russia. We are now fully in control of the situation. Our machine-building plants will receive orders for excavators, dump trucks, and other equipment...

[Andriyanov] Does all this pertain to more than just the Udokan deposit?

[Shurchkov] The committee for industrial policy as a state organ is doing all the necessary work for protection of Russia's interests. This pertains to the Shtokmanovskiy deposit and the Astrakhan plans as well.

[Andriyanov] And what would you like to say to industrial workers, entrepreneurs, and directors?

[Shurchkov] We can overcome this crisis only by exerting all efforts to organize business and normal work. The Committee for Industrial Policy is prepared to consider any constructive proposals. For much is being impeded by the lack of a legal or legally binding act and certain bureaucratic structures are also slowing things up. We are prepared to step in and help.

[Andriyanov] What are your wishes for PROMY-SHLENNIY VESTNKI?

[Shurchkov] I am very glad that RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA has begun this publication. It will help to communicate with industrial workers throughout Russia and the Commonwealth so we can search for solutions together.

Industry is not to blame for the fact that it was constructed according to certain principles and is forced to live by others. No, it has not turned out to be very pretty and perhaps it is lop-sided...

[Andriyanov] But we have no other...

[Shurchkov] No, there is no other. This industry has given us food, drink, and shelter. And it has made Russia a world-class power. And until another industry grows out of its bosom, there is no way we can destroy the old one. The dialectic of growth: As new productions and forms of ownership come into being and are established, the old ones will die out.

Muscovite Opinion Polled on Prices, Wages

PM1901142593 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
14 Jan 93 p 1

[Unattributed report under the general heading: "Attempt Being Made To Freeze Prices. But They Very Much Want To Thaw"]

[Text] PRAVDA's sociological service has recently conducted a poll of 340 Muscovites with regard to their living standards.

Indicating their income—actual and desired—none of them, with the exception of one, dreams of being a rich loafer. People know that it is impossible to live on the pennies on which they now have to live from hand to mouth. Pensioners, indicating their average "income" of 3,000 rubles [R], ask for R8,000-10,000. Their argument is that they need money just so as not to starve and... to be given a decent burial.

People of working age with an income of R6,000-10,000 say that, with life the way it is today, their wages should be increased approximately tenfold. This is certainly not in order to be "chic" but merely to preserve a more or less ordinary way of life...

How possible is this? Here are the data of the FITUR [Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia] Council Standing Commission on Social Guarantees on the number of foodstuffs that can be acquired on the average monthly wage:

	Kilograms per month	
	1990	1992
Meat and meat products	95	52
Milk and dairy products	1,237	480
Fish	178	98
Sugar and confectionary products	137	57
Margarine and other fats	182	76
Potatoes	690	335
Fruits and berries	132	120
Bread products	675	381

Compared with last January, consumption of meat has fallen 12 percent, that of dairy products 18 percent, and that of fruits and berries by one-third. People are spending more and more of their income on acquiring foodstuffs. Thus, pensioners spend up to 80 percent of

their budget on food. The average of this expenditure for the entire population stands at approximately half of consumer expenditure.

Below we cite the prices of basic foodstuffs in Russia:

Moscow: white bread—R18-25; black bread—R24-26; butter—R670-700; meat—R387; milk—R20-60; eggs—R120-150.

Kazan: white bread—R20; black bread—R16; butter—R340; meat—R200; milk—R19; eggs—R46.

Tula: white bread—R20; black bread—R19; butter—R1,005; meat—there is none in the stores; milk—R20 at present; eggs—R125.

Saratov: white bread—R28; black bread—R20; butter—R600; meat—R180-190; milk—R26-52; eggs—R105.

Petrozavodsk: white bread—R28; black bread—R26; butter—R760; meat—R400-600; milk—R60-80; eggs—R134.

Energy Sector Re-Examines Sverdlovsk, Irkutsk Oblasts

Sverdlovsk Oblast Said To Contain Oil, Gas

934A0636A Moscow DELOVOY MIR in Russian
16 Dec 92 p 8

[Article by Yevgeniy Vladikin, the ExMedia Center: "There Is a Lot of Oil in the Urals. But Getting to It Is Not Easy"]

[Text] There are quite a few oil and gas deposits in the bowels of Sverdlovsk Oblast, which have always been considered unpromising from the point of view of fossil fuel reserves. So say the specialists from the Ural Geological Committee and the Geophysics Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences' Ural Department.

In the specialists' opinion, Sverdlovsk Oblast is quite comparable in this sense with neighboring Perm Oblast, where the industrial production of oil has been going on since the thirties. The "State Program for the Development of the Mineral and Raw Materials Base and the Geological Study of the Territory of the Russian Federation for the Years 1993-1997 (Sverdlovsk and Kurgan oblasts)," drawn up this year by the Uralgeokom [Ural Geological Committee], acknowledges the scientists' long-standing suppositions.

The basic hopes have been inspired by the southwest section of the oblast (the Krasnoufimsk, Shalya, Achit and Nizhniye Sergi rayons). Already discovered and set aside here have been the Kedrovskiy and Bukharovskiy gas fields which have numerous indications of containing oil and gas. The approximate volume of fuel reserves is more than 50 million metric tons of oil and more than 50 billion cubic meters of gas.

One more promising area is Yeremino, located in the northeast in Gari Rayon (an approximate volume of 240 million metric tons). And in the northernmost part of the oblast (Ivdel-Vizhay), there is a possible seam of petro-bituminous accumulations with a volume of up to 100 million metric tons.

Attempts to study the available deposits were also made previously: in the sixties and seventies, in the northeast section of the oblast, people from Tyumen conducted surveys, while people from Perm did so in the southwest section and local geologists did not forget about oil either. However, right up until recently, only enthusiasts talked about the necessity of thorough prospecting and production of Ural oil.

Meanwhile, the estimation of the reserves of "black gold" is extremely important for the Central Urals which depends on fuel from traditional oil-production regions. This is why attention to the "oil question" is now being displayed by the oblast authorities, as well as by many commercial structures—both Russian and foreign (according to unconfirmed data, among the latter is such a giant as Hudson Oil).

It is true that, for the time being, there are more questions than answers here. It is known, in particular, that Ural oil lies in areas with a very complicated tectonic structure. Domestic production technologies in similar instances frequently prove to be ineffective. Little is known also about the quality of the oil and the conditions for producing it, which determines directly the economic advisability of developing the Ural deposits.

Putting an end to these doubts, without having detailed and scientifically confirmed data, is impossible. However, the scientists from the Geophysics Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences' Ural Department, members of local geophysical expeditions with experience in working in Tyumen Oblast and oil industry specialists from Perm and Udmurtia are ready to conduct a preliminary study of promising regions.

The ecologists' opinion, apparently, will also play a large role: oil-and gas-bearing areas are located precisely in the last regions of the oblast, which have been relatively untouched by civilization. Many specialists believe that, for the time being, the discussion cannot be about the production of fuel and, at first, not even about surveying its deposit sites, but only about assessing their promising nature. Therefore, it is not precluded that a decision will be made about setting aside their development until better (or worse) times.

Angara Oil Production Now Cost-Effective

934A0636B Moscow DELOVOY MIR in Russian
22 Dec 92 p 9

[Interview with Anatoliy Petrovich Golovin, executive manager for economics and finances of the RUSSIA Petroleum company and candidate of economic sciences, by

DELOVOY MIR staff correspondent Yuriy Kolesnikov, Irkutsk: "Angara Oil"; date not given]

[Text] Discussed in the article "Angara Oil and Gas," published in DELOVOY MIR on 31 October, were the prospects for the exploitation of gas fields in Irkutsk Oblast. Now Oil will be discussed. The license for its production has also been obtained by the RUSSIA Petroleum company. Our correspondent talks with Anatoliy Golovin, the company's executive manager for economics and finances and candidate of economic sciences.

[Kolesnikov] Anatoliy Petrovich, the presence of oil in the Angara region has been known for a long time. Yet, it is only now that its production has been approached in earnest. Was it being kept in reserve?

[Golovin] As long as Tyumen was flourishing, it was inadvisable to begin working in the Angara region. When a metric ton of oil cost 60 rubles [R], here it would have come to significantly more. Therefore, funds were allocated for prospecting, but not for production. About 5 years ago, operators from Kuybyshevneft [Kuybyshev oil] started going to the northern section of Irkutsk Oblast and began setting up a production base and work settlements, but the budget was catastrophically shrunk and the field workers went home. Now our company has accepted the baton.

[Kolesnikov] Then this means that Irkutsk oil's time has come?

[Golovin] Yes, yesterday was too early, but tomorrow will be too late. Tyumen is in a fever and its fields are in need of enormous subsidies and serious re-equipment. Even now, because of the shipments of raw materials, Agarsknefteorgsintez, the largest association in Siberia and the Far East, is experiencing great difficulties. The oblast needs its own oil—this is clear. Especially since, in the present situation, when the price has soared to R8,000 per metric ton (and this is not the limit), its production fully pays for itself. There are very favorable conditions here: the capacities of the petrochemical enterprises make it possible to obtain the most diverse products. Not partially processed materials, mind you, but finished products, the price of which is significantly higher.

[Kolesnikov] What is the field like, are the reserves large, what will be the expenditures and the expected profit and will it be difficult to get the oil?

[Golovin] The so-called Nepa Dome lies to the north of the Baykal-Amur Mainline, encompasses three large rayons—Ust-Kutskiy, Kirenskiy and Katangskiy—and extends to Yakutia. This is something like an enormous bulge on the earth's surface and it is especially well visible from space. We are talking basically about the Verkhnechonskiy Field. It can be regarded as among the ranks of the medium-sized fields. The proven protected reserves amount to 230-240 million metric tons. On the global scale, this is a small amount, but for the region, it is respectable. About as much or a little more than that is

produced in Tyumen in a year. Now let us look at this from the point of view of local needs. Angarsknefteorgsintez refines 20 million metric tons per year. There is also a number of smaller fields and by far not all have yet been surveyed. Specialists from the British Petroleum company, with which we are working closely, are predicting reserves in the amount of 1.3 billion metric tons. But getting this oil completely today is practically impossible—it is in fractured carbonates. So, for the time being, we will keep in mind the 230 million metric tons.

[Kolesnikov] Incidentally, recently in the local press, one of the heads of the service of the Ministry of Safety for Irkutsk Oblast spoke not very approvingly about the activities of the British Petroleum company and Statoil in the Angara region. He said that they collected a mass of economic information that was such that it would have taken a whole army of spies years to collect it.

[Golovin] I cannot pass judgment here. I know only one thing: the foreigners left us (completely gratis) detailed and ecologically ideal, preplanned designs for the exploitation of the oil and gas fields. If we had acted independently, we would have lost many years and suffered a loss in quality. In such instances, it is customary to say thanks.

[Kolesnikov] Will the collaboration with foreign firms continue?

[Golovin] British Petroleum and Statoil are displaying a certain caution and they have not become part of the RUSSIA Petroleum joint-stock company. The firms of Conoco (USA) and the international Belgium Petrofina have come and gone. They are troubled by both the political and the economic situations in the country, the lack of reliable protection for investments and the legislative confusion. All this is understandable. But we also noticed something else: working with giant firms is very complicated—they are inert and sluggish and drag out decision-making. After looking around, we decided to change our tactics and turn to a mid-sized business. There are already a number of interesting proposals. And we are working with them. But we are deliberately choosing a difficult path and restricting the desires of the foreign firms—indeed, first of all, RUSSIA Petroleum is striving to solve the problems of the ecological restoration of the entire region, including Lake Baykal. The oil project is of a purely commercial nature. In general, of course, we are interested in collaborating with the foreign firms, both in projects for the exploitation of the fields and the refining of the raw material and in the modernization of industrial enterprises and in investments.

[Kolesnikov] Who will finance the project and to what extent?

[Golovin] I will not undertake to estimate anything in rubles—this is a hopeless pursuit. In terms of dollars, the project looks very attractive. And it will cost \$3.5-5 billion. If things go quickly, we will get the oil no sooner than 1997—the development of the infrastructure drains off too many forces. The expenditures will be recouped after 5-6 years.

[Kolesnikov] What assets will be used to carry out the project?

[Golovin] Those of the stockholders of the company [obshchestvo] which will include the largest enterprises of the power and chemical complexes. In matters of preferential taxation, it seems the Oblast administration and the Russian Government will meet us halfway. At least at first. The oblast and the country have a chance to obtain a substantial gain. If, of course, they meet us halfway. RUSSIA Petroleum is claiming no more than a 20-22 percent profit. But even now, in estimating the expenses and revenues, we note with alarm how much has to be paid out. Payments for resources, for territory, for prospecting, accounting of past expenditures, federal tax, oblast tax, rayon and settlement assessments.... Take just prospecting. Now it is conducted at the expense of the state budget. But how? Until now, the "linear meter" served as the standard. And never mind where this "meter" was drilled. To put it briefly, the expense mechanism is continuing to operate efficiently right up to this very day. But this trick will not work. If circumstances begin to threaten our commercial interests, it will be necessary to curtail the project.

[Kolesnikov] And the last question. Is it likely that the ecological consequences of the prospecting and exploitation of the fields will be of interest to everyone?

[Golovin] We will be using the same models as during the development of the gas project. The foreign specialists gave us a good example of how it is necessary to operate. They know how to produce oil in resort areas. And everything is clean. We have the materials prepared by our specialists and the foreign specialists of integrated social and economic research. And we will be guided by them. In all, plans have been made to sink around 500 wells. By using horizontal drilling, we will be trying to reduce their number to the minimum. This is costly, but it cannot be helped. Of course, all operations will be conducted with the consent of and taking into account the interests of the local populace. Oil should serve the people and not be a burden to them. No one will forgive us for repeating the Tyumen methods of rapacious production.

The RUSSIA Petroleum Company: telephone: (3952)23-37-77, fax: (3952)43-06-41.

Questions Raised Over Winning Bid for Udokan Project

PM1901160193 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 16 Jan 93 First Edition pp 1, 2

[Yekaterina Vasilchenko commentary under the "News and Commentary" rubric: "The Motherland or Copper"]

[Text] The "Udokan Mining Company" has become the master of the copper mountain in Udokan following an international tender.

Tender Committee Chairman Viktor Marchenko claims that the exploitation of this deposit promises substantial benefits for Chita Oblast and Russia as a whole. There will be a clear profit of \$5 billion after credit payments. Half of this sum will flow into the Russian budget in the form of taxes.

"Udokan Mining Company" President Andrey Chuguyevskiy's promise to begin work as early as this year suited the Chita Oblast Administration very well.

Eight firms tendered—seven foreign, and one Russian, with the latter going on to win. But six companies withdrew their applications at the last moment, and only the "Udokan Mining Company" and Australia's "BHP" entered the final stage. The rush to withdraw applications was prompted by another Australian firm "RTZ," which suddenly announced that, according to calculations by its experts, it would be economically unprofitable to exploit this deposit. The irony of the situation is that "RTZ" and "BHP" are close partners. Together they control up to 30 percent of the world's copper reserves. There is no doubt that "RTZ" made this maneuver in order to clear the way for its companion: After all, they have common interests.

But these interests consist by no means in releasing a sizable batch of Russian copper onto the market, but actually in preventing this, at least for the immediate future—holding off for around 20-30 years, by which time, according to the forecasts, several major mines will have been exhausted. To all appearances, these ideas were also reflected in the excessively "cautious" program which "BHP" submitted to the tender committee. Its essence was as follows: The firm will spend one year investigating the reserves, and a further 18 months to two years carrying out calculations and studying the market. Then, and only then, will it decide whether to invest money in developing the deposit, and when. It is easy to see that such terms would leave Russia, which needs investment, and, moreover, immediately, looking rather foolish.

It is interesting that two of the 10 members of the tender committee voted in favor of "BHP." They were Proshin, representing the Ministry of Economics, and Kudryashov, representing the State Committee for the North [Goskomsever].

By a majority of votes, the tender committee and the Chita Oblast Administration opted for the project proposed by the "Udokan Mining Company": In this situation, they could not do otherwise.

But does this mean that the project will actually get under way in the next few months?

Many experts believe that the project submitted by Andrey Chuguyevskiy is somehow too good, and this makes them wary.

The "Udokan Mining Company" considers itself Russian because it is registered on Russian territory. But in

fact it is a joint venture in which almost 50 percent of the incorporation capital belongs to American private individuals. Without this it is unlikely that the firm could have participated in the tender. The project requires \$1.3 billion in investments. There is nowhere for home-grown companies to obtain such a sum. But it is thanks to these dollars that the Americans gain a decisive influence over their Russian partner. Are they interested in seeing the project get under way? After all, it is quite possible that these private individuals may hold senior posts in American companies which extract and sell copper, and maybe even in those which submitted tenders. For instance, there is no law against a member of the board of directors of one firm working in a private capacity in a different one. Furthermore, this is very difficult to verify. As for the American copper magnates, they, like the Australians, do not want Russian copper on the market right now either. Submitting an attractive project to the tender committee, winning the tender, and then delaying investment on some pretext or other—such "military ruses" are not unknown in business. The Chita resident Andrey Chuguyevskiy may have the very best of intentions, but he will not realize them without dollars.

It is also possible to play a subtler game: mobilizing the "greens" against the project, for instance, and dragging it through the courts. This fate has already befallen several deals beneficial to Russia which promised millions and billions of dollars in financial injections. However, for the sake of justice it should be noted that rivals of the "Udokan Mining Company" can also do this. By way of insurance in the competitive battle which is only just beginning, the tender committee, Russian committee for mineral resources, and the Chita Oblast Administration have decided to enlist the support of the president. And only then to ring the copper bell.

Western Oil Firms Said To Suborn Tyumen Officials

*PM1901142793 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 19 Jan 93 p 4*

[V. Zaynetdinov report: "Slavonic Wardrobe Sold in Tyumen"]

[Text] Last weekend saw the completion of the visit by Russian Federation Minister of Security Viktor Barannikov to Tyumen. The aim of the trip was to study in detail the oil capital of Russia and certain service questions.

At a meeting with officials of the Ministry of Security's Tyumen Administration Barannikov stated: "Be afraid of nothing and of no one. The law is on your side."

The process of familiarization lasted more than seven hours. The minister noted that in recent times the Tyumen region had been attracting more and more foreigners. Last year alone the oblast was visited by more than 32 Western diplomats from the United States.

Great Britain, Canada, the FRG, and even the United Arab Emirates. Among the visitors were special services officers.

Today they are interested above all in acquiring geological and geophysical information about Tyumen's oil and gas regions. Possessing this data, they can in the future make almost unerring assessments when leasing any particular deposit. Tyumen oil is now permitted to be pumped to anyone. But since it is impossible to obtain such information through legal means (such information is a commercial secret at state level), Western businessmen are trying to obtain it by other methods. Aleksandr Petrushin, chief of the press service of the Ministry of Security's local administration, said that officials of the Russian Ministry of Security administration had already nipped in the bud several attempts by Western firms to suborn officials directly. In all, 32 officials of the oblast's state structures are under operational investigation on suspicion of corruption.

Aircraft Accidents, Safety Issues Examined

934A0665A Moscow TRUD in Russian 22 Jan 93 p 2

[Article by Irina Nevinnaya: "The Unexpected in the Air and on the Ground"]

[Text] *Civil aviation accidents are becoming more and more frequent. Why is a plane passenger's life at risk?*

The plane turned smoothly and started its landing. The roaring engines changed pitch. The still distant glow ahead and down below was changed by the scattered lights of a big city. The atmosphere in the cockpit changed in just a few seconds. No more gaubing. Cups of leftover coffee were cleared away by the air hostess. The pilot-in-command, second pilot, navigator, flight engineer—everybody is doing his own thing in his own place.

A fiery cross suddenly appears like a flash in front of the eyes—it is the aerodrome strip marker. Another couple of seconds and the wheels touch down on the concrete, gently but also powerfully. Everybody lurches forward. A crewman decides to crack a joke: "Don't postpone loving till your old age, don't postpone braking till the end of the runway..." Phew, everything is all right. We have landed.

But it can be different. A flight may end in disaster. Or it may begin with a disaster, and the number of such disasters is growing, however terrifying such statistics may be. The best results in flight safety were achieved in our country in 1987 through 1989, when the number of people killed in plane crashes was approximately one per 3 million passengers. But since 1990 the rate of aviation accidents has started going up. The number of people killed in them is also growing. According to Valeriy Postnikov, an expert from the commission on flight safety, now there is one victim per 300,000-400,000 passengers, even though the volume of air traffic decreased in 1992 by some 30-40 percent compared with

the past. The so-called "acceptable risk" in civil aviation is defined by experts as one victim per 5-7 million passengers.

Many people are saying (and quite justifiably so) that the planes of our existing fleet are worn out and their technical characteristics are obsolete in many ways. Yes, all this is true. But still, almost three quarters of the several dozen disasters which resulted in loss of lives were caused by flagrant violations committed by plane crews. Almost every accident happened to a normally functioning plane in good repair. This means that the trouble is rooted in somebody's carelessness or lack of professionalism...

FROM AN UNOFFICIAL CONVERSATION WITH A PILOT. "Suppose you are a passenger and you have extra luggage with you. It is too expensive and takes too long to pay for extra weight; a much simpler solution is to place a thousand or two in the handler's palm. This 'benefactor' will enter the standard weight on the cargo boarding list. Without knowing the exact gross mass of the plane, the pilots could make a mistake during take-off which might be their last one. Often the pilots have to develop a speed higher than indicated in the flight manual in order to be able to lift off..."

Sometimes they fail to take off even if they use a speed "higher than indicated in the flight manual." A TU-154 plane of the Belarusian aviation administration was on a charter flight to China, on what became known as a business tour. On the way back from Beijing it took on some additional cargo in Vladivostok. But the plane was so overloaded and the load shifted so much out of the center of gravity that the plane failed to lift off after the run, rolled to the end of the runway, skidded into dirt, and was completely destroyed. Fortunately, nobody was killed.

But a similar incident in Tbilisi ended in tragedy. A TU-154 aircraft, overloaded above all norms, made it to the end of the runway, where it failed to take-off; it crashed into the radio beacon building and started to break apart. The plane skidded to a little village located close to the airport. Eight crew members, 16 unregistered passengers, and four people on the ground were killed.

Incidentally, this is one more evil: The crewmen themselves break the rules and allow "stowaways" on their plane. An official of the Interstate Aviation Committee travelling by plane counted... 98 passengers without tickets on his flight. He was very indignant but could not do anything because he was on a personal trip and not on business. Such actions displayed by the pilot-in-command and the crew can be very simply explained by their desire to make money. The means of persuasion in some "hot" spots can be more serious, like a gun pointed at one's head.

FROM AN UNOFFICIAL CONVERSATION WITH A PILOT. "We are approaching our home airport. Cloud cover is low. The ground controllers suggest that we land at another city airport. This means: First, two hours of

flight each way there and back; also who knows how much time you have to spend there... Secondly, it is not so much a different city, it is a different state where we will not have an especially warm welcome. We circled above our home airport once and then one more time; then we found 'a clearing,' prayed a bit, and 'dived' into it. We landed. Everybody's shirt was dripping wet..."

Fortunately, the "clearing" in the clouds did not close that time. Also, I was told that the risk taken by the pilots was "within allowable limits." But it seems that we need to ponder why pilots are so reluctant to spend any time at the airport of a neighboring republic.

I am looking at a sheet of paper with an analysis of causes of flight delays at airports of various republics of the former Soviet Union; their general number has been growing recently.

AIRCRAFT NO. 85537 belongs to the Kazakh Civil Aviation Administration. The delay occurred in the joint-stock airline Uzbekistan (with an airport in Tashkent). A brief description of the problem: Pressure drop in the second fuel system, hydraulic pump replaced. Delay time—32 hours. Footnote: The new pump was delivered from Alma-Ata.

AIRCRAFT NO. 85345 belongs to Turkmenavia. The delay occurred in the Belarusian Civil Aviation Administration. Cause of delay: Sheared starter mesh in engine No. 3. Delay time—18 hours. Footnote: The new starter mesh was delivered from Ashgabat.

Countries are different, airlines are different, and "yours" is being constantly separated from "ours" because we do not have any reliable system of mutual payments or responsibility for broken contract obligations. That is why they keep hauling to the other end of the "single economic space" torque links from Tbilisi or a wheel from Baku.

This separation also has other aspects. A serious incident occurred several years ago in Vnukovo. A landing-gear strut broke on an IL-86 plane (which, according to pilots, is one of our most reliable) as it was landing. The plane (those who fly imagine the huge size of it) tilted to one side and scraped its wing and one engine on the concrete. Fortunately this happened at the end of the braking action when the speed was low, and the plane avoided destruction and fire. No passengers were seriously hurt. An investigation of the incident discovered that a mistake was made during manufacturing: The strut thickness allowance was not observed. An immediate order to check every plane was sent from above to all civil aviation administrations in the country. As a result, similar defects were found on seven more planes.

Experts from the flight safety commission continue to investigate most scrupulously the causes of every accident in civil aviation. But do the results of their work become known in Ukraine or Azerbaijan?

There is a second signature concept in aviation which means a system of function and control redundancy. A mechanic checks the plane before the flight and signs a release after he finishes every stage of his work. But no passengers can board the plane until there is another signature next to his, that of the person who verifies the quality of his work. This is done to exclude any accidental mistakes or plain carelessness.

Nobody, of course, has canceled this rule. But all of our life today is a complete mess. So, the effect of the second signature has unfortunately lost its unfaltering power.

Three large planes burned up in Russian airports last year. A mechanic in Bratsk was refueling a TU-154 aircraft and "forgot" to cut off the pressure before disconnecting the fuel hose. He "forgot" because he was drunk. But he did not forget to disconnect the special device which controls the kerosene flow and blocks the connector; he did not forget this because it was inconvenient and interfered with his work. As a result, fuel gushed out on the ground, splashed onto a red-hot small motor running nearby, and caught fire. The plane burst into flames like a match. While they were moving away the burning fuel tanker the burning fluid also reached another TU-154 nearby.

A major conflagration also occurred in Domodedovo. The cause was pretty much the same, a plain violation of safety rules. Mechanics are required to use special lamps in their work. This mechanic did not have one and used an ordinary lamp. There were lots of flammable materials around—oil, hydraulic fluid. A fire started. They had a fire extinguisher there but...it did not work. When the fire engine arrived there was nothing left of the huge IL-62 but its frame.

"The culture of safety in our civil aviation is low at present," states Valeriy Postnikov. "The number of accidents has been growing and will continue to grow if we do not take immediate and very strict measures. I think that there is an extreme need to introduce efficient government control at every stage, from preflight preparation of the aircraft to the actual flight. At the same time, we have to think about a large-scale program for the rehabilitation of our industry."

FROM AN UNOFFICIAL CONVERSATION WITH A PILOT. "They say, one Australian airline develops cooperation and mutual understanding among its crewmen in the following way. They take the crew out in the country, put them on an inflatable raft, and tell them to row the raft with joint effort to the middle of the lake. When the raft goes far from the shore, it 'shoots out' all its plugs simultaneously. The close-knit crew plunges into the water... It becomes evident immediately who is worth what and whether they can work together... See how it was here with the Ivanovo crash? The navigator warned the pilot-in-command that landing was premature, that they should not do it: 'Let us go for a second circle, Nikolayevich...' Nikolayevich did not listen to him... So, they crashed..."

This might not be a very apt comparison, but our entire civil aviation currently resembles that sinking raft. We can save ourselves only by making a combined effort. Can the "crew" unite? Or will everybody try to save himself, whichever way that may be?

New Railroad Routes Added

934A0637A Moscow GUDOK in Russian 10 Dec 92 p 2

[Article by V. Stepanov, Minsk: "New Routes Into Poland"]

[Text] Just in the very near future, new passenger trains from Minsk and Brest will begin to run to Siedlce, Bialystok, Warsaw and other cities of Poland. An agreement about this was reached by the heads of the railroads of the two countries at a recent meeting in the capital of Belarus.

This decision arose out of vital necessity. Over the last few months, the stream of tourists, business people and relatives living on both sides of the border of these states has increased many times over. Meanwhile, locally formed trains from both sides, as they say, amounted to no more than one or two. In addition, certain routes introduced at one time basically to serve military units of the former USSR, which had been stationed in Poland and Germany, ones like Brest-Erfurt and Brest-Magdeburg, are now being abolished.

As a result, at the railway stations, there arise long lines at the ticket counters, in the public dining rooms and in the baggage check-rooms. All this causes irritation, dissatisfaction and nervous strain in people.

On the other hand, one has to rejoice at the fact that the number of people wanting to use the railroad is growing. Thus, it is successfully competing with other types of transportation. It is just necessary to organize everything properly. Then the railroads will be able to earn much more at this than currently. And besides, how is it possible to ignore this opportunity now, when the volume of freight shipments is dropping steadily?

The scheduling of the new trains will be worked out by the Polish specialists, while the rolling stock will be put together by their Belarusian colleagues. But before solving all the organizational and technical problems, it has been deemed advisable to inaugurate traffic along the Brest-Golya-Cheremkha-Bialystok route as an experiment already from 10 through 20 December of this year.

An understanding has also been reached on the establishment of a Minsk-Warsaw transfer service. The essence of this process consists of having a train come into a platform in Brest, on the other side of which there will already be standing a similar empty set of the same number of cars with Western European wheels. The arriving passengers will transfer to it and take the same seats they had on the train they rode to Brest. All the customs and border procedures will be taken care of en route on the section from Baranovichi to Brest. Of course, transferring with their things from one train to another does entail certain inconveniences for

people but, on the other hand, there will be a substantial gain in time which is now wasted in changing the wheels and in the border formalities.

Security for Passenger, Suburban Trains Viewed

934A0637B Moscow GUDOK in Russian 10 Dec 92 p 2

[Article by GUDOK correspondent A. Kucherenko, Tashkent: "The OMON [Special Purpose Police Department] Will Help"]

[Text] Begun on the Central Asian Railroad has been the formation of a special subunit of the police, the members of which, as of 1 January, will accompany passenger and suburban trains across the republic's territory. Funds to pay for 300 policemen are being allocated by the railroad's divisions and enterprises.

Despite the measures undertaken, the situation remains complicated. Causing special alarm are the passenger trains, where the crime rate in the current year has increased by more than 30 percent. The number of serious crimes has increased: thefts, robberies and larcenies involving personal property. Fanciers of an easy profit, for example, selected for themselves a train travelling between Tashkent and China. There, at the final section of the track, thieves, robbers and extortionists are constantly active. Both the passengers and the conductors are suffering from them. Instances of embezzlement and equipment damage in suburban electric trains and hooligan assaults on workers of train and locomotive crews have become more frequent.

This has prompted the administrations of the Central Asian Railroad and Internal Affairs for Transportation of the republic's MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] to establish a special subunit of the police. Depending on the crime situation on the trains, a determination is made of the number of escorts, the procedure for their travel is approved and provisions are made for joint actions with the train crews, as well as the participation of volunteer squads.

Plans have been made to use the assets of transport enterprises, organizations and associations which use the railroads and the dues of individuals to set up a non-budgetary fund for "Law and Order." The money from it would be used for strengthening the material and technical base of the transport police agencies and improving the daily living conditions of the personnel.

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Vologda Communists Oust Pro-Reform Papers From Kiosks

PM2001173593 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
19 Jan 93 p 5

[Report by Viktor Filippov: "Vologda Communists Take Control of Masses With Assistance of 'Rospechat'"]

[Text] Vologda—Since 1 January it has been impossible to buy all-Russian newspapers which support the reforms at Vologda's "Rospechat" [Russian Main Administration for the Distribution of Printed Materials] kiosks.

According to the kiosk attendants for some reason they have stopped supplying them with IZVESTIYA, KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, and ARGUMENTY I FAKTY. On the other hand there has been an increase in the influx of communist newspapers published in Moscow and St. Petersburg. Lyudmila Balakshina, deputy chief of the Vologda "Rospechat" enterprise, had a simple explanation for this New Year surprise:

"The communist publications work with us on commission terms, that is they write off unsold copies at their own expense. But IZVESTIYA wants us to bear losses for unsold newspapers so your newspaper's retail sales are restricted."

The restriction is as follows: There are 50 copies of IZVESTIYA on sale for all Vologda, whose population is almost 300,000.

Well, "Rospechat" is free to trade in newspapers on the basis of its own interests. But are they its own interests in this case? The events of recent weeks make us doubt that the fourfold reduction of January retail sales compared with December is dictated merely by commercial calculation.

Immediately after the Constitutional Court's decision Valentin Kuptsov, former first secretary of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Communist Party Central Committee, stated in an interview with a Vologda newspaper his firm intention to resurrect the communist party and restore to it the property which it had before the president's ban.

The local communist leaders interpreted the statement of their fellow countryman (Valentin Kuptsov was once first secretary of the Vologda Oblast Communist Party Committee) as an order to emerge from underground. They are now preparing a citywide meeting at which it is planned to resurrect the party organization as the legal heir to the RSFSR Communist Party. The next step is the struggle for its legacy: Before the August putsch the communist party had real estate and property on Vologda Oblast territory worth 17,337,000 rubles (in 1991 prices).

Valentin Kuptsov promises to restore a communist party which "will stand at the head of all mass organizations for the defense of the working people's interests." Today, when just 500 people in Vologda have openly confirmed their membership of the communist party, this claim to nationwide leadership seems absurd at first glance. But history has already repeatedly shown that the Communists know how to achieve their goals at any price.

Radiation Levels Above Normal Discovered in Moscow

934C0746A Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 17 Dec 92 p 1

[Unattributed report under the rubric "Around Moscow": "The City Monitors Radiation"]

[Text] In the course of scheduled radiation level checks in Moscow over the three quarters of 1992, the Radon Scientific-Industrial Association and the Geococenter have found 47 areas where background radiation exceeded permissible levels. Most of the time, such places contained either discarded devices in which radioactive elements are used, or parts to them. For instance, they discovered large quantities of smoke detectors with components that contain plutonium. The greatest number of radioactive areas—20—was discovered in the South-West District. The North-East District came in second with 12. All the dangerous spots have been cleaned up.

Sale of Toxic Milk in Moscow Confirmed

934C0746B Moscow MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS
in Russian 17 Dec 92 p 1

[Unattributed report: "Moscow Drinks Toxic Milk"]

[Text] According to an expert evaluation conducted by the laboratories of the Russian Federation State Committee for Standards, milk products harmful to life and health are being sold in Moscow.

The inspection was conducted at the city's seven dairy-processing enterprises: the Moscow, Ostankino, and Lianozovo dairy combines; the Ochakovo Dairy Plant—a leased enterprise; the Cherkizovo dairy plant; the Imeni Gorkogo dairy plant; and the Lianozovo infant dairy products plant. As it turned out, these enterprises received raw materials (milk, cream, cottage cheeses, sour cream) containing two-three times the allowable levels of antibiotics and toxic elements (lead, zinc, and arsenic). Such materials were received from farms and supplier plants in Moscow and Ryazan Oblasts, and used them in production (!).

Final products also were inspected. A high lead content was detected in the pasteurized milk produced by the Imeni Gorkogo plant; and a high antibiotic content in the sterilized baby formula (!) produced by the infant dairy products plant.

Counterfeit Dollars Seized During Arrest in Moscow

934C0746C Moscow MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS
in Russian 18 Dec 92 p 1

[Unattributed report "A Million Counterfeit Dollars"]

[Text] As reported yesterday at a press conference given by the Moscow Administration of the Ministry of Security, a few days ago the security services of Italy and

some other countries, together with the U.S. Embassy security service, arrested a group of smugglers and counterfeiters. Almost all the suspects were detained near the Leningradskaya Hotel. The last one was arrested in the Cosmos Hotel, where he was arranging a banquet to celebrate a large deal.

The substance of the case is as follows. The counterfeiters were trying to get half a million real U.S. dollars for a million counterfeit ones printed in Italian printing houses (four citizens of that country were among the detained).

Not all the counterfeit money was confiscated: Several tens of thousands have been circulated in Ukraine and may reach Moscow.

It was reported that in the Central Asia, meanwhile, more than half the foreign currency in circulation is home-made.

By the way, the chief of the Ministry of Security Moscow Administration investigative service asked those going abroad not to tape dollars to their body with scotch tape—he said that customs officers were well aware of this trick.

'Working Moscow' Rally Protesting Alleged Rent Increase Viewed

934C0746D Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 18 Dec 92 p 1

[Report by Ye.K.: "Opposition Protests Potential Rent Increases"]

[Text] On 26 January a rally took place at the initiative of the Russian All-People's Union, the Working Moscow movement, and other leftist and patriotic parties and organizations at the Yuriy Dolgorukiy monument in Moscow; the rally was linked to the 70-year anniversary of the establishment of the USSR. Among the speakers were USSR People's Deputy Aleksandr Krayko, Russian Deputies Sergey Baburin and Nikolay Pavlov, and the leader of the Communist Union Aleksandr Prigarin. The speakers announced this to be an opening action in the campaign against the intention of the Moscow mayorality and the government to sharply raise apartment rents (first six-fold, then 48-fold).

The special proclamation "Listen, people of Moscow!" calls on Moscow City Soviet deputies to derail these antipopular plans, and on ordinary Muscovites to join forces and not pay any more for their apartments than they pay now.

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

IMF Letter Criticizes Russian Economic Policies

934A0659B Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian
20 Jan 93 p 2

[Report by RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA Rapid Response Service: "Was Gaydar Trying To Be Cunning?"]

[Text] Several days ago Arkadiy Volskiy, president of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, received a confidential letter from the leadership of the IMF. At this point the authors' "veto" on its publication has not been lifted. Therefore we cannot print the full text of the letter. The small excerpt we are offering to our readers, however, is quite informative by itself. Besides, we are free to do so since it was received from an unofficial source.

From the IMF Letter

"There is an alternative to the ineffective economic strategy currently being implemented in Russia. This strategy emanates from the illusion that Russia can easily step into a market economy through immediate and complete deregulation of prices and imports. Those who developed this strategy—mainly Western consultants—said that it would ensure stabilization of prices and restore the volume of industrial production through foreign investment. In reality, however, this strategy has produced a decline, shrinking incomes, and inflation, as well as deep distrust towards world financial projects. Today the conduits of this economic policy offer explanations of its misjudgment, blaming opposition on the part of the so-called military-industrial complex, which in reality is the only force capable of supporting the minimum level of employment in production. And although the "cold war" is over, the current failure of Russia's economic policy is still seen as a positive factor by intelligence circles and some mass media in the West, who naively assume that any weakness on the part of Russia or Ukraine is advantageous to the West."

Christopher Pledges Increased Support for Reforms

PM1501141993 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
15 Jan 93 p 3

[Aleksandr Shalnev report: "New U.S. Secretary of State Promises To Increase Support for Reforms in Russia"]

[Text] Washington—Help for the reforms in Russia will be one of the Clinton administration's highest foreign policy priorities, Secretary of State-designate Warren Christopher has stated.

According to Christopher, speaking Wednesday in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, where the hearings into his appointment have begun, the United States "along with its partners in the G-7 will increase its support for the reforms" in the former Soviet Union. However, the scale and intensity of the support will be conditional on the readiness and determination of the governments in Russia and in other republics to continue "taking difficult but necessary steps" in the economy and other areas of reform.

The reasons cited by the future secretary of state to explain the importance of helping the former Union included the following: "The collapse of the Russian economy could fatally discredit the ideas of democracy" not only in Russia itself but in other countries of the

world too. The global development of democracy, including the affirmation of human rights and freedoms throughout the world, is, according to Christopher, one of the "three main basic principles" of the activity of Clinton's administration in the foreign policy and national security sphere. The two other basic principles are ensuring U.S. economic growth and supporting its military might.

It is very noteworthy that Christopher made economic growth the priority. In his speech he made it absolutely clear that his State Department and, in particular, U.S. embassies and other missions abroad will try to pay far more attention than before to questions of the economy and in particular to the kind of aid and assistance to be given to U.S. businessmen entering international markets and how to give it. Christopher did not hide his indignation at the fact, for example, that "there is just one commercial staffer at the embassy" for the whole of a country as gigantic as Russia. There must be an end to the situation, he said, in which "the economy is poor relation of foreign policy."

Talking about the Moscow embassy, the future secretary of state announced that an "active search" is now under way to find a candidate for the ambassadorship, which has been vacant since Robert Strauss returned home. It is extremely important, Christopher noted, to choose someone with influence so as to demonstrate the level of our support for Boris Yeltsin.

But Christopher spoke mainly in general terms about support and help for the former Union: When listening to him you did not get the impression that the Clinton administration's policy toward Russia has been clearly thought out or defined in detail yet or that there are already specific figures and dates in mind. The secretary of state could not even say when the Russian-U.S. START II treaty will be presented to the Senate for ratification.

The very fact of the signing of this document was welcomed by Christopher, who congratulated President Yeltsin and President Bush on the conclusion of such an important treaty and stressed that START II is one of the most significant achievements of the Bush administration.

However, this policy will be assessed "not according to the elegance of its theoretical tenets but according to its practical results," Christopher noted; incidentally, he did not cite any "general human values" or "norms of the civilized world" but spoke mainly and precisely about just one thing—the interests of America itself and the American people. He flatly dismissed everything else as insignificant.

The future secretary of state did not hide the fact that, if America's interests require it, the Clinton administration will resort to force with more assurance than the present administration. Speaking, for example, about the situation in the former Yugoslavia, Christopher said: "There is too much at stake there to hope and rely solely on the talks that are being held in Geneva." He also

hinted that the United States will now probably be ready to place its troops at the United Nations' disposal for the creation of UN "rapid reaction forces." Christopher stressed the importance of America's settling its debts to the United Nations and suggested that the Pentagon budget be used as one way of doing that.

The future secretary of state warned that there will be reforms in his department. One of the main ones will be the creation of an administration under the assistant secretary to tackle problems of preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction: One specific area of activity here will be China, which is causing Washington concern by delivering weapons to dubious regimes.

Another innovation announced by Christopher is that he will make far fewer foreign trips than his predecessors. Instead he will be considerably more active in his travels around the United States "explaining our foreign policy to Americans, consulting with them, and seeking consensus with them," as he said.

Council of Europe Membership Coming Closer

*PM1501172793 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
14 Jan 93 Morning Edition p 4*

[Article by Aleksey Portanskiy: "Council of Europe Prepared To Open the Door to Russia. But It Must Be a Dignified Entry"]

[Excerpts] Strasbourg/Paris/Moscow—It may be assumed that the talk about Russia's joining the civilized world is now annoying many people, since life has not yet become any better as a result. Nonetheless, this process is objectively taking place. One criterion of a civilized European state is membership of the Council of Europe. [passage omitted]

"The situation in the Old World has changed radically and this requires changes in the Council of Europe," Jack Khanning [name as transliterated], adviser on relations with the press, told me in conversation. "Now the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have to take their seats on the 'European train.' To do that they need to accept the three main principles: Adherence to parliamentary democracy, respect for human rights, and the creation of a rule-of-law state.

What are the merits of the Council of Europe? Despite the undoubted successes of European integration, the building of a unified Europe within the framework of the EC is encountering serious problems: Controversial formulas such as "Two-Speed Europe," "Variable-Geometry Europe" and so on are under discussion even now. As for the Council of Europe, essentially it cannot be split into categories. Although membership of it presupposes subscribing to approximately 150 conventions, Strasbourg is not demanding the immediate adoption of the whole "package." The principles are most important.

For the first time since 1949 a meeting of Council of Europe state and government heads is to be convened in Vienna in October—a natural need for the Council arises in a Europe that has overcome confrontation. Will Russia be represented at this summit?

Russia applied to join the Council of Europe last May, but does our country today conform to the aforementioned principles?

Parliamentary democracy. Judging by the formal indications, maybe. Although the present Russian Federation Supreme Soviet can scarcely be regarded as freely elected and as reflecting the distribution of forces in society. Not to mention the cumbersome structure of our representative authority and such specific features as the tendency to usurp elements of executive and judicial authority.

Human rights. No gulag and no persecution for dissidence—that is definite progress by our standards. But, by international standards, we are again not up to the mark. In particular, Russia is not yet ready to subscribe to the European Convention on Human Rights: All our legislation has to be brought into line with its demands. Work is in progress on this, with the assistance of Council of Europe experts, incidentally, but it has been established that the preparation of the laws can be completed at best by the end of 1993 or beginning of 1994.

As for the third principle, which is the creation of a rule-of-law state, the new Russian Constitution, to all appearances, should conform to international norms. But will it be adopted by the planned date?

When Council of Europe Secretary General Catherine Lalumiere met with President B. Yeltsin in Moscow last fall she was told, in particular, that if Russia participates in the Vienna summit, it will only be as a full member of the Council of Europe. Such is Russia and its importance in the world.

"We want Russia to join the Council of Europe more than ever," Mrs. Lalumiere stressed in conversation with me at the end of last year, when she kindly received your IZVESTIYA correspondent in the Palais de l'Europe. "Because it will show that your country has embarked on the path of reforms which appears to us to be the correct one. Moreover, Russia will thereby confirm its desire to belong to the European family, without in any way losing its distinctiveness, but, on the contrary, asserting it through its link with the rest of Europe."

But the Russian Federation Foreign Ministry leadership reckons that it is too early to talk about a specific date for our joining the Council. The working program to bring us closer together looks as follows: Russia moves ahead with its reforms taking into account Council of Europe membership requirements and the Council of Europe does its utmost to assist us in this. The more vigorous the process, the more willing they will be to help us along.

Of course, one might take a different view: Why is the Council of Europe, which is so keen for Russia to join, not paying special attention to its situation and not lowering the hurdle for us? But are we any better than Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Bulgaria, for which no significant membership allowances were made? Anyway, we would scarcely benefit from unwarranted indulgence. Particularly as not much is actually expected of us—a sign that Moscow really has started bringing its state institutions into line with general world standards.

So neither Strasbourg nor Moscow knows at the moment whether or not Boris Yeltsin will go to Vienna in October to attend the first Council of Europe summit. But that is not the point. The point is that the question of Russia's being admitted to the Council of Europe is on the agenda, and that is important for us above all. Indeed, by applying Council of Europe standards to ourselves we will advance more rapidly along the road we must follow.

Russia Joins Asia-Pacific Parliamentary Forum

LD1501180993 Moscow *ITAR-TASS in English*
1354 GMT 15 Jan 93

[By *ITAR-TASS* correspondent Andrey Varlamov]

[Text] Tokyo January 15 TASS—The Asia-Pacific Parliamentary Forum, whose constituent meeting ended in Tokyo today, has approved Russia's membership in this unique regional organisation of lawmakers. This decision was announced to a press conference on the results of the forum, held in the Japanese capital.

Replying to an *ITAR-TASS* question, first president of the Asia-Pacific Parliamentary Forum, ex-Prime Minister of Japan Yasuhiro Nakasone said that its members expected Russia's equitable and adequate participation in the work of the new organisation, "openness for all the legislative bodies of Asian and Pacific states, particularly members of the ASEAN, the Conference for Pacific Economic Cooperation and the South Pacific Forum, wishing to promote a dialogue among parliament members of the region".

The forum's constituent meeting, which was preceded by two preparatory sessions in Singapore and Canberra, was attended by 59 members of legislative bodies from 15 Asian and Pacific states, including the United States, Canada, Australia, Japan, China, Mexico, ASEAN and Oceanian countries. Besides Russia, whose application was forwarded in advance to the forum's secretariat and was considered by correspondence, membership in the new organisation was also granted to Peru and Mongolia.

The meeting which, according to Nakasone, was marked by "heated discussions, but culminated in a consensus", adopted a Tokyo declaration, announcing the forum's inauguration and promising to "promote a constructive and frank dialogue among parliament members, recognising and respecting at the same time the role of governments, business associations and other organisations in

order to promote mutual understanding for the sake of peace, freedom, understanding, democracy and prosperity, to expand free trade and investments and to implement different forms of non-military cooperation".

Discussion on Division of Powers in Concluding Treaties

934C0706A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 10 Jan 93 p 7

[Transcript of discussion by Vladimir Nikolayev, candidate of economic sciences, Aleksandr Ostrometskiy, candidate of juridical sciences, and Mikhail Leonidov, a senior official of the Russian Government: "The Mechanism for Concluding International Treaties of Russia Has Still Not been Worked Out"]

[Text] The stormy and at times unpredictable events that occurred at the Seventh Congress of People's Deputies underscore the importance of drawing a clear distinction between the authority vested in the executive and legislative branches of government, particularly in the formation and implementation of foreign policy. Adoption by both chambers of the Supreme Soviet of the bill entitled "On the International Treaties of the Russian Federation" at its first reading should provide the clarification necessary to address this complex and rather muddled problem, which was never resolved by the laws of the former Soviet Union. Did the bill clarify this issue? If not, what corrections to it are necessary? Is it a problem that can be solved by legislation, or is it primarily a problem of practical application?

The following discussion of this issue is presented to readers of ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA. The participants include Vladimir Nikolayev, candidate of economic sciences; Aleksandr Ostrometskiy, candidate of juridical sciences; and Mikhail Leonidov, a senior official in the executive branch of the Russian Government.

[V. Nikolayev] Unfortunately, today, as in times past, the most important matters of state, including the conclusion of international accords, are handled for the most part within a narrow circle. As in the past, lawmakers as well as the public find themselves confronted with a fait accompli after changes have been made either belatedly or imprudently with possibly serious repercussions. The result of such secrecy is obvious. Hasty, ill thought-out foreign policy decisions can undermine the prestige of Russia and lead to losses in terms of geopolitical position.

One of the principal reasons for the situation we now find ourselves in is the absence of any clear-cut, constitutionally based legal mechanism for making foreign-policy decisions. The most important factor perhaps in such a system is parliamentary and public supervision of foreign policy. Such a system operates fairly effectively in countries of the West. Here, however, efforts to establish one like it evoke at times a painful reaction among officials and diplomats of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

What is your opinion in connection with the bill "On the International Treaties of the Russian Federation"?

[M. Leonidov] In my opinion, when we criticize the Ministry of Internal Affairs, we are going too far—we are beating a dead horse. Now, as in the past, it is merely carries out the will of the top political leadership. There are, of course, deficiencies in its performance, and quite a number of them. But the main danger now stems from incompetent interference from people—for the most part, of course, deputies—who are poorly informed in an area that is necessarily the province of specialists. It is, for example, impossible to have all foreign loans and credits without exception arranged for with the approval of the Supreme Soviet. Approval should be limited to only the most important and significant ones. Otherwise the government will simply have its hands tied, and it will be impossible for it to show the necessary flexibility and resourcefulness. One can sometimes see in the people's deputies a tendency to try to control everything in sight.

At the same time, I am in complete agreement with the contention that the lawful means for working out and implementing foreign policy decisions must be securely founded on the basis of the Constitution. In this respect, the current bill is clearly a step forward, although unfortunately the version that went through a first reading is not entirely free of defects. Earlier, preliminary versions considered by the working group were more appropriate and precise in their formulations.

[A. Ostrometskiy] For reasons I cannot understand, these were passed over in favor of some provisions that are extremely inappropriate. To begin with, I am referring to the Article 3 as it presently stands, which states that international treaties are to be concluded "in accordance with a procedure established by the President of the Russian Federation." According to the Russian Constitution, as I recall, the President may sign international and inter-republic agreements, which shall enter into force subject to ratification by the Supreme Soviet (Article 121b). The procedure itself, however, may be established only by law. The bill's formulation on this point aptly illustrates the encroachment of executive authority upon the prerogatives of the executive branch—a form of encroachment, unfortunately, that has been sanctioned by the legislators themselves. If the President is the one to set the procedure for making international treaties, then why pass another law? In that case, whatever the President and his advisers want will be the procedure set since any executive caprice is given a seal of approval in advance.

Incidentally, this formulation is not in accordance with the Vienna Convention of 1959. Moreover, there are other articles in the law that either explicitly or implicitly infringe on the prerogatives of legislative authority.

[A. Ostrometskiy] In the law, there are other articles which infringe, openly or hidden, on the prerogatives of legislative power.

[V. Nikolayev] In speaking of the deputy corps, reference is made to a "snobbish disdain" of specialists. What, specifically, is expressed by this term?

[A. Ostrometskiy] The text of the bill makes no mention of the prerogatives of the chairman of the Supreme Soviet, although these have been spelled out in the Constitution (Article 115). Article 22 of the draft law, although it mentions the temporary, provisional entry into force of international treaties, does not indicate specifically who is to make the appropriate decisions involved. And, of course, this question is extremely important in view of the fact that the provisional period may last for more than a year.

The text should indicate who could suspend the provisional period of the treaty. Finally, there is Article 39, which I shall quote in its entirety: "The RF Ministry of Foreign Affairs shall inform the RF Supreme Soviet of the current status of all international treaties, including their temporary suspension or revocation." In view of the fact that the text makes no mention of any possible participation in the negotiation process by the people's deputies (as, incidentally, is the practice in many countries of the West, where members of the legislature are often included as members of diplomatic missions and delegations), it is obvious that there is a desire to isolate the Supreme Soviet from the negotiation process involved in the preparation of international agreements. This, in my judgment, cannot be condoned once we adopt a policy in principle of the separation of powers.

[M. Leonidov] I cannot agree with such a categorical conclusion. Let us look at the real situation. The former Soviet Union concluded about two hundred international and interpublic agreements annually. Of this number, approximately 30 were multilateral agreements; and no more than 10 percent of them were subject to ratification by the legislative body. Right now, of course, in the Russian context, the actual numbers are substantially reduced, but the proportion between the ones that are ratified and not ratified remains about the same. The question arises: Can the deputies cope with the avalanche of international treaties that descends on them? Would it not be better to concentrate on ratification of the key documents for which the work required is more than enough? I am also against strengthening legislatively the role of deputies in international negotiations, which, so far as I am aware, is not provided for in Western countries either in their legal statutes or international legal documents. Members of legislative bodies, of course, participate in international negotiations, and on a rather broad scale, but they do so in a working capacity, so to speak.

[V. Nikolayev] But it is at this point that the question arises: Who is to say what documents are subject to ratification and which are not? A situation, as you know, might occur in which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for understandable reasons, finding naturally convenient reasons for its actions, and after conferring with their negotiating partners, fails to submit an important document to the parliament. If the deputies were, so to speak, legislatively keyed in to the

process of preparing and concluding international agreements, there would be substantially less chance that the parliament would be bypassed.

[A. Ostrometskiy] The draft law, which we have been discussing, should also provide for the possibility of denunciation of an international treaty, as provided for, incidentally, in both the Constitution and the Vienna Convention.

[V. Nikolayev] In my view, we are suffering right now more from a shortage of legal regulations covering vital issues, including foreign policy and foreign economic issues, than we are from an excess of them. In fact, for the time being, there is no real parliamentary or public means of oversight control, particularly of such issues as these.

In civilized countries the legislative bodies have first and foremost the power of the purse. They have the final word with respect to matters of budget and finance, and that is no small matter; for it concerns the money provided by taxpayers. Here, it is only with great difficulty that we are establishing a constructive relationship between the executive and legislative, as was revealed most recently by the Seventh Congress of People's Deputies of Russia. But there is no other way. The country simply cannot bear a return to totalitarian government.

Servicemen Internationalists Solicit Aid for Cuba

934C0744A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 5 Jan 93 p 8

[Declaration by MAVI board of directors and Cuban group bureau under "Letter to NG" rubric: "Servicemen Internationalists Against Economic Blockade"]

[Text] We, servicemen internationalists, who fulfilled our military duty in Cuba in 1961-1963, who are faithful to our friendship and solidarity with the Cuban people, listened with bitterness to the announcement by TV commentators and newspaper journalists that in the UN vote on ending the American blockade of Cuba, the Russian representative abstained. This is tantamount to showing disrespect towards the Cuban people. A diplomatic step such as this is all the more strange, as Russia has had the most friendly ties with Cuba for three decades, and in 1989, the Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation for 25 years was signed, as well.

Much can be said about the nobility and friendship felt towards the Russian people on the part of the Cuban people. Cuba, a small country, to this date has been helping us treat Russian, Ukrainian and Byelorussian children who were exposed to the effects of the Chernobyl accident. Cuba has taken in about 10 thousand children for treatment, and this is uncompensated. About 500 "Afghantsy" servicemen have undergone treatment and fittings for prostheses, and now, more than thirty of them are being treated in Cuba.

Cuba was the first to come forth offering aid to Soviet people after the catastrophe at the gas line near Ufa, immediately sending by plane its entire experimental

reserve (developed and prepared by Cuban medics) of scarce burn ointment, which saved the lives of many.

If we are to speak of economic relations, then until 1991, the trade turnover with that country reached about nine billion rubles. Cuba supplied us yearly with up to five million tons of sugar, hundreds of thousands of tons of citrus fruits (which Soviet people bought in the store for two rubles a kilogram), provided us with 30 percent of our strategic raw materials—nickel, tobacco products (cigarettes, cigars, pipe tobacco), alcoholic beverages (liqueurs, rum) and other commodities.

And all of this has been cut off in an instant. From the complete shut-down of trade with socialist countries (including the USSR) alone, Cuba has lost close to eight billion dollars. Cuba's losses from the economic blockade by America are about 15 billion dollars.

Now, economic ties are gradually being restored, a trade agreement was concluded recently between Cuba and Russia. Agreements like this were concluded with other CIS republics earlier. This gladdens us, the servicemen internationalists, since Cuba deserves to be treated well.

Right now, many countries of the world are giving humanitarian aid to Cuba (Mexico, France, Argentina and even the people of the United States), and we, Russians, in response to the Cuban people's noble act towards restoring the health of our children and "Afghantsy" servicemen, should display solidarity and provide aid to Cuba.

The servicemen internationalists of the Cuban group of MAVI (International Association of Servicemen Internationalists) are unanimous in their friendship towards the heroic Cuban people, and join the votes by representatives of the 59 countries that voted at the UN to end the blockade against Cuba.

At this time, a difficult one for the Cuban people, we call for state and commercial enterprises and organizations, as well as servicemen internationalists, to answer our call and provide what humanitarian aid they can to Cuba.

We request that you send your contribution to MAVI's current account, No. 700310 at the Commercial Bank "KUNTSEVO-BANK", MFO 201304—to help Cuba.

The MAVI Board of Directors and
Cuban Group Bureau

Social Democrats Ask Parliamentarians To Protest Arms to Cuba

934C0744B Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 11 Jan 93 p 1

[Unattributed article: "Cuban Opposition Searches for Understanding"]

[Text] Carlos Alberto Montaner and Juan Suarez Rivas, leaders of the Cuban opposition and heads of the Cuban

Liberal Union (a constituent part of the Cuban Democratic Platform), met recently with leaders of the Russian Social Democratic Party. The Russian Social Democratic Party leadership displayed its concern about deliveries of Russian arms to Castro's government, and called for "democratically inclined parliamentarians" to direct their protests at this matter to the Russian Federation government.

Anti-Zionist Committee Criticizes Deportation of Palestinians

934C0744C Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 12 Jan 93 p 3

[Presidium of the Anti-Zionist Committee of the Soviet Public, under "Letters to the People's Newspaper: Lines" rubric: "The Tyranny of the Israeli Authorities"]

[Text] The deportation of over 400 Palestinians from the territories occupied by Israel is a crude violation of the norms of international law and the Geneva Convention on the protection of the civilian population in time of war. The tyranny of the Israeli authorities does not receive adequate reaction from the UN, which is conducting a policy of appeasing the aggressor. Zionist ideology and political practice obtained an additional impulse after the repeal, under pressure from the United States, of UN General Assembly Resolution No. 3379, which qualified zionism as a form of racism and racial discrimination. Life reaffirms the fairness and precision of this determination.

The Anti-Zionist Committee of the Soviet Public appeals to all organizations that are patriotic and defenders of the law with a call to raise their voices in defense of the just cause of the Arab people of Palestine, to express their resolute protest against the inhuman acts of Israel's Zionist ruling clique.

(From an announcement by the presidium of the Anti-Zionist Committee of the Soviet Public)

MFA Opens Mission in Nizhny Novgorod; New Airport Planned

934C0744D Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 11 Jan 93 p 1

[Article from publishing agency "Northwest": "Nizhny Novgorod in World Arena"]

[Text] As has been stated in the Nizhny Novgorod city administration, the Russian government has adopted a decision on the opening of a Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs representation in Nizhny. The EEC commission on the provision of technical aid has announced a competition for the right to develop a business plan for the construction of an international airport in the city.

IA "North-West"

POLITICAL AFFAIRS

Plyushch Outlines Future Tasks

934K0041A Kiev GOLOS UKRAINY in Russian
5 Jan 93 p 2

[Interview with Ivan Stepanovych Plyushch, chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine, by unidentified GOLOS UKRAINY correspondent; place and date not given: "Ivan Plyushch: Stabilize the Economy, Raise the Standard of Living; The Chairman of the Supreme Soviet's First Interview in the New Year, with GOLOS UKRAINY"]

[Text]

[GOLOS UKRAINY] The first issue of the newspaper GOLOS UKRAINY in 1993 is coming out with a new circulation—more than 730,000 copies... This is almost double what it was last year. We also had a lot of subscribers from outside the borders of Ukraine. What would you, Ivan Stepanovych, wish for our readers in 1993, and in your opinion, what will it be like for Ukraine and the people?

[Plyushch] I think it is a good sign that even in such a difficult time many people, including your readers who live in need, can squeeze money out of their modest family budget to subscribe to GOLOS UKRAINY. This means that people are interested in life in the country and in state policy. They are not indifferent to what path the new Ukraine is taking and what fate awaits our society.

We will speak the truth: For many the New Year holiday did not bring the joy that in good human tradition is awaited in every family. And, still, while wishing the readers of the newspaper GOLOS UKRAINY and all our citizens and their families the best in the New Year, and wishing them a Merry Christmas, I would advise them to be optimistic. It has fallen to us to begin extremely important work—the construction of an independent democratic Ukraine, and we have to build the foundation brick by brick. From the time that has passed since the proclamation of independence we have become convinced what difficult work this is. Doubts and disenchantment are appearing among some: "Perhaps we are not going on the right road?"

I want to say that the processes occurring in Ukraine are moving according to the objective laws of the development of society. And not only here, not only in the countries of the former USSR and Eastern Europe, but also in other regions where one or another form of the administrative-command system was preserved, and where a method of production was retained that does not support the requirements of society. How we direct our activities relative to these processes will determine the kind of results we achieve.

It is impossible to forecast what 1993 will be like without taking into account what has already been done.

Regarding political reform, the Supreme Soviet established a legislative base in order to begin building a new Ukraine. We became an evolutionary state, by legal means. The world recognized us—more than 130 countries, and 106 countries have established diplomatic relations with us. Ukraine became a full blooded member of the United Nations and a member of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, it joined the Helsinki process, and it joined other European and world structures. I get a feeling of pride when, abroad, I see a new map of the world on which Ukraine is shown as a separate state.

So, the first stage of political reforms has passed. Now we have to create the conditions for intensifying the democratic processes and constructing a rule-of-law state. The Supreme Soviet is working on legal acts on these problems. In particular, it is very important to determine legislatively what the representative and executive organs of authority on a regional and local level should be, and to give them more rights in administering the territories and resolving local living problems.

Simultaneously it will be necessary to work a lot and earnestly on the law on elections to the Supreme Soviet on a multiparty basis, taking into account the practice of democratic countries and the real conditions of our life. Afterwards, time will be needed to explain this law to the voters. After all, such elections did not exist before. A lot of work lies ahead on the draft of the new constitution, whose adoption we cannot accelerate, for it is the Basic Law of our state. It is very important to combine world experience and our own filtered-out realities of contemporary Ukraine.

People are especially troubled by the fact that the economic crisis is getting worse and that the standard of living is falling. We will be frank, the organs of authority did not do everything possible by far in order to stop these processes. However, it should be taken into account that, given similar sociopolitical shocks, no one in any kind of society has succeeded in stabilizing the economy quickly. During the switch to new rails and new conditions of functioning, the economy proved to be not only in a deep crisis but frequently even in a state of paralysis. And if anyone today thinks that these processes can be implemented quickly, or that we can return to yesterday, he is very wrong.

Undoubtedly we must do everything we can in order that fundamental economic reforms move more quickly. Their essence is precisely that there should be a property owner, that everything should belong to "someone," and that there should not be this general irresponsibility. Privatization, rent, and other forms of economic management should be used more actively in order to change production relationships and motivate people to work. Time must not be lost here. After all, many of our laws are not working, because they are oriented on market relations, on the transition period, but the economy essentially remains yesterday's. It rejects them like a foreign body.

The Supreme Soviet, taking the real situation into account, will perfect the laws in effect and work on new ones. In the foreground here are specific problems in the development of the national economy and the requirement for social protection of the people. We granted the government additional powers to accelerate economic reforms, resolve social questions, and adopt emergency measures to overcome crisis manifestations. Of course, the decisions it is compelled to make to restrain a further slump in the economy are perceived differently, and for many they arouse concern and alarm over tomorrow. What can be said here? I am confident that we will be able to stabilize production to a significant degree this year, and this also means the standard of living, and preserve peace and tranquility in society. At the same time I would like to emphasize: Real results depend not only on the Supreme Soviet, the president, the government, and other organs of authority, but also on each of us.

Our country has great potential. I have in mind not only our rich resources, although they were partially exhausted and robbed over 70 years, not only the Ukrainian black earth, which is known far and wide in the world, and not only the means of production of various industries, but, first and foremost, our people, who are industrious, talented, capable, and steadfast. I recently had a conversation with representatives of the American company Edge Petroleum Corporation. Its specialists analyzed the situation with respect to oil and gas reserves. They are prepared to conduct further explorations, invest capital, and use their technology so that in a short time, on mutually advantageous conditions, they may organize the productive recovery of these energy sources that are very important to Ukraine. They told us: "You have reliable people, with whom it is possible to work." I think what they had in mind was that we have a lot of experienced specialists who took part in mastering the northern trades of the former Union. But not only this.

While abroad I had occasion to meet with many Ukrainians living in the United States, Canada, Brazil, and Australia. Fate brought them there, or their fathers or grandfathers, at different times. It was not easy for any of them to get started. But I did not see any poor people among them. Some are rich, others have average incomes. So, can we not really, Ukrainians on our own blessed land, together with people of other nationalities—citizens of Ukraine—build the same kind of life as in the developed democratic countries? I am firmly convinced that we can.

Taking this opportunity, I would like through the newspaper to address our countrymen in the countries that emerged after the breakup of the Soviet Union, and those who live in many countries of Europe, North and South America, and far-off Australia. From the bottom of my heart I wish them a happy New Year and extend to them my best wishes. I would like them always to feel

closer to Ukraine and to invest at least a little part of their souls to its construction. After all, Ukraine is their motherland.

To all readers of GOLOS UKRAINY—I wish you a good New Year, happiness, and prosperity!

Hurenko Resigns From Parliament

934K0045A PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian
11 Jan 93 p 1

[Interview with Hurenko, first secretary of Communist Party of Ukraine, by V. Fomenko; place and date not given: "Hurenko Leaves Parliament"]

[Text] A meeting on the night before Christmas with the first secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine

"The night before" was used for poetic license. In reality the meeting took place just before the start of the Holy Eve. Its initiator was not S. Hurenko, but the author of these lines who, with all due respect for Gogol, would like to warn the readers to guard against all evil spirits.

But closer to the matter at hand. On Christmas Eve I learned from well-informed sources that S. I. Hurenko (who recently declared that he would become a "former" secretary of the Central Committee only after his death), announced his resignation from the Supreme Council of Ukraine.

I telephoned Stanislav Ivanovich:

"Is that true?"

"It is true."

We immediately agreed to meet. In order to avoid unnecessary questions the leader of Ukrainian communists acquainted me with the text of his statement. Here it is in full:

"The political course of the current Ukrainian leadership contradicts my vision of the ways of building a sovereign state and ensuring public harmony and prosperity of the people.

"At the same time with the prohibition of the Communist Party of Ukraine the political and moral consequences of this anticonstitutional act deprived me of the possibility of effectively carrying out my preelection program and actively influence the formation of state policy. Under such circumstances I consider it impossible to participate in decisions the adoption of which contradicts my convictions.

"Guided by provisions of the Constitution of Ukraine and Article 3 of the Law on the status of a people's deputy of Ukraine, I announce that I am relinquishing my powers as a people's deputy of Ukraine. 30 December 1992. S. Hurenko."

But, of course, there were questions.

[Fomenko] First of all it would be good to know if your demarche is a signal to your politically like-minded followers in parliament to "do as I do"?

[Hurenko] No. It only concerns me. I am not calling for anyone to follow me. I would like to stress right away that I am strongly opposed to the early dissolution of the Supreme Council of Ukraine.

[Fomenko] Still, the motives described in the announcement are not very convincing. They could be interpreted either way...

[Hurenko] In my opinion everything is clear. I consider the concept "Independence at any price" unacceptable as it is currently loudly expressed in political acts under the slogan "Away from Russia!" In my opinion the finale here will be a political dead end and total collapse of the economy. I will not accept shock therapy methods which are being implemented in life at full speed under the excuse of the forthcoming economic reform to which there is no alternative. I cannot reconcile myself with the fact that political pharisaism, deeply rooted in rural nationalism and anti-Communism, thanks to the efforts of new politicians, is presented in Ukraine as a new facet of public life.

[Fomenko] Still, it is strange that the leftist forces in parliament are initiating a struggle to legalize the Communist Party while at the same time you are abandoning them.

[Hurenko] First of all I am not abandoning anyone. Secondly, it is important not to overevaluate the possibilities of those forces. Despite all efforts the Presidium of the Supreme Council did not even adopt a decision to bring up this issue at the Seventh Session.

[Fomenko] Are you anticipating a reaction of your opponents to this resignation? After all, this is all grist for Chernovil's mill. Now he will proclaim at every occasion that Rukh purportedly forced Hurenko to resign.

[Hurenko] Let him say what he wants, that does not concern me. In the next six months it will become clear to the people who is defending their interests and who is merely using them as a screen.

[Fomenko] What is your attitude toward Petr Symonenko under whose guidance preparations are under way for a constituent assembly of the new Communist Party of Ukraine?

[Hurenko] A normal attitude. I will assist him in every way I can. I feel convinced that the party cannot be revived from the top. It is necessary to act from the bottom.

[Fomenko] As commonly known, despite pressure by the CPSU Central Committee, you at one time favored an independent Communist Party of Ukraine.

[Hurenko] Yes. That is my firm conviction.

[Fomenko] Does this mean that if you are elected at the constituent assembly, you will be heading the new party of the communists?

[Hurenko] Let's not talk about that.

[Fomenko] What is the reaction of the leadership in parliament to your announcement?

[Hurenko] So far, none.

Security Service Denied Right To Read Letters to Editor

934K0045B Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
 in Russian 16 Jan 93 p 2

[Article by O. Musafirova: "No One Writes to the Colonels"]

[Text] On New Year's eve Vladimir Kulebe, the editor-in-chief of the NEZAVISIMOST newspaper, was visited by three security service agents. They requested permission to read the editorial mail.

The agents did not make a secret of their special assignment. It turned out that the SBU [Ukrainian Security Service] in this manner decided to seek out the anonymous writer "Alpha" who sent letters to many offices. They, in part, contained appeals for the dissolution of the Supreme Council of Ukraine which fully discredited itself and removal of former highly placed communists from executive positions.

The editor in chief attempted to simplify matters for the colonels by suggesting that they take a year's collection of NEZAVISIMOST issues in which everything is included, with the exception of the last point, along with argumentation and facts. The emissaries, however, refused.

The editorial mail department personnel had to produce originals. The journalists were in a decidedly bad mood. For a long time no outsider has disturbed the mail from readers, including some that is quite frank in the political sense. "How do I know what they are really looking for? Some old man in the countryside writes complaining against the president. They will record his address as someone undermining the foundations of power!" The department head Galina Dotsyuk, remarked indignantly.

They did not find "Alpha" in NEZAVISIMOST. But attention was devoted not only to one of the most disturbing newspapers in the republic, but to a number of other publications as well, including the completely reliable parliamentary GOLOS UKRAINY. The press, however, found out a lot. Particularly what the SBU presently considers as its priority task.

Ex-Party Boss Seen as Sign of Communist Resurgence

93UN0658A Lvov ZA VILNU UKRAYINU in Ukrainian
31 Dec 92 p 3

[Article by Mykhaylo Aksanyuk: "A Behind-the-Scenes Leader Enters the Arena"]

[Text] From the first moments of the "appearance" on a direct radio broadcast of the south of Ukraine of the former Communist Party leader of the Odessa area, Ruslan Bodelan, he ran into tricky questions.

"Is it not too much in these difficult times, that you are completing a luxurious three-story palace with an area of over 380 meters, in the seaside zone of Ovidiopilsky rayon, when you have spacious apartments in Odessa as well? Is it true that the construction of the gas line which runs there cost a million and a half? How do you reconcile this large-scale construction with resolution no. 170 of the oblast executive committee, which you signed, and which conflicts with the circumstances of the building, and in what way are you preparing to continue activity of a similar sort as a national deputy of Ukraine?"

But they looked in vain to bring to bay the twice-over national delegate. Ruslan Borysovykh, as it is said, did not deny the fact—how do you hide a "humble little building?"—but he also did not confirm it. And this showed that a host of trained and experienced legislators, who vote two mandates, has arrived in the Supreme Council.

Because since December 14 the head of the Odessa oblast council is defending at the oblast sessions the interests of the voters of the city of Odessa, where he lives. And in the parliament of Ukraine he represents the voters of Kiliysky rayon, where his own brother, Volodymyr Bodelan, gave him great help in getting the legislator's mandate. The former first secretary of the local rayon committee of the CPU, and now—the head of the rayon council.

"Passed," in a word, the former first secretary of the Odessa oblast committee in the district of the former first secretary of the rayon committee, and by a "presidential" share of votes "for" and "against"—68 percent. The rest from local residents went to his rival, who did not even withdraw his own candidacy. Thus, the election took place in a complete in an absolutely "civilized" way: there were no errors or cheating!

Well, but the fact that the Odessa "Rukh" and the "Democratic Odessa" bloc of parties decided it was superfluous to send observers to the district's electoral wards can by no means be seen as a manifestation of scorn, by the political opponents of Bodelan, of the unworthy methods by which he won the parliamentary mandate. At least the brothers Bodelan, certainly, have another point of view on this matter, as with methods of achieving goals in general....

In fact, the "nontraditional" methods, used by Ruslan Borysovykh in political competition, evoked discord in the opinions of the citizenry before. It would be enough to recall the previous pre-election campaign, when the then secretary of the oblast committee for questions of ideology and simultaneously the candidate for legislator failed, it can be said, because of an "ethical" trifle. The newspaper "Arguments and Facts" published with the help of the activists of "Rukh" an address by the archpriest of the Kotovskyy district to all priests of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in the northern rayons of the Odessa area, with an appeal to agitate from the church pulpits for the "worthy candidate" Ruslan Bodelan. Is it necessary to say that the points of view of Orthodox Christians and of Communist Party functionaries, as concerns support for the organizer of many years of antireligious work in the Odessa area, did not coincide?

It would not in general be worth speaking about all these "nuances" of the creative laboratory of Ruslan Bodelan, perhaps, if the news about his "passage" as a legislator had not evoked noisy elation in the quiet circles of the orthodox communists and restorationists of "Novorossiia," and had not given birth to public prognoses: will Bodelan's return to political life lead to a new upsurge of separatist actions under the fine sounding pretext of struggle to strengthen the federative structure in the new Constitution of Ukraine? In the memory of many, the blackmailing of Kiev by "attacks by workers from south Ukraine" on the Supreme Council and in Halychyna is still fresh, and also attempts to create in Odessa the "inter-movement" and the reanimation of "Novorossiia." And now the veterans of the undeclared war against the independence of Ukraine are not hiding anywhere—they are awaiting a good time to renew their activity. These are, first of all, the former secretary of the Odessa city committee of the CPU-CPSU M'yatkivskyy—now a member of the oblast political council of the SPU; and the inspirers and participants of these actions, the writer Mykhaylyk, employee of the oblast executive committee Serov, and head of the oblast committee for the defense of peace Haydayenko, who approved the publication of fliers opposing the national-democratic forces of Ukraine, the members of the National Council and parliament.

But anyway, there are really more than enough bases for these sorts of prognoses and hypotheses, if one analyzes the points in the reports of the present head of the oblast council. It is enough to listen to the recordings of some key speeches of deputies at the last session of the oblast council, which the newly minted legislator headed, in order to understand which political line he is pursuing, imposing it on his colleagues. I add only, that in the thoroughly created atmosphere of anti-Ukrainian psychosis, even those who at times have openly voted against the state sovereignty of Ukraine, in the meeting hall of the oblast council appear either as "politically unreliable," or in the best case as unprincipled partners of the "alliance of nationalists and shadowy figures, that throng around the government Olympus" in Kiev.

"Sorry, deputy Romanov, but I cannot assure you of the acceptance of the new Constitution, since you somehow criticized its project, unhurriedly, in an unprincipled way," stated the deputy Hennadiy Prystav of the oblast council directly to the face of his parliamentary colleague, Yuryy Romanov. "And if the Constitution is approved anyway, then the political forces which have matured among us might explode: a revolutionary situation will appear, which means a new struggle and new blood will begin... In his report Ruslan Borysovykh clearly stated: this Constitution will not guarantee any rights, which means we will not have popular rule, or democracy...."

And so, there is a vote of no confidence even for those, who simply do not fervently and zealously enough come out for dismembering Ukraine by means of federalization, like, for example, Charodeyev or Meshcheryakov. And here, we will note, there is no exception at all. In the speech of deputy Artemenko, who in the elections of November 22 also tried for a parliamentary mandate, are these "Ukraine-loving" themes:

"Indeed, a regional-federative structure and other normative acts could give the document under discussion a positive direction. Indeed, if Russian is not given today the status of a state language, then the tension, which is already growing now, will gain ever more strength. Especially in the Black Sea coastal region, and in the Donbass...."

And what is most troubling of all: the same leitmotives in speeches, the same themes and ultimative character, could be heard on the day before in the Donetsk oblast council. Naturally, the resolutions which have been accepted are directed, on the one hand, at the federalization of Ukraine, and on the other, at the "general strengthening of the CIS and the activation of the role of Ukraine in this process," as the parliamentarian from Kharkov, Meshcheryakov, indicated the task of the national deputies to be at the last session of the Supreme Council of Ukraine. In other words, the growing coordination of the anti-Ukrainian forces has become a reality. First, the commissions of deputies of the Odessa oblast council are preparing projects for resolutions to support the "federalizationist" actions of Donetsk. And then the initiative of the deputy from "Novorossiya," Yuryy Selivanov, who also was a candidate for the Supreme Council, on the necessity of Ukrainian subsidies for "Ostankino" are urgently supported by the deputies of the Donetsk area.

"We dealt a preventive blow—and won!" So Selivanov himself evaluated in a television interview this political action, which cost Ukraine more than two billion karbovantsy coupons.

It is understood for whom the blow was dealt. And it is worthwhile to specify who is organizing these forces, that do not cease to deal blows to Ukrainian statehood. Even more so, because only in Kiev is this not being noted and remarked upon. And this was discussed extremely

openly in the recent official address of the parliament of the Republic of Moldova to the Supreme Council of Ukraine: we are encountering "many mutual problems, connected with the efforts of certain circles to restore the Empire, to preserve party-state nomenklatura privileges, with open and secret opposition to progressive transformations, and with attempts to dismember states (the society "Odessa-Tiraspol," "Novorossiya," etc.)"

Is it possible, the reader wonders, that the "novorossy" are continuing divisive activity even after the self-liquidation of the Union? Unfortunately, we have to confirm it: there is reliable information in the Moldovan parliament, which has already shown to what the propaganda actions of the leaders of the "fifth column" can lead. Precisely in November 1991, when Rukh and other organizations with all their might were agitating for the independence of Ukraine, the Odessa oblast executive community by its decision nr. 564 registered the society "Novorossiya" in Odessa. Evhen Utkiy, the representative of the legal office of the oblast state administration, gave this official answer to the question of the correspondent of "Za Vilnu Ukrainu," at a meeting with the leaders of the parties and the press.

"But this was done not merely secretly," protested Rukh leader Viktor Tsybalyuk, "but at the very moment, when in the Odessa press explanations appeared, that such organizations as "Novorossiya" would not be registered in sovereign Ukraine!"

"It is possible, that we will not re-register them in 1933," the representative of the state administration was only able to add, commenting on the action last year by the direction of the oblast executive committee.

After all, what sort of commentary could there be? Only someone completely covering his ears and closing his eyes, as it is practiced in Kiev, could not notice that the Odessa area and the Nikolayev areas, in fact, are now repeating under the direction of the leaders of the oblast radas essentially the same political maneuvers, by which two years ago the Crimea drifted into autonomy. Practically every week, under the influence of the crazy anti-Ukrainian hysteria in Russian language newspapers and on television here, there is born either some party of a pro-imperial orientation, or the "inter-movement."

Moreover, the leaders are people of the local establishment, or are experienced in political battling and blackmail. They know how to play on a population which has suddenly become impoverished, and how to splash gasoline, while at the same time remaining in the shadows. The sole goal is to turn Ukraine back, into the embrace of its "elder brother." For example, the "Citizens' Movement of Odessa," which was created as a counterweight to the NRU, and in the ranks of which are over 50 deputies of the city council, is headed by the assistant to the head of the Kiev rayon council, Oleksiy Kostusev; the "Novorossy" in the oblast council are represented by Yuryy Selivanov, lieutenant colonel of the service of

psychological disinformation of the intelligence directorate of the staff of the military district; "Odessa Memorial," the societies "Rus," "Ukraine-Russia," and others that in their activities are oriented towards Moscow, are led by Viktor Prymatov, reserve lieutenant colonel of the KGB, the head of the oblast committee of the machine builders' union Volodymyr Bilyavskyy, and a number of pro-imperialy inclined journalists, professors, and instructors in Odessa institutions of higher education.

Let me point out this detail: in the leadership of the oblast society "Ukraine-Russia" there is not a single representative of the Ukrainian community, since the oblast leadership, on the sly, entrusted the leaders of the SPU to arrange the constituent conference. And moreover, it would not be superfluous to say, that the head of the oblast council, Ruslan Bodelan, directed the presidium of the meetings of all these and other "workers of Odessa," dedicated to the 75th anniversary of the October revolution in Petrograd. He did not even separate himself from the provocative address which was made by the ardent adherents of the renewal of a "united-indivisible" Union...

And the recent television interview of the President of Ukraine on the anniversary of the referendum of the first of December should be mentioned here. Answering the question, as to what thoughts were evoked by the disoriented population, and the confrontational activity of certain civic and state figures, Leonid Kravchuk stated: "Clearly, they either do this unconsciously, or consciously are doing everything, so that in this conflagration, in this clash of interests, they can hold onto power." The President, as usual, did not specify to whom he was addressing the warning. But from the further subtext of the interview it became clear, that it concerned in a large measure the Odessa fighters for an "Ostankino" unified space, and, especially, Ruslan Bodelan, under whose direction they tried to strike a "preventive" blow...

If I were asked, what further can be expected from Bodelan, who managed after a false start to get into the Supreme Council, I would repeat the words of the noted Russian parliamentarian Petr Filippov: "He will support carrying out reforms in words, but in actions will work for the return of the command-administrative system." And he could accomplish it this way. The emergence from behind the scenes into the state arena of Bodelan, a true follower of Georgiy Kryuchkov, symbolizes that the south of Ukraine is threatened by a real danger. Because it is completely credible, that immediately after the odious leader, there will begin to return to power, either under the name of socialists, or simply of nonparty parties, those who are not able to work and manage, but who possess the gift of the demagogic phrase. The party, which in its numbers reaches almost the entire village stratum, however, is capable in the present circumstances perhaps of again drawing the nation into the whirlpool of civil confrontations and fratricidal battles.

And this is why, it seems, the circumstances of the arrival in the legislative branch of the "nonparty" Bodelan is worthy of the special attention of students of politics. And the entirely possible winning of mandates by the same sorts of the "nonparty" "novoross" Selivanov or "professional defender" Artemenko...

P.S. When this newspaper "presentation" of the new member of the Supreme Council of Ukraine was ready for print, news from Donetsk confirmed the prognosis. The constituent conference of the Donetsk oblast organization of Communists of Ukraine had taken place here. About 300 participants from various places in the Donbass termed it "revived" after the prohibition of the activities of the CPU-CPSU, which had resulted from the participation of the Communists in last year's putsch.

One of the participants in the conference, the head of the Donetsk oblast organization of the SPU, Heorhiy Voyko, stated: "The main thing now is to get the prohibition changed, and revive everywhere the Communist structures, and to get freedom of action for them. And future events will show how matters will develop among people of socialist and Communist orientation... A combining of socialist and Communist structures is entirely possible."

The hope to realize these efforts, clearly, rests with the constituent congress of Communists of Ukraine, which is being planned in Donetsk. It can be assumed that many Odessans named in this publication will be active participants. At least the former leader of the Communists, Ruslan Bodelan, has publically stated, that he is not planning to give up his party membership card.

Commentary Reviews New Passport Procedures

AU1901134893 Kiev HOLOS UKRAYINY in Ukrainian
12 Jan 93 p 5

[Commentary by Serhiy Danylenko: "It Is Only a Matter of Obtaining a Visa"]

[Text] News reports on the new procedure for foreign travel by citizens of neighboring Russia and Belarus were among the last of the last year and the first in the new one. Ukraine has adopted a similar regulation. On 31 December the Cabinet of Ministers adopted Decree No. 738, establishing a simplified procedure for travel abroad.

A briefing was held last week by the Foreign Ministry Press Center which dealt with this question. Viktor Kyryk, deputy chief of the consular department, and Mykola Shepel, chief of the visas and registration department, took part in the briefing. They spoke in detail about the measures being used by their departments for implementing the decree.

"The Foreign Ministry has informed all states around the world about the new departure procedures for Ukrainian citizens," Kyruk said. "We let the international

community know what kind of documents the people must have and how they must be prepared."

As stated at the briefing and in accordance with the aforementioned decree, a simplified procedure has been established for foreign travel. It is necessary to have a visa of the state of destination, or a standard invitation. A general civilian foreign passport will be used. Therefore, all passports of this type that were issued by 1 January 1993 must be reregistered by the internal affairs authorities at the person's place of residence. A stamp in Ukrainian and English reading "Valid for traveling to all countries of the world" must be included, as well as a visa seal. Those who registered their travel documents before 1 January 1993 may travel abroad only provided that they have acquired the necessary credentials.

Diplomatic passports of the "DK" series are valid until 1 January 1994. Official foreign passports of the "SK" and "SM" series are valid only if they are reregistered at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and bear a stamp in Ukrainian and English reading: "This passport is property of Ukraine."

"The Cabinet of Ministers and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have elaborated provisional regulations on the procedure for issuing foreign passports," V. [as published] Shepel told reporters. "This document has been coordinated with the Security Service and Ministry of Foreign Affairs."

It is, in particular, pointed out in the document that citizens 18 years of age can submit passport applications to the internal affairs authorities. The provisional regulations contain reasons why a person's rights to go abroad may be restricted. This will apply in the following cases:

If the citizen has knowledge constituting a state secret;

Until the end of the investigation of any criminal charges brought against him;

Until he serves his sentence or is released from imprisonment if he has been convicted for committing a crime;

If he evades the obligations given him by a court of law;

If he has deliberately supplied false information about himself;

If he is registered with a military induction station and is about to be called to active service;

If the citizen has not completed his compulsory military service and has no lawful exemption from it;

Until the end of any civil proceedings brought against him;

If, in accordance with the court's verdict, the citizen has been found to be a particularly dangerous criminal or if he is under administrative surveillance by the militia, until the surveillance is over.

Also, in order to obtain or reregister a passport, it is no longer necessary to produce the invitation or state the purpose of the trip to the internal affairs authorities. Requests for issuing or reregistering a passport will be considered within one month. In the case of requests for going abroad for permanent residence, the consideration period extends to three months.

Reregistering and issuing passports have been postponed temporarily until the Cabinet of Ministers establishes new customs duty rates. Those permits issued earlier continue to be valid.

P.S. When this material was being prepared for publication, it became known that the Cabinet of Ministers has established the customs duty for obtaining or reregistering a passport to be one month's wages.

ECONOMIC AFFAIRS

Deal on Foreign Debt With Russia Viewed

WS1901134793 Kiev RADA in Ukrainian
11 Dec 92 pp 1,2

[Article by O. Dubyna; "The Holokhvastov Club"]

[Text] As we know, the immortal literary character, chased by creditors, went around like a chicken with its head cut off. Today not individuals, but whole nations have found themselves in such a situation. In the eighties, almost all Latin American countries became hopeless debtors.

Today Russia is steadily moving to join the Holokhvastov [literary character, epitome of debtor] Club. Acting in accordance with the "Forever Together" slogan, she is dragging Ukraine with her. In 1993, \$38 billion of the former USSR debt must be paid, while Russia is able to pay only \$2.5 billion. If the existing agreements are kept valid, Ukraine will be responsible for one-fifth of the debt. It is clear that we do not have this much money. Under the circumstances, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations has achieved an agreement with the creditors of the so-called "Paris Club" on a postponement of debt payments for 10 years. This means that even under a 10 percent yearly interest rate, the debt of \$70 billion (a very doubtful figure, probably artificially decreased by Russian brainwashers) will more than double. This would be a disaster impossible to survive. So, Russia's Foreign Economic Relations Minister P. Aven suggested "turning the debt into property." Foreign property, of course. In normal people's language, it means that we will have to pay with raw materials and in some cases we will have to give up those enterprises of the military industrial complex which will be of interest to the creditors. This is a direct path to the loss of economic, and what follows, political independence. Those in Moscow who have understood the danger are ringing all the bells, not forgetting to pour dirt on Ukraine.

For about a month now, the Russian mass media have been repeating the information about the agreement between Russia and Ukraine, according to which Ukraine has handed over to Russia the control of its part of the debt.... PRAVDA wrote: "After the refusal of all the CIS states to pay the Paris Club's accounts and Ukraine's abandoning of the ruble zone, Russia took over all the foreign debt." It is hard to believe that Moscow has more hard currency reserves than Kiev," mocks the newspaper. It does not mention the fact that all the hard currency reserves were kept in Moscow banks, and that Kremlin reformers still conceal the data on the assets which should belong to all those responsible for their creation, not to Russia alone. What is Ukraine's stance on this issue?

With a large delay, as if feeling shy, Ukrainian newspapers reported that Ukraine did not give up its share of the debt, but temporarily transferred its management to Russia to help it reach an agreement with creditors on the postponement of payments. On 28 November, HOLOS UKRAINY published a short report on the news conference at which Ukraine's Minister of Economy V. Pynzenyk reassured that there existed a preliminary Ukrainian-Russian protocol on a temporary transfer of the debt and assets of the former USSR to Russia. The appropriate agreement was to be signed on 31 December. If before this term, Ukraine considered the information on the volume of the assets insufficient, it would refrain from signing it. In the meantime, P. Aven managed to make an arrangement with the Paris Club doubling the debt....

Today raw materials and consumer goods sold abroad at dumping prices make up almost 90 percent of Ukraine's exports. Ukraine has substantially contributed to the fact that world prices for nonferrous metals have reached an extremely low level.

To avoid a drop in income, commercial structures keep increasing raw material shipments. The increase in the rate of sale of our national wealth may lead to a situation in which by the time the payment postponement expires, we will be left without raw materials. What will happen then? Will we have to sell our fertile black soil, or maybe donor blood, as it was done by Nicaraguan dictator Somoza?

Even today things are getting tough for us. In 1993 Ukraine's regular hard currency payments will amount to \$7 billion, of which \$3 billion are foreign debt payments. Were it not for the debt, we would have been able to achieve an export volume of \$4.2 billion, which would have permitted us to make both ends meet and look into the future without fear. What shall we do?

Holokhvastov's only hope was Pronya's dowry. We do not have a wealthy bride. Should we turn for more loans from international financial organizations, as some people suggest? But even today, we spend more than 70 percent of our export profit on our foreign debt payments while the world's experience shows that spending

more than 10 or 15 percent leads to the debt's constant growth. But the postponement of payments is not a cure. It will make life easier for the current authorities but will become a heavy burden for the future ones. Is there a way out?

There is. First of all, we must put things in order in our own home. Then we will be able to pay the creditors not with raw materials, sold at dumping prices, but with real money. We are able to do it. In his speech at the Supreme Soviet session, L. Kuchma said that during the first 10 months of 1992, \$5 billion worth of export licenses had been issued (not considering barter deals). These operations brought Ukraine's currency fund ... \$17.7 million. Most probably we will never know what happened to the lion's share of the money, but we shall put an end to this kind of operations once and for all.

Second, how many times shall we repeat that Russia should pay Ukraine for the transit of Russian energy carriers to the West through Ukrainian territory? Different figures are named, passionate speeches uttered, but the matter is still in a stalemate, although we are talking about billions of dollars!

Third, we should make better use of the money that we have. Revealing Kiev's fabulous currency reserves, PRAVDA wrote about Ukraine's deal with Pepsico on the construction of new bottling factories, and 100 pizza producing enterprises, although "pizza will hardly win the contest with traditional halushkas [dumplings]". Let us not talk about our halushkas having an effect on Moscow reporters similar to that of the red rag on a bull. But if this is true information (by the way, why have its details not been carried by Ukrainian newspapers?), this time PRAVDA was right. During the crisis we can do with traditional meals and beverages. Would it not be better to resume the production of half-forgotten lemonade, "cream soda", and "citro" than to act as the market for Pepsico, forced to leave India due to the questionable quality of its products.

Finally, we have to settle our financial matters ourselves, and not charge Moscow with it, which will quite naturally act in its own interests. We have to hold talks with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund ourselves, bearing in mind that these are not charitable organizations. According to the testimony of THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS magazine, during the eighties, the United States received yearly payments of \$600 million due to the membership and leading positions in the IMF. This money did not come out of the blue, it was paid by debtors like us.

Another solution is prompted by Russian mass media: why not refuse participation in the USSR's foreign debt and the money its debtors owe it? Let Russia get all those Syrian pounds and Cuban pesos from the countries that long ago became members of the Holokhvastov Club, and let us abandon the club. We will have to take precautions not to get there again. Otherwise, our

descendants may hear the same kind of words uttered by a police officer, as Holokhvastov once did: "Welcome to the police station".

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Ukraine's Kravchuk on CIS, Relations

TA1501130193 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew
15 Jan 93 p B5

[Interview with Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk by Isabella Ginor; during Kravchuk's visit in Israel "last week"]

[Text]

[Kravchuk] "After declaring independence, Ukraine has to demonstrate its presence on the international arena and make its policies clear everywhere, including the Middle East. We have a special interest in friendly relations with the Arab countries and the State of Israel," Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk said shortly after arriving in Israel on a first official visit of a post-Soviet republic president. "Many Israeli residents are of Ukrainian origin, and it will remain their fathers' homeland. Our support for them is guaranteed, and we hope for their support during the difficult times we are going through. The visit is, therefore, natural but also important for us."

[Ginor] Nevertheless, you are cutting your visit here short by one day to meet in Moscow with Russian President Boris Yeltsin. Do you have many disagreements?

[Kravchuk] Problems were created when the empire was breaking down. Since the connections between Russia and Ukraine are the oldest, and because the two are the largest of the CIS republics, the difficulties between us may be the greatest. For example, in the past, 80 percent of trade inside the USSR was between the two republics. I do not want to harm Russian interests, but I insist on ours.

[Ginor] You were one of the founders of the CIS, and yet you have just declared that Ukraine will not endorse the charter of the CIS. Does that mean that you will quit the commonwealth?

[Kravchuk] The two are not interrelated. Some agreements have already been approved, and I continue to support the CIS in its current status. Nevertheless, new processes have begun. There are those who would like to tighten the incorporation by establishing joint political and economic structures which we believe would necessarily lead to the reestablishment of a centralist state, because the new structures would be mentally immature. We in Ukraine have distanced ourselves from this.

Also, the charter suggested is based on documents that have not yet been drafted and I do not know their contents. I believe this is a serious matter which needs time: It took 35 years for the Treaty of Rome to become

the EC, and even now there are still unsolved problems. Still, certain leaders of the former USSR would like things to be handled the way they were in the Politburo: a vote is held and everything ends in two days. When the inauguration session was held in Minsk last year, I came there fully authorized by a public opinion poll, held a week before, in which 92 percent voted for Ukrainian independence. Based on this, I worked for the breakdown of the empire. What am I taking with me to Moscow today? Has anything changed? I do not want this to be understood to mean that Ukraine is quitting the CIS. Everything has to be done in a civilized manner and upon consultations with people.

[Ginor] Does this mean that you fear the reestablishment of the USSR?

[Kravchuk] Undoubtedly. A careful reading of the suggested charter shows that this is the trend. A charter is a rigid thing. Agreements and treaties are more common in international relations, and here they are offering us a charter placing each member country in a rigid economic and political framework. We have already been through that during the Gorbachev era.

[Ginor] Is this one of the reasons for your reservations regarding START II?

[Kravchuk] The two issues are not related. Ukraine has already declared that its policy is to stop being a nuclear superpower. But, how should this be done? Should we ratify the agreements automatically, without reading them? It took seven years before START I was drafted, and another seven months for the U.S. Senate to ratify it. We were not party to the phrasings then, and now our parliament members are given thick volumes to read. They have asked for several months for this, and now Ukraine is accused of stalling on the agreement. We have the right to receive assurances for our security in return for giving up on the third-strongest nuclear power in the world.

What does it mean to destroy 176 missile facilities? Only a person who has never seen them could think that it is as simple as detonating a hand grenade. Except for the warhead, each missile has 100 tons of poisonous petrol, and we do not have the technology to neutralize it. A whole array of political, economic, organizational, and environmental problems have been created. We must make sure that a situation does not occur where after we remove the warheads as required, everyone will lose interest in us: "Now sit on your missiles, with the fuel." How would I be able to explain this to my people? Therefore, we have no intention to change our policy for nuclear disarmament, we only want to protect our interests.

[Ginor] Russia is receiving generous economic aid from the West in return for its part in the START agreements. Do you deserve anything as well?

[Kravchuk] The United States indeed declared that it would give us funds, but only for the specific purpose of destroying the missiles: \$175 million. The truth is that so far it was all declarations of intent. I have not seen the money yet, and I doubt that I will see it soon, although the media is already reporting on remarks by this senator and that congressional member. I understand that money is not given out just like that, and the ratification of the agreements will be a long process.

[Ginor] Russia also receives humanitarian aid. Do you in Ukraine need it, in view of its current economic crisis?

[Kravchuk] The Ukrainians living abroad give us something, and we receive donations for the Chernobyl victims, but it is never near the sums Russia is getting. It seems to me that the situation in Russia is worse and it really needs more aid. As for us, we would rather not get donations, but create an interest for investments in Ukraine. We want business and finance men to have freedom of operation in investing money here, in developing production and creating a market. The legislation exists and the possibilities have been created. We would like Ukraine to be able to compete with products on the international markets; we want joint ventures; we want the military industries to become civilian. I intend to raise these issues while in Israel. We could have great ties in the fields of agriculture and electronics. Democracy is a wonderful vision, but it has to be based on economic grounds.

[Ginor] How do you intend to attract foreign investors?

[Kravchuk] Our laws provide excellent conditions: A full tax exempt for the first two years, a partial exempt for the next five years, and the freedom to choose between cashing out the profits or reinvesting them. I still anticipate difficulties due to the fact that Ukraine still does not have an exchangeable currency. Nevertheless, our laws guarantee good profit for the entrepreneur.

[Ginor] Is it not difficult for an old-time Communist like yourself to adapt to the principles of a market economy?

[Kravchuk] Can you find many in our current administration who were not party members then? Some have even worked in the party institutions and reached the level of the Central Committee. We are not interested today in investigating everyone's "pedigree." We are

only interested in finding out what interests he defends today. For me, the main interest is Ukraine. It is normal for a head of state.

[Ginor] Do you expect to see the Israelis as such business partners?

[Kravchuk] History gives basis to the hope that the currently evolving ties between Ukraine and Israel would become ties of equality and partnership. The foundation has already been laid for Israel to view Ukraine as a good, peace-seeking partner, which could in the future play an important role in Europe, and not only there. Israeli businessmen and politicians could participate in the creation of our nation, and help us construct it as a democratic state.

[Ginor] There were hard times in the history of the two nations in Ukraine.

[Kravchuk] We must study the past, draw from it only the good, and forsake those things that left a heavy sediment on our lives, which many forces today exploit. Until now there has been no Ukrainian state, and the Ukrainian policy was not decided on in Kiev but elsewhere, and was exploited to confront the two nations. I do not deny that throughout history there were and are such periods. You know this, and I would not like to pretend that it is not so. Then, there were periods of violence and mutual disrespect. Biblical wisdom tells us that the community should not be punished for the sin of the individual. Those who brought disgrace on their people should be put on trial, not the entire nation.

[Ginor] Before you left for Israel, there were demonstrations against the Demjanjuk trial in Israel.

[Kravchuk] Trials should be based on precise documents, on law and justice, and not on vengeance. I would not like to go into the details about who is guilty and who is not. Nevertheless, this trial should not be allowed to be exploited by forces that want to sow separation between us, making it a comprehensive fact that would cast a shadow on our relations. Yes, Demjanjuk is an Ukrainian. Yes, if he is proven guilty—although there are documents proving the opposite—he must pay the price for his deeds. There are people like this in every nation. We should not project from one person to an entire nation. Unfortunately, we have documents indicating that such an attempt was made, and I am not referring to what the state has done. In every country there are forces interested in exploiting every fact for their own sectarian interests. On this background, nationalistic and other phenomena may rise that could damage the entire country.

BELARUS

Opposition Said To Be Denied Media Time

93UN0682A Minsk NARODNAYA HAZETA
in *Belarusian* 5 Jan 93 p 2

[Article by S. Navumchyk, coordinator of the Belarusian Popular Front parliamentary opposition, under the rubric "Contentious Situation": "Who Holds the Censor's Cudgel?"]

[Text] Recently periodicals carried an interview with A. Butevich, minister of information, and I. Karenda, his deputy, in which these respected gentlemen accuse opposition representatives of deceiving the population by declaring that the leadership of the ministry has violated the agreement on presentation of air time to the opposition.

The need to establish the truth requires that we offer a chronology of events.

"There was no previous agreement on the distribution of scheduled air time to the BNF [Belarusian Popular Front] opposition," declared Anatol Ivanavich on 7 October 1992 in ZVYAZDA, and he was absolutely right about that. Realizing that under no circumstance would the respected minister grant air time to the Popular Front and that any discussion of this was a waste of time, we requested air time for the opposition BNF deputies.

Because, in the first place, the Law on the Status of the Belarusian People's Deputy guarantees us such an opportunity. Secondly, the opposition is made up not only of people of the BNF but also of members of other democratic parties.

Putting the law to use, on 13 August 1992 we demanded that A. Butevich, minister of information, grant us two hours of television air time and one hour of radio time per week. We explained that members of democratic parties who are not deputies of the Supreme Soviet as well as deputies of local soviets (as you know, it is much harder for supporters of democratic principles to work in the press in the countryside) would be taking part in the broadcasts.

On 26 August we met with Ivan Karenda, deputy minister of information, and Balyaslav Sushkevich and Pawl Shawchuk, deputy chairmen of the Belarusian Television and Radio Company (BTRK) (Butevich and Stalyarow were on vacation).

We reasoned that such negotiations should be based on principles of mutual trust and did not see a need to record the meeting on dictaphone, but we did keep the minutes of this constructive—as it seemed to us at the time—conversation.

[Karenda] We agree that the situation in the mass media does not correspond to the realities which exist in our sovereign state. All political forces should have access to air time, and the voice of the democratic opposition should be heard in full.

[Shawchuk] We would like to meet with the BNF and the opposition. We have much to talk about.

[Navumchyk] We are prepared for a constructive dialogue at any time.

[Paznyak] So do you see an opportunity for two hours of air time for the opposition?

[Shawchuk] You must have a person who will stay in contact with me. Two weeks before each broadcast you must present a script plan—that is the procedure. And do not take a long time on this—I would like to meet again immediately and agree on the technical details.

[Sushkevich] If you would like to know about the best hours on the radio, they are the morning and supper time hours. But I would also ask that you designate responsible people on your side, and we are seeking radio journalists.

[Navumchyk] I ask that you keep in mind that we do not take any pay.

[Paznyak] In the immediate future we will work out a text for the agreement based on your requirements.

In this fashion the preliminary agreement on steady air time for the parliamentary opposition was achieved. ZVYAZDA and DOBRY VECHAR also reported on this in August. There were no denials on the part of the Ministry of information and the BTRK. Moreover, soon afterward there was one more meeting with P. Shawchuk, and at his request we composed the text of the agreement, which laid out in detail the obligations of both parties. Responsible people on the part of the opposition were designated as well—Deputies I. Hermyanchuk, L. Dzeyka, and the author of this article.

And here is the next meeting, this time with A. Butevich, who had returned from his summer vacation, and A. Stalyarow, recently approved for the post of chairman of the BTRK.

[Butevich] The sense of the agreement is political, because today there are no de facto obstacles to the opposition. You are creating a precedent, and that must not be done... I agree that you must be given an opportunity to use the media, but one foresees politicization of the Supreme Soviet... My position is as follows: Such agreements must be signed by a specialist—Stalyarow.

[Stalyarow] I support Butevich. The agreement is not satisfactory for us. Social investigations have shown that there are no political programs on the air...

[Navumchyk] And do many people watch your "Telebirzh," which sells Mercedes for millions?

[Stalyarow] Two hours per week—these are unrealistic conditions.

[Paznyak] Let us talk in specific terms.

[Butevich] The opposition must create its own television station.

[Hermiyanchuk] Why? You are supposed to reflect the political process.

[Paznyak] We have a right to air time that is guaranteed by law. Are you rejecting our demand?

[Butevich] Yes.

[Paznyak] Do you reject it completely?

[Butevich] No. The opposition had, has, and will have the right to take part in any broadcasts, informational and serial.

[Paznyak] What if we agree to 30, 40, or 50 minutes of air time?

[Stalyarow] No.

[Navumchyk] This means that you deny us even what we had previously, albeit only occasionally?

[Stalyarow] Yes.

[Paznyak] Then there is no sense in further conversation. Goodbye.

In this fashion, the negotiation ended with no result.

In their interview the respected gentlemen talk about certain ultimatums on our part. But one could only talk about pressure if member of the BNF Navumchyk, using his official position as secretary of the parliamentary Commission on Informational Media (I occupied this position until recently), were to summon the minister and his deputies and order them to give his political movement air time. I should note that A. Butevich, former deputy head of the ideological department of the Belarusian Communist Party Central Committee, and A. Stalyarow, former sector head of the Belarusian Communist Party Central Committee, (both, incidentally were members of the Central Committee of the last "Malafeyewskiy" convention) know about such methods of "party leadership of the press." Representatives of the Popular Front have never used them. But, you see, we are fed up with more than two years of wasting time on long and fruitless discussions with the heads of the television and radio stations. And the respected minister should not deceive the citizens by declaring that there is nothing keeping the opposition from getting air time. Here is an example: I requested an opportunity to read on "Radyefakts" the Statement of the opposition concerning the decision of the Supreme Soviet on the referendum (incidentally, it was signed by 32 deputies), and on 3 November the executive director of state radio did not merely refuse me but also added, "Why stir things up?" Thanks to the courage of workers of the young editorial board we nonetheless made it on the air. But later journalists of BTRK explained that an order had come from above: Not a word was to be said on the air about the referendum.

The methods studied by the respected gentlemen Butevich and Stalyarow in the hermetic offices of the communist Central Committee and transferred to the informational policy of an independent state are not to the benefit of the state. Society is interested in the civilized and consistent development of political processes where each segment of the population may express its interests as broadly as possible via parties. And this is the most important condition of political, economic, and every other kind of stability and a guarantee against the rule of lumpenized and mob-rule forces. As a result, in many countries with a rich experience of democracy the law stipulates financing of parties, the creation of favorable conditions for them, and a guaranteed opportunity for them to propagate their programs.

But in Belarus they try to collect payment for air time from parties and political movements to which the state has not given a kopek. And in the meantime press services compete to give equipment and air time to the leader of the parliament and the head of the government, who act as their patrons. People carefully analyze the size of the type used in the printing of the last name of a chief and where the announcement of the latest rally is located on the newspaper page. Then it is cynically declared that, you see, parties in our country are not expanding or maturing, many of them are ailing and barely known to the population, and meanwhile the popularity of a single individual is greater than the popularity of all the parties and movements put together. And in conclusion, the proposal to hold new elections to the parliament on the basis of party lists is without realistic justification...

Finally, there is a party in Belarus which gets unhampered and generous use of air time paid for by taxpayers. This is the party of power, the party of the procommunist nomenklatura, which, engaging in bureaucratic maneuvering, is not prepared to risk its guiding role. Indeed, why give the opposition an opportunity to put forward its economic concept when the government does not even have a detailed program? Who will benefit if the corrupt commercial "transactions" of the state magnates are finally publicized?

Why let all this be made public when there is an opportunity to hide it?

Thus the behavior of the leaders of the state mass media conforms completely with the postulates of party discipline, and they need not show any shame before their former party comrades.

However at solemn sessions and diplomatic receptions these esteemed gentlemen should not be speaking of their desire to join Europe and the civilized world.

From the editorial board.

While the article was being prepared for publication we learned that I. Karenda, deputy minister of information, interpreted the course of the conversation with the representatives of the parliamentary opposition differently, as did, incidentally, the leadership of the television and radio

company. The editorial board of NARODNAYA HAZETA has no opportunity to find out which side is the more objective one, and as a result we leave all this to the conscience of both the author of the article and his opponents.

The main thing is that the problem exists and must be resolved. How? All interested parties must consider this in more detail. Perhaps our readers will offer advice.

MOLDOVA

Snegur Statement on Unification Assessed

934K0087A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 14 Jan 93 p 3

[Article by Aleksandr Tago: "The Struggle for Independence Has Become Exacerbated: Each of the Opposing Sides Understands the Word 'Independence' in Its Own Way"]

[Text] The sharp statement made by President Mircea Snegur in Moldova's parliament disrupted the even tenor of the work being done by this republic's highest legislative organ and introduced quite some turmoil in the parliament's actions. It exacerbated to the maximum the equilibrium among the various parliamentary factions. The unambiguous stance taken by the president, who firmly declared himself in favor of this republic's independence and against unification with Romania, was unexpected by everybody. Taking this into account, the president justified his statement by the following five key factors. First, he said that territory had been inherited from the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic which could in no way be called homogeneous on a historical, ethno-psychological, and cultural level. As the events of the last few years have shown, this diversity has created the prerequisites for a split in society. Second, objective historical conditions as well as the imperialist policy aimed at altering the demographic structure of this territory have led to the establishment of a specific correlation of forces with antagonistic interests. Third, the processes of denationalization, which began as far back as 1812, has turned into a profound Romanophobia among the population. Neither presidential edicts nor parliamentary decrees can annul this feeling. Fourth, interference in the conflict by foreign states and the delays in withdrawing their troops from Moldova's territory attest to certain specific geopolitical interests which may be partially seen in the scandalous speech made by Russia's minister of foreign affairs in Stockholm. Fifth, taking into consideration the extremely explosive situation in this region, any politician must understand the need for a moratorium on border changes.

The president was supported by a majority of the deputies; they declared themselves in favor of holding a republic-wide referendum and on finally removing the issue of Moldova's unification with Romania. In the event of a plebiscite on this matter, its results are not

hard to predict. Numerous sociological surveys and studies conducted on this score testify to the fact that only 7-10 percent of Moldova's population favors an immediate unification of these two states, and another 10-15 percent admit the possibility of such a unification after a lengthy transition period. But the majority—approximately 70 percent—consider unification with Romania to be undesirable for Moldova.

It's possible that not the weightiest argument in favor of independence is the fact that—after the inclusion of the thesis of unification with Romania in the program of the People's Front—its ranks were deserted by thousands of zealous advocates of the idea of national rebirth. However, there are also more significant indicators: 86 percent of this republic's population in the presidential election held in December 1991 voted for Mircea Snegur, whose election program was based upon the building of an independent state in Moldova, and this despite the fact that the People's Front organized a boycott of the elections, and the leaders of the Dniester Republic placed quite a few obstacles in the path of these elections being conducted on the left bank of the Dniester River.

While the parliament is in recess, having left open the question of holding a referendum pertaining to the republic's future status, the struggle has become considerably exacerbated. The opposing forces of parliament, understanding the complexity of the situation which has evolved, are attempting to utilize the holidays with the maximum benefit to themselves. Thus, for example, the agrarian deputies who advocate independence and among whom are many kolkhoz chairmen and middle-rank leaders, are conducting rallies and meetings in villages in support of President Snegur's stance. The president himself visited the "Moldovan Evenings" Agrofirm in the southern part of this republic. The choice was obviously not by chance. Aleksandr Snegur, the firm's chairman—who has the same last name as President Snegur—had grappled furiously with deputies from the People's Front and had come out categorically in favor of independence for the republic and holding a referendum on this issue. By means of his own trip the president let it be understood that he was grateful for the support rendered to him and that he would continue the struggle.

A few days ago he visited a village in the northern part of the republic—a place where the construction of a gas pipeline has been completed. Mircea Snegur told the villagers that he would continue to defend Moldova's independence in the future and that he considered that this republic has all the possibilities of becoming a truly independent state. At the same time the president came out in favor of cooperation with all states, even including the former republics of the USSR. This was Mircea Snegur's unique reply to a resolution passed on the eve of Chisinau's First Congress of Moldovan Intelligentsia, which was convoked upon the initiative of the Association of Cultural, Artistic, and Scientific Leaders. The latter is, in fact, an intellectual cover for the Christian-Democratic People's Front.

The overwhelming majority of the intelligentsia at this congress were zealous followers of the People's Front, and it was not difficult to predict that they would support the position taken by the Front. They criticized the stance taken by the president and by Moldova's other leaders in favor of state independence. In the opinion of the congress participants, it is precisely the holding of a referendum which is undermining this independence and is confronting Moldova with the threat of a new catastrophe. Having declared that Moldova lacked healthy forces advocating speeding up the process of unification with Romania, the congress at the same time declared itself for the fastest possible integration of the two Romanian states in toto. And they emphasized that only unification would give Moldova the chance to overcome the present-day economic difficulties.

Moldova's national radio and television broadcast detail reports from this forum. However, its participants stated that the work of their congress should be broadcast in its entirety, and they accused the leading officials of the national radio and television of being antinational and of pandering to the leadership. And they requested Romanian television to broadcast a tape of the speeches made at this congress. By the way, the representatives of the intelligentsia who were registered in the People's Front were not included and simply were not given the floor at this forum.

From among the republic's highest leaders, the congress organizers invited the chairman of the parliament, Aleksandru Mosanu, who—after the relations between the republic's leadership and the opposition became sharply worse—became virtually an open member of the opposition.

Many persons had merely guessed at the existence of differences between him and the president; everybody was waiting for Mosanu's speech in the parliament, and they even proposed that the presidium members should state their own attitudes toward the president's statement, as well as toward the proposal to conduct a referendum. However, the speaker refused to even hold a session of parliament during the time when this matter was being discussed, assigning this task to his deputy. And already during the parliamentary holidays Aleksandru Mosanu made a sharp statement over national radio, criticizing the president and practically

aligning himself with the speeches being made by the most radical leaders of the People's Front, thus removing any and all doubts concerning his own political sympathies. His radio speech was reprinted by the press organ of the People's Front, the newspaper CARA ("Country"). The leaders of the self-proclaimed Gagauz and Dniester republics likewise declared their own attitudes toward the statement. Whereas up to now they have been reprimanding Moldova's leaders for ignoring the people's opinion and refusing to conduct referendums, now they are saying that this is an internal affair of the neighboring state of the Republic of Moldova.

The chairman of the Gagauz Supreme Council, Mihail Kendielian, issued a special directive—a recommendation to the organs of local self-government—in which he says that the "Gagauz population declared its attitude toward the problem of unification with Romania during the course of the referendums which were held on this territory, and it formed the Gagauz Republic." Therefore, its leaders do not recommend that its citizens take part in Moldova's republic-wide referendum.

It is obvious that this referendum could deprive the leaders of the Dniester and Gagauz republics of their trump-card argument, by means of which they justify their own actions with regard to creating their own state formations on the territory of Moldova. The argument used up to now was precisely Moldova's unification with Romania. Therefore, the leaders of the Dniester and Gagauz republics have virtually formed a solid bloc with the Christian-Democratic People's Front in the struggle against President Snegur and the advocates of Moldovan independence. By their own actions they practically confirmed the words from President Snegur's statement to the effect that they are operating on the principle of "the worse things are for Moldova, the better they are for realizing their own political ambitions."

All this attests to the fact that the president's statement—which the speaker of parliament termed an apple of discord—introduced a split not only in the parliament, but also in the society as a whole. One does not have to be a prophet to say that after the present Christmas holidays the political battles in the parliament will be renewed with unprecedented force. The parties involved understand that the time for decisive actions has arrived.

KAZAKHSTAN

Arrest in Murder Conspiracy Rumored

934K0017A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 11 Jan 93
Morning Edition p 2

[Article by Oleg Stefashin: "Investigation Into Svichinskiy Case Continues"]

[Text] It has become known through reliable sources: The militia succeeded in arresting one of the suspects in the organization of the murder of A. Svichinskiy, general director of Kazakhstanskaya Magnitka. However, the workers of Karaganda Oblast Procuracy, who are conducting the investigation, flatly refused either to confirm or to deny these facts, saying that it could hurt the interests of the investigation.

In the last few days, the investigation still has not been able to get any closer to solving the crime, although, as I was told in the oblast Directorate of Internal Affairs, a rather aggressive search is going on for the criminal, day and night without stop. V. Shumov, Kazakhstan's minister of internal affairs, flew into Temirtau and took charge of the operation. A large group of experienced investigators of the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] and of the republic's National Security Committee came with him after receiving pertinent instructions from President N. Nazarbayev.

The general director of Kazakhstan Magnitka was known almost everywhere, and many, naturally, cannot drop the question: Whose path did he cross? Alas, there is no answer yet. On the other hand, something else is perfectly clear: A. Svichinskiy is by no means the accidental victim of a crime.

The economic slump that has hit Kazakhstan did not bypass the metallurgical combine either. However, there, despite the powerful earthquakes, it did not assume a threatening character. Svichinskiy displayed persistent efforts to unite the CIS industrialists who work in the metallurgical complex, and he established a whole series of transnational industrial-economic associations whose members are very large enterprises of Russia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Central Asia, and other nearby foreign countries.

But Svichinskiy did not stop at this. The metallurgists are starting to finance a pastry factory, a meat combine, and "to take over completely" the synthetic detergents factory, the hosiery factory, the municipal bus park, and a whole number of agricultural enterprises of the oblast.

For A. Svichinskiy, dangerous, envious people cropped up in governmental circles, in local organs of authority, and even in the combine where he conducted a very tough personnel policy.

He had a lot of enemies, including among the mafia, against whom he declared a decisive war. But Svichinskiy was killed three days before his 45th birthday...

Russian Community Problems Continue

934K0017B Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 12 Jan 93 p 7

[Article by Sergey Skorokhodov: "We Ask Moscow To Remember Us"]

[Text] Alma-Ata—From February to September, the Russian community agonizingly registered its charter in the Kazakhstan Ministry of Justice. It has its own association chapters in 14 oblasts of the republic and in all of the rayons of Alma-Ata.

But in contrast to the Kazakh national parties and movements, such as Alash and Azat, the Russian community emerged significantly later, and it keeps somewhat aloof of politics. Although Yuriy Bunakov, the head of the community, believes that it is the political jokes about the national problem that prompted the Russians to create such a community organization.

"It is difficult and insulting," he says. "Besides the Russian community, Alma-Ata has Korean, Chinese, Jewish, Greek, Uighur, and German communities... And all of them receive help from their states. But for us, Russia seems not to exist. At the same time, there are 7 million Russians in Kazakhstan. Seven million!"

Our conversation is taking place under the resonant arches of the warehouse of a commercial store. But the community was already asked "to leave" it. For the Russians, Bunakov thinks, "the train has already left the station" in Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. It has also left in the Caucasus and in Moldova. There is no point in even talking about the Baltics.

"But for us, we think, it has not left yet. If we unite and conciliation becomes the principle of life of the Russians in this country, if in Alma-Ata out of 600,000 Russians at least 100 remain within a year, then we will have no need for any kind of political parties. We will defend ourselves.

The community professes the idea of community mutual help. Having accumulated a data bank on the professional and other capabilities of each community member, it will be able to provide any kind of help to those who need it.

"A Russian Embassy has been opened in Alma-Ata," continues my interlocutor. "Perhaps the ambassador is a good person, but it seems to me that an ambassador of Russia, in a state where half of the population is Russian, should, first of all, look for contacts with associations of Russian people, find out how they are living and what their problems are.

And the problems are considerable. The puppet theater group in Talgar is being closed. Because it is Russian. Almost nothing Russian remains in the opera, in the conservatory, in publishing houses, and on radio and television. Culture is fading away.

There are people who are capable of organizing universities for teaching the humanities and technical subjects to which the Russian people living in Kazakhstan could send their children. And then no one will be able to eliminate them according to national features—in an underhanded way or openly. Based on this idea, the community is seeking Russian entrepreneurs who understand that they also will not have a business tomorrow, if they do not help the Russian movement today. And they are being found.

"We will ask the Russian ambassador and his government not to forget about us, and to give us credits in order for us to stand on our own feet. We are not asking for charity—we are Russian people on whom Russia can rely on here. We will never leave here. The government will not be able to manage without us. If we establish a Russian bank under the roof of the community, and if Russia gives us favorable credits, we will be able to become the guarantor of the preservation of the interests of the Russian population in Kazakhstan.

KYRGYZSTAN

Green Banner of Islam Raised in Border Clash

934K0021A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 12 Jan 93 p 1

[Article: "Alarm at the Border"]

[Text] "Armed groups have appeared in the area of Kyrgyzstan's border with Tajikistan." This news was sent by republic radio, and the city newspaper VECHERNYY BISHKEK said that one of them was led by leaders of an opposition group that is strenuously agitating the local population to rise up under the banner of Islam. According to these sources, three local residents who offered resistance to the revolutionary groups were killed and 18 persons were taken hostage. At the administration building of Dzhergetalskiy Rayon the revolutionaries implanted a green banner.

New 'Atameken' Party Founded

934K0021B Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 13 Jan 93 p 7

[Article by Valeriy Kuklin (Bishkek): "Six Hundred People Also Are a Party"]

[Text] A new political party—Atameken (Motherland)—has appeared in Kyrgyzstan. As its founders assert, the party is called upon "to unite all people for a way out of the economic crisis." In essence, they are setting for themselves as a minimum program those same tasks that are the basis of activity of the republic's current government. For many the question arises: Why and for whom is this duplication necessary?

The answer, seemingly, can be the composition of the new party. Basically it consists of representatives of that same nationality intelligentsia that did not have the

opportunity during the Soviet years to satisfy its political ambitions because of strong interclan opposition when Kyrgyzstan was socialist. Sovereignty did not solve this problem, more likely it aggravated it. Northerners fortified their position in the entourage of President A. Akayev, whereas the southerners could seek support only in the person of Vice-President F. Kulov.

Similarly, personal ambitions are precisely what brought this fourth officially registered party into being. There are no representatives of the Slavic nationalities among Atameken's members. Atameken does not have a clearly formulated policy on the nationality problem. Right now it has only 600 people in the whole republic, but already there are four "obkoms." Its members are preparing to fight for deputy mandates at the next elections. Perhaps its comical face will manifest itself then.

Official Visit Ends With 'Mutual Understanding'

934K0021C Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 15 Jan 93 p 1

[Article by K. Bayalinov: "A Visit for Tea"]

[Text] Yesterday a Tajikistan government delegation finished an official visit to Bishkek. The delegation was led by the state's new chief, Supreme Soviet Chairman Emomali Rakhmonov. It was expected that diplomatic relations between the two neighboring republics would finally be established and a treaty of friendship and collaboration signed. Today, expressed in diplomatic language, there is neither war nor peace between Kirgizia and Tajikistan.

During the visit the parties reached a mutual understanding on a large number of problems, but the basic documents, the draft of a treaty on friendship and collaboration, for example, was turned over to appropriate commissions for preparation.

UZBEKISTAN

Human Rights Activist's Trial Commences

934K0074A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 23 Jan 93
Morning Edition pp 1-2

[Report by Marina Lebedeva: "The Trial of Well-Known Human Rights Activist Abdumannob Pulatov Opens in Tashkent"]

[Text] As a reminder: A. Pulatov is accused of insulting in the mass media the honor and dignity of Uzbekistan's President Islam Karimov.

Specifically, he is charged with giving to two students on 17 January 1992 a poster with his portrait with the caption: "There Is Such a Beast That Eats His Own Offspring." The second of the charges is that A. Pulatov called on his acquaintance to photograph these students, and then published this photo in the NEZAVISIMYY YEZHENEDELNIK newspaper published in Russia.

The main event of the first day of the trial was the permission granted to Yuriy Shmidt, a well-known St. Petersburg attorney and the chairman of the Bar Society of Russia, to participate in the trial (several weeks ago the investigation did not grant him access to the case materials).

Before the trial began, Shmidt told Judge Kh. Usmanov that he needs two days to familiarize himself with the case and to confer with his client, since he had been deprived of this opportunity before then. However, his and local attorney Kh. Zaynutdinov's request was not granted. He was not given an opportunity to see his client before the trial. Instead of two days, the attorneys were given a few hours. Also denied was defendant Pulatov's access to the case materials; the latter contended at the trial that he had been deceived during the investigation. The investigator promised him that if he signed the protocol of the completion of the investigation, both attorneys would be granted access to him and the case materials would be made available. This promise was not kept.

This explanation had no effect, however. On the second day, too, the request for continuance in order to study the case materials was denied, which is a violation of the law.

On the whole, the hallmark of second day of the trial were measures taken to "tame" the press. Taping and photography were prohibited. In the second part of the day, when the witnesses testimony was to begin, Moscow journalists and THE NEW YORK TIMES correspondents were not permitted into the court chamber without any explanation. An observer from the Memorial society also fell victim to this treatment.

In attorney Shmidt's opinion, one can already tell that there is no formal element of a definition of a crime in the actions of the accused, even the way charges are currently formulated. The case materials he was able to peruse clearly show that the investigation set up Pulatov by using three students and giving them a choice: either to be held responsible for the actions they committed, or to shift all the blame onto Pulatov, who "took advantage of their young age and inexperience for his mercenary goals."

In reality, says Shmidt, what we have here is a political trial. Pulatov's "guilt" is his opposition to the policy of Uzbekistan's authorities, which had manifested itself in his human rights activities.

A. Pulatov himself had said that he represented the opposition—but a constructive one.

Pulatov refuted the accusations made by Yusupov—the rector of the Tashkent University where Pulatov had taught before he began to study for his doctorate at Moscow State University—and said that they are clearly biased. Yusupov told the investigators that Pulatov interfered with his speech at a rally on 17 January, the purpose of which was to calm the students down, and was instigating unrest among the students. Pulatov completely denies the allegations, believing that such statements on the part of Yusupov are

the result of a serious disagreement between the two with respect to the August 1991 events. At the time, Pulatov publicly condemned the rector for his support of the GKChP [State Committee on the State of Emergency]. Being a member of the Birlyuk opposition movement is still punishable to this day; a testimony to this was arrest on the eve of Pulatov's trial of his confederate, 67-year-old Doctor of Science Olim Karimov, who is also a cochairman of the Free Peasant Party. He was "arraigned" at home on 19 January while he was having breakfast. For three days now, an ill, elderly man—who, according to his relatives, still has not been charged with anything—has been kept in detention.

Proposed Changes to Banking, Banking Activity Regulations Reported

92US0847B Tashkent OZBEKISTON OVOZI in Uzbek
8 Aug 92 p 2

[Revision of Law: "Concerning Changes and Additions to the Law of the Republic of Uzbekistan on Banks and Banking Activity"]

[Text] The following changes and additions are to be inserted into the law of the Republic of Uzbekistan "Concerning Banks and Banking Activity" (The Bulletin of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Uzbekistan, 1991, No. 4, Article 84) which was accepted on 15 February 1991 by the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Uzbekistan.

1. The words "Uzbekistan SSR State Bank" should be changed to "Central Bank of the Republic of Uzbekistan," and the words "Foreign Trade Bank of the Uzbekistan SSR" should be changed to "National Bank for Foreign Economic Activity of the Republic of Uzbekistan" in all articles of the law.

2. In Article 2:

The words "and in the USSR" should be removed from the part 'i' of the first paragraph.

The words "USSR State Bank" and "as well as the Union" should be removed from the second paragraph.

Paragraph 3 should read as follows:

"3. Banks may carry out other transactions in accord with permission granted by the Central Bank of the Republic of Uzbekistan within its own purview of authority. Transactions covered in the above article will be carried out within the boundaries of the republic in the monetary unit in effect.

5. Article 5.

Paragraph 1 should read as follows:

"1. Those listed below are part of the banking system of the Republic of Uzbekistan:

a. The Central Bank of the Republic of Uzbekistan and establishments subordinate to it.

b. The National Bank of the Republic of Uzbekistan for Foreign Economic Activity.

v. The republic's Trade and Industrial Bank.

g. The republic's Trade and Agriculture Bank.

d. The State Trading Bank of the Republic of Uzbekistan for Workers Investment and Consumer Credit.

e. Trading banks formed and the basis of stock as well as those formed in partnership with foreign capital, their subsidiaries, and their offices.

j. Cooperative and private banks.

Trading, cooperative, and private banks are to establish relations with the Central Bank of Uzbekistan and other banks on the basis of contracts.

The last phrase of the third paragraph should read as follows after the changes are taken into account:

"The Central Bank of the Republic of Uzbekistan has the right to permit the opening of branches of foreign banks and offices, and banks in partnership with foreign capital within the boundaries of the republic."

In the fourth paragraph, the word "associations" should be followed by the words "holding companies".

4. Article 6:

The first paragraph should read as follows:

"The banks of the Republic of Uzbekistan, in their activities, will act in accord with the above law, with other legal documents of the Republic of Uzbekistan, and with their own charters.

5. In Article 7:

The first paragraph should read as follows:

"The Central Bank of the Republic of Uzbekistan will be considered to be the republic's state bank, its issuing bank, and its bank of deposit, and will be organized on the basis of this law.

The third paragraph should read as follows:

"The Central Bank of the Republic of Uzbekistan will enter into relations with the national and central banks of other states in the ruble zone, as well as with the banks of other foreign states, on the basis of contracts and inter-bank written agreements."

The fourth and fifth paragraphs below should be added to the article:

"The Central Bank of the Republic of Uzbekistan will be considered the bank of deposit for the instruments of international organizations.

"Government organs do not have the right to interfere in the activities of the Central Bank of the Republic of Uzbekistan undertaken within the purview of its own authority."

6. In Article 8:

In the first paragraph, the words "economic policy" should be changed to "economic and monetary policy" and should be followed by the words "and production".

In the third paragraph, the words "bank account loan" should be followed by the words "and currency". The words "in agreement with the USSR State Bank" should be removed.

In the fifth paragraph, the words "money and credit" should be followed by the words "and currency".

The following paragraph should be added to Article 8:

"managing the republic's money and credit system, managing the national currency, and supplying it to the economy, helping to strengthen and develop cooperation with countries in the ruble zone and other countries, protecting the interests of the Republic of Uzbekistan with their central and national banks, international banks, and other financial and credit organizations, forming the republic's gold reserve and precious stone fund, creating the Central Bank of the Republic of Uzbekistan's hard currency fund, carrying out the responsibility of executive manager of organizing and regulating the state currency, granting licenses for performing banking activities, and granting permission to offer retail and foreign currency services."

7. In Article 9:

Paragraph 2 should read as follows:

"The management of the Central Bank of the Republic of Uzbekistan shall be carried out by a board consisting of a president and his assistants. The president of the board will be appointed by the president of the Republic of Uzbekistan and confirmed by the Supreme Council of the Republic of Uzbekistan."

8. In Article 10:

The phrase "The Central Bank of the Republic of Uzbekistan may establish a charter fund in foreign currency." should be added to the first paragraph.

The words "and laws in force" should be removed from the second paragraph.

9. In Article 11:

Paragraph 2 should read as follows:

"2. Profits of the Central Bank of the Republic of Uzbekistan are to be divided in accordance with this law and the other laws of the Republic of Uzbekistan."

10. In Article 12:

The first paragraph should read as follows:

"With the goal of implementing a sole monetary, credit, currency investment, and issuance policy, the Central Bank of the Republic of Uzbekistan will, within the purview of its

authority for banking matters, issue regulatory documents which will be binding on all banks and banking establishments within the borders of the republic."

The second sentence should be removed.

11. In Article 13:

The fifth paragraph should be removed.

A new paragraph should be inserted to read as follows:

The Central Bank of the Republic of Uzbekistan will grant credit resources, which are to be repaid, to the trading banks."

12. In Article 14:

The first paragraph will read as follows:

"Until a national currency is put into circulation, the official monetary unit of the Republic of Uzbekistan will be the ruble. This ruble is composed of 100 kopeks. The ruble is considered the only means of payment within the borders of the Republic of Uzbekistan. When its own currency is put into circulation in the republic, payment in foreign currency may be effected within the borders of the Republic of Uzbekistan in the manner prescribed by the Central Bank of the Republic of Uzbekistan."

The second paragraph should be removed.

13. In Article 15:

The second paragraph should read as follows:

"The Central Bank of the Republic of Uzbekistan will regulate the volume and structure of the money supply on the basis of the main outlines of the state money and credit policy which has been confirmed in the manner specified."

The following new paragraph should be appended to the article:

"The Republic of Uzbekistan will independently prescribe the volume of money in circulation and the issuance of money and other financial instruments of the state."

14. In Article 16:

The words "likewise will undertake transactions in the precious metals market" should be added to part 'b'.

Part 'd' should be changed to part 'z'.

Articles 'd', 'e', 'j', 'i', and 'k' should be augmented as follows:

"d) providing gold and silver to form the republic's gold reserve, to guarantee its integrity, and to utilize it in the economy and in foreign trade."

"e) granting permission to set up retail trade and offer foreign currency services."

"j) organizing the preparation, transport, and security of monetary instruments and coinage."

"i) establishing relations with the central and national banks of states in the ruble zone and with the banks of other states."

"k) effecting transactions in the name of the republic pertaining to its membership in international financial organizations."

The words "from the Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Uzbekistan" should be removed from the second phrase of the second paragraph.

The third and fourth paragraphs should read as follows:

"The Central Bank of the Republic of Uzbekistan will carry out the counter operations of the budget of the Republic of Uzbekistan through its own establishments and through the trading banks within the borders of the republic."

The Central Bank of the Republic of Uzbekistan will protect the interests of the republic in relations with the banks of other countries and in financial and credit organizations which are planned at the level of international banks and partner central banks."

The following paragraph should be added to the article:

"The Central Bank of the Republic of Uzbekistan, in a manner agreed upon with the government of the Republic of Uzbekistan, will keep the account of government indebtedness (in both the national and foreign currency) arising from transactions connected with the placing of government bonds, repaying their principle, and paying interest."

15. The title of Article 17 should read as follows:

"Article 17. Transactions With Foreign Currency and Economic Activity Abroad"

The Central Bank of the Republic of Uzbekistan may undertake, either in the republic or abroad, any type of foreign currency transaction which complies with the laws of the Republic of Uzbekistan and which is used in international practice.

The Central Bank of the Republic of Uzbekistan has the right to transfer to the trading banks a specified portion of its own rights to:

- participate in the creation of the monetary and financial terms of inter-governmental trade and payment agreements.

- conclude contracts of mutual cooperation with states in the ruble zone in accordance with written agreements (contracts or statements of intent) and with the central and national banks of other states.

- purchase stock, obligations, and financial instruments, and to possess foreign currency interest funds.

- make the activities of banks conform with regard to foreign economic transactions.

- designate the rate of exchange of the monetary unit of the Republic of Uzbekistan vis-a-vis foreign currencies and to specify and implement measures aimed at strengthening this currency.

- specify rules for granting licenses and to grant licenses for carrying out banking transactions using currency reserves to the trading and foreign banks (to their branches and offices), as well as to banks in partnership with foreign capital.

- effect limits on the volume of credit for banks from foreign countries and the level of the interest rates on this credit in a manner conforming the Republic of Uzbekistan's money and credit policy.

16. In Article 18:

In the first part the words "the trading banks" should be followed by the words "and banks which are in partnership with foreign capital".

The word "skill" in the third part of the sixth paragraph should be replaced by the words "accordance".

The words "foreign countries" in the first paragraph of the fourth part should be changed to "corporations and individuals of foreign countries".

The following should be added to part 'a' of part four:

"The accounts declared concerning the activity of a foreign establishment or bank, its charter which has been confirmed by the republic's consular section in the foreign country in the specified way, or another document proving the legal location of a non-stationary or foreign establishment."

The article should be followed with a new part 5 as below:

"5. The Central Bank of the Republic of Uzbekistan has the right to request necessary additional information for granting licenses to conduct transactions in foreign currency."

What is in the fifth and sixth parts should be put together and made into the sixth part, and the words "a period not to exceed two months" should be substituted for the words "a period for reviewing the application not to exceed one month".

The first paragraph of the seventh part should read as follows:

"The trading banks of other countries may, upon receiving permission from the Central Bank of the Republic of Uzbekistan, open its own branches and offices within the borders of the Republic of Uzbekistan and set up regional banks. The system for receiving permission will be prescribed by the Central Bank of the Republic of Uzbekistan. The branches and offices of the

trading banks may begin conducting banking transactions only after receiving permission."

In the second paragraph of this part, the words "from interest" will be followed by "from economic account profit", and the word "of interest" will be followed by "of economic account profit".

The words "as indicated in this law" should be removed from the last paragraph of the eighth part.

The first word of the ninth part, "branches," should be followed by the words "the Central Bank of the Republic of Uzbekistan". Part 13 should read as follows:

"The trading banks, or their branches, may complain to the courts or to the Supreme Court about decisions by the Central Bank of the Republic of Uzbekistan regarding the granting or renewal of a license, and, likewise, about other issues relating to the Central Bank of the Republic of Uzbekistan's duty to monitor their activity."

17. In Article 19:

The second paragraph of the second part should read as follows:

"For newly constituted trading banks the smallest amount of the charter fund is fifty million rubles and five million for cooperative and private banks, and this money must have been paid by the bank organizers by the time the bank begins operations."

The following paragraph should be added to the second part:

"standards for appropriating money from profits to the general bank fund and its own reserve fund for deposit insurance; limiting the amount of currency and exchange risk."

The fourth paragraph should be removed from the fifth part.

The words "will submit" in the second phrase of the fifth paragraph should be changed to "must submit".

Part six should read as follows:

"6. Monitoring of the activities of trading banks within the borders of the Republic of Uzbekistan, their branches, and the branches of banks of other countries will be carried out by the Central Bank of the Republic of Uzbekistan in accordance with this law and the charter of the Central Bank of the Republic of Uzbekistan".

The Central Bank of the Republic of Uzbekistan has the right to order investigation of the transactions of the trading banks either together or separately in order to carry out its duties in monitoring the banks. Verification of banking activities will be carried out by specialists and auditors from the Central Bank of the Republic of Uzbekistan."

The law should be supplemented with the new Section III below.

THE NATIONAL BANK OF THE REPUBLIC OF UZBEKISTAN FOR FOREIGN ECONOMIC ACTIVITY

Article 19. The Duties of the National Bank of the Republic of Uzbekistan for Foreign Economic Activity. The National Bank of the Republic of Uzbekistan for Foreign Economic Activity is the bank which has been specified to effect the government's policy in the sphere of foreign economic relations, to provide services for foreign economic activity, and to invest currency.

Consequent to this transmittal of the republic's central bank and the government, the National Bank of the Republic of Uzbekistan for Foreign Economic Activity will:

- grant credits in foreign currency for organizing and developing the production of export goods, provide services for government bonds and credits which will be provided to the Republic of Uzbekistan in foreign currency or which the republic will take in foreign currency, and provide an accounting.
- effect transactions on the international market.
- aid in collecting sums which remain because of the transgressions of foreign banks, concerns, firms, and other companies when the terms of the contract are fulfilled.
- participate in producing the payment terms of inter-governmental contracts.
- carry out other duties envisioned in the charter.

The National Bank of the Republic of Uzbekistan for Foreign Economic Activity will operate on the basis of its charter which will be confirmed by the government of the Republic of Uzbekistan and which will be taken under review by the Central Bank of the Republic of Uzbekistan.

19. Article 20 will read as follows:

Article 20. Duties of Trading Banks

Trading (stock, on the basis of shares, and private) banks will provide credit accounts and similar banking services on a contractual basis by effecting transactions covered in this law for corporations and individuals.

The trading banks will be distinguished from one another by the ownership of the charter capital and its structure, by the transactions they carry out, by the limits of their activity, and by the system sign.

Special trading banks may be organized in the manner and conditions envisaged in the legal documents of the Republic of Uzbekistan for supplying national, regional, and other bodies with money.

The trade banks will undertake foreign currency transactions after obtaining the appropriate licenses from the Central Bank of the Republic of Uzbekistan.

20. In Article 21:

The words "and their branches" should be added to the words "the trading banks" in the fifth paragraph.

21. In Article 22:

The new paragraph below should be added to the second part:

"Bilateral Relations with the Central Bank of the Republic of Uzbekistan"

The words "limited liability stock group" in the third part should be replaced by the words "stock groups and limited liability groups".

22. In Article 33:

The word "financial" in the second part should be followed by the words "and tax"

23. In Article 24:

The words "of inspections" in part one should be replaced by the words "of organs".

24. Article 36 should read as follows:

"Article 36. Interest Rates From Trading Banks

Trading banks are free to set their own interest rates on transactions, but these rates must not be higher than the highest rates specified each year by the Central Bank of the Republic of Uzbekistan based upon interest rate policy, the main outline of which is specified in the government's money and credit policy.

25. In Article 39:

The second part should read as follows:

"2. Banks must keep accounts in a manner acceptable the Central Bank of the Republic of Uzbekistan."

26. In Article 41:

The words "to the managing committee of the Soviet of Peoples Deputies" are to be changed to "to the local government and directing department".

27. In Article 42:

The words "the managing committee of the Soviet of People's Deputies" in the last paragraph should be changed to "the local government and directing department".

28. In Article 44:

"In order to guarantee soundness in monetary activity and prevent inflation, the Central Bank of the Republic of Uzbekistan may set limits on deposits and financial instruments."

29. In Article 46:

The words "trading banks" in the first part should be changed to "state trading banks."

Part three will read as follows:

"3. Sums attracted by the Investment Bank of the Republic of Uzbekistan will be given to the Central Bank of the Republic of Uzbekistan on a contractual basis for satisfying the needs of the economy's credit resources, will be used by the Investment Bank of the Republic of Uzbekistan to give credit to individuals and corporations to which the Investment bank is directly offering services, and will be placed at the disposal of the credit obligations of the Republic of Uzbekistan".

Part four will read as follows:

"4. The Investment Bank of the Republic of Uzbekistan will operate on the basis of its own charter which will be

confirmed by the government of the Republic of Uzbekistan and registered by the Central Bank of the Republic of Uzbekistan."

30. In Article 47:

Part one should read as follows:

"Citizens of the Republic of Uzbekistan and those of other countries, as well as individuals without citizenship, may make deposits".

31. In Article 49:

"The words 'USSR State Bank' will be changed to "The Central Bank of the Republic of Uzbekistan".

President of the Republic of Uzbekistan

I. Karimov

Tashkent 2 July, 1992

ARMENIA**Armenia Completely Without Gas Supply***934K0083A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
26 Jan 93 p 1*

[Article by IZVESTIYA correspondent Sergey Bablumyan: "Armenia Is on the Verge of Introducing a State of Emergency"]

[Text] Yerevan—The gas supply to Armenia has been completely cut off. As IZVESTIYA was told by the republic Ministry of Energy, in the Marneuli region of Georgia five supports for the main gas line were blown up and it will take no less than 10 days to restore them.

Armenia has been completely plunged into darkness. The subway and the underground electric transportation system in Yerevan are not working and tens of thousands of telephones have fallen silent.

Throughout the city there are persistent rumors that President Levon Ter-Petrosyan intends to introduce a state of emergency in Armenia and impose a curfew. Official sources have confirmed that this question was discussed at a joint meeting of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and government but no decision was made.

The leader of the government press service, Vladimir Manoyan, announced that the sharp aggravation of the crime situation in Armenia makes it seem expedient to introduce a state of emergency. In particular, it is possible that stores in Yerevan might be ransacked during the night and it is predicted that muggings and apartment thefts will increase.

Certain observers link the probability of the introduction of a state of emergency to the fact that the authorities are afraid of mass disturbances among people driven to despair.

AZERBAIJAN**Budget Deficit Reaches R9.4 Billion***934K0064B Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 20 Jan 93 p 3*

[Article: "Azerbaijan"]

[Text] According to refined data of the Azerbaijan Ministry of Finance, the republic's budget deficit was 9.4 billion rubles [R]. A substantial part of it (R4.1 billion) consists of funds that were paid in 1992 to workers of the republic's budgeted organizations under the president's edict, "On Measures for Social Protection of the Population."

Opposition Takes Dim View of Presidential Edict*934K0064A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 19 Jan 93 p 1*

[Article by Aydyn Mekhtiyev: "The Presidential Edict and Its Interpretation: The Radical Opposition Does Not Believe Abulfaz Elchibey"]

[Text] Abulfaz Elchibey, President of Azerbaijan, signed an edict that reassigns all correctional labor institutions of the republic's MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] to the Ministry of Justice. The Main Administration for Executing Court Decisions was created for this purpose. The internal troops and the police who guard those confined have been transferred to its jurisdiction. According to the official version, this presidential edict was dictated by the necessity for creating more humane conditions in places of deprivation of freedom and for maintaining a system of correctional labor institutions that accords with world practice. However, not everyone agrees with this interpretation. In particular, the radical opposition is inclined to see in said edict a striving on the part of the authorities to inflate still more the staffs of the punitive agencies. Incidentally, opposition forces are reacting painfully not only to this decision. On 13 January the National Assembly approved a statute about the status of the armed forces that calls for use of the army during an immediate threat of overthrow of the lawfully elected organs of authority. Because of this, chairman of the National Independence Party Etibar Mamedov has pointed to the danger that this can give the authorities grounds for using the national army against the opposition.

Anniversary of 'January Tragedy' in Baku Observed*934K0082A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 21 Jan 93 p 1*

[Article by Aydyn Mekhtiyev: "Baku Blames the USSR Leadership Three Years After the Bloodshed"]

[Text] On 20 January, Azerbaijan marked the third anniversary of the tragic events which took place in Baku in January 1990. At that time, during the night of 19-20 January 1990, in accordance with an order handed down by USSR Minister of Defense Dmitriy Yazov and KGB Chairman Vladimir Kryuchkov, Soviet Army troops entered the capital of Azerbaijan. As a result of this action, 130 peace-loving residents were killed and 774 wounded. In Baku, in accordance with an order by the chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet Mikhail Gorbachev, a state of emergency was declared and a curfew introduced. The state of emergency was abolished only one and a half years later, following the collapse of the August putsch. According to data supplied by a parliamentary committee of Azerbaijan, which investigated these events, responsibility for the mass killing of these peace-loving citizens rests with the leadership of the former USSR. The committee evaluated the event which took place as a "crime against the Azerbaijan people" and it demanded that the following

individuals be held accountable: the former USSR Minister of Internal Affairs Bakatin, the former KGB chairman for the USSR Kryuchkov, USSR Minister of Defense Yazov, and also Yevgeniy Primakov, who was in charge of the Russian foreign intelligence service at the time.

Following the arrest of Kryuchkov and Yazov, the legal protection organs of Azerbaijan turned to the Office of the Public Procurator with a request to provide Azerbaijan with those documents and circumstances associated with the movement of Soviet Army forces into Baku. However, a positive response has still not been received. Officials in Baku hope that, during the forthcoming trial for GKChP [State Committee for the State of Emergency] members, defendants Kryuchkov and Yazov will agree to testify regarding the events of 20 January 1990.

On 19 January 1993, the question regarding the January tragedy was on the agenda for the National Assembly of Azerbaijan. The public prosecutor for Azerbaijan, Ikhtiyar Shirinov, informed the deputies that during the investigation conducted by the Office of the Public Procurator it became known that the former KGB chairman for Azerbaijan, Vagif Guseynov, was the chief organizer for the blowing up of the power unit for Azerbaijan television. State security worker Nikolay Savchenko carried out this action by order of Guseynov. At the present time, Vagif Guseynov, charged with complicity in the January tragedy, has been arrested and is being held in a cell undergoing preliminary investigation. On 19 January, a solemn meeting was held on the central square in Baku in memory of those who perished. A speech was delivered here by President Abulfaz Elchibey, who emphasized that "it was precisely this crime, carried out against the Azerbaijan people in January 1990, that hastened the collapse of the Soviet empire."

In the opinion of observers, one of the chief results of the tragedy was the resentment of the republic's population regarding the presence of Soviet forces on Azerbaijan territory. This played an important role in the collapse of the 4th Army, which by the autumn of 1992 was completely demoralized and disbanded. By the end of October last year, the headquarters of the 4th Army and its command had been hastily evacuated from Baku and almost 60,000 Russian military personnel were withdrawn from the territory of Azerbaijan in record breaking time—within a period of 2 months. According to the Russian-Azerbaijan protocol signed in the autumn of last year, the last Russian border guard will depart the republic on 31 August of this year. Thus Azerbaijan has become the first republic of the former USSR to liberate itself completely from the presence of former Soviet forces.

GEORGIA

Shevardnadze Statement on Visit to Iran

934K0062A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 20 Jan 93 p 3

[Article by Nodar Broladze: "Difficulties in Relations With the Russians Will Be Overcome"]

[Text] Eduard Shevardnadze has been sent on a visit to Iran.

On the morning of 19 February a Republic of Georgia governmental delegation under the chairman of parliament—chief of state Eduard Shevardnadze—was sent on an official visit to the Islamic Republic of Iran. The delegation included Minister of Foreign Affairs Aleksandr Chikvaдзе and other officials. The purpose of the visit was to lay a foundation for close collaboration between the two countries. For two days they will hold negotiations with the highest leaders of Iran, negotiations that will conclude with the signing of a number of packages—agreements on political, economic, technical, scientific, and cultural relations. Exactly a week ago, on 9 January, a group of experts from Georgia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs was sent to Teheran. One of its representatives telephoned Tbilisi on 18 January and reported to the chief of state's staff that the preliminary work on preparing for the visit had been performed successfully. In the morning, on 19 January, before his departure for Teheran, Eduard Shevardnadze held a press conference at the Tbilisi Airport. "The visit to Iran has great significance for the fate of Georgia as a sovereign and independent state," Shevardnadze announced. "Georgia's geographic position and geopolitical situation provoke the intense interest of many states, of both East and West. Our republic should search for and find its place in the balance of these interests. It is natural that Iran has definite interests in our region. The interests are both political and economic. It can play a definite role in settling the situation in the Caucasus, the more so because stability in this region answers Iran's interests completely."

Shevardnadze reported to the press conference that prior to the visit much preparatory work had been done, during which a number of documents were drawn up, including a declaration and a package of agreements in 10 areas. "Thus," he declared, "it can be said without any exaggeration that a new stage in our mutual relations is being started." In answering a question about the prospects for and dates of ratification of Russo-Georgian treaties, Shevardnadze remarked: "Right now the main job is to complete the preparation and signing of these most important documents. Including a treaty about friendship, collaboration, and neighborliness, an agreement on the status and length of stay of Russian forces on Georgian territory, and an economic agreement. Unfortunately, negative signals have been coming from the Russian parliament, which we have evaluated as an attempt to interfere in Georgia's internal affairs. However, we have now held useful constructive negotiations with a representative of Russia's President—the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Boris Pastukhov—and it seems to me that we shall be able to overcome all the difficulties that have arisen in our relationships." Moreover, Shevardnadze added that, unfortunately, Russia is delaying, while determining the scope and level of its relations with Georgia, but he expressed confidence that all this can be overcome.

Abkhazia Appeals to Butrus-Ghali, Yeltsin
934K0062B Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 20 Jan 93 p 3

[Article: "Abkhazia"]

[Text] The Committee for the Rescue of Abkhazia has adopted an appeal to UN General Secretary Butrus-Ghali and to Russia's President Yeltsin.

The appeal says, in particular: "Those Abkhazian politicians who came to power on a wave of pseudo-democratic transformations have brought the Abkhazian people to the latest national tragedy. Most of them do not possess experience in political and economic leadership, they have found nothing better than...to propose the slogan of sovereignty for Abkhazia, and in a very short time they pointedly turned their backs on the Georgian people.

"This policy was adopted in spite of the will of the majority of the Abkhazian people, who understand well what the policy of violent disruption of the vital ties of the Abkhazian and the Georgian peoples have led to."

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

POW Question in Karabakh Conflict Viewed
934K0067A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 19 Jan 93 p 3

[Article by Liana Minasyan: "Prisoners of War in the Karabakh War"]

[Text] One must be above politics in humanitarian matters.

The Karabakh war is undeclared and is not being played "in accordance with the rules," but nevertheless it is a war and, like every catastrophe, victims remain afterwards. The soldiers who are prisoners of war and the civilians who have been detained, whose fate has often turned out to be tragic, also are victims.

The first meeting on the problem of prisoners of war and of detainees was held about two months ago at the Azerbaijan-Armenian border, and the most recent should have been held on 12 January, between Kapan and Idzhevan, but it fell through. As Andranik Arshakyan, chief of the Social Protection Administration of the Armenian Ministry of Defense, told NG [NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA], the relatives of soldier POWs in both republics were waiting for this meeting with bated breath, but from Baku the Armenian delegation reported that they will not come, since the roads are blocked by snow and they proposed that they meet in Tbilisi. We had agreed to any place of meeting, Arshakyan admitted, but the Azerbaijan representatives avoided concrete decisions: They told us that they simply were not ready for a talk, but they continued to insist that the parliaments first adopt a legislative enactment that would prohibit the taking of detainees.

Arshakyan considers that there is no sense in elevating the decision of this question to the rank of law: We are actually waging war, and there will still be time to formulate its background details in documentary fashion. In humanitarian problems one must rise above political conventions.

Moreover, this problem concerns three sides: Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Nagorno-Karabakh, but since Azerbaijan does not want to hear about discussing it with Stepanakert, it becomes difficult to solve the fate of the prisoners of war: Most of the Azerbaijan soldier prisoners of war are in Karabakh and I, Arshakyan said, cannot vouch for them and do not have the right to extend my authority there. Therefore, this portion of the prisoners will remain uninspected—the Karabakhers are holding them to exchange for their own.

If the problem is decided in the parliaments, then Karabakh will "fall out" from under the effect of the laws, since they do not recognize Azerbaijan's laws there and Armenia's laws do not apply to them. In Yerevan a Ministry of Defense order that regulates practically all sides of this problem is being prepared, and the Armenian delegate has proposed to Azerbaijan that they proceed along this route: If there is a long wait for some decision, people held prisoner will continue to suffer, but a ministry order can be put into effect within a week.

According to Karabakh radio, prisoners can go on the air regularly in the Azerbaijan language to tell about themselves and to report that they are alive and that they are ready to be exchanged here. According to a report of the NEGA [NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA] agency, this past week relatives of prisoners of war and of the missing have picketed the parliament building with a demand to clarify the fate of their families. According to Azerbaijan data, about a thousand have been taken prisoners of war. Andranik Arshakyan declared that there are no more than a hundred of them. He explained that the Azerbaijan Army has left many bodies on the field of battle (up until now about 300 of them have been left at Kapan, on the Armenian side of the border, since the most recent attack on the border). But the Azerbaijani are avoiding the realities concerning the number killed, it is easier for them to announce that these soldiers are suffering in Armenian prison camps than to admit their deaths to relatives. That is why these figures arise.

Arshakyan contends that the places where prisoners of war are confined should be opened up for visitors, relatives of the prisoners of war, and observers of humanitarian organizations: "I am even ready to bring the Azerbaijan relatives here so they will then be able to force their leadership to solve this problem in earnest."

In Azerbaijan, according to its data, about twice as many are confined. There is also another problem: many families are holding prisoners "privately" at home (if someone in the family has been taken prisoner of war or held in confinement, the relatives will "buy" or take a

person from the other side prisoner for an exchange). This is a trade in people: some are making money on the sale of prisoners of war.

At the state level, Armenia has been engaged in the problem of prisoners and detainees for about half a year, and, until now, since there is no appropriate state service in Azerbaijan, exchanging has proceeded more often on the private level. Moreover, the Ministry of Defense is occupied primarily with the fate of those

who were taken prisoner of war in battle. During this time, it became possible to receive the bodies of 12 soldiers who were killed in August of last year during the capture of the Armenian enclave of Artsvashen (some of the bodies were so mutilated that it was impossible to identify them). Five people have been released for ransom. But even while the bodies were being exchanged, Andranik Arshakyan said, we were being fired upon. It is difficult to regulate such "details" as the safety of official delegations.

ESTONIA

Yakovlev Discredits Anti-Russian Discrimination*934K0102A Tartu POSTIMEES in Estonian
11 Jan 93 p 1*

[Article by Kalev Vilgats: "Alexandre Yakovlev Does Not Understand Why People Who Have Lived Here for Decades Have Not Mastered Estonian"]

[Text] Yesterday marked the end of Alexandre Yakovlev's three-day private visit to Estonia. During that time he had meetings with members of the scientific, business and political communities.

On Saturday, Alexandre Yakovlev acquainted himself with the University's museum of history where, to a packed auditorium, he delivered a lecture dealing with relations between Estonia and Russia, their history, the present state of affairs, and offered some projections for the future.

At the press conference, the advisor to the President of Russia, and deputy director of the Gorbachev Fund, responded to questions from the media. The afternoon was reserved for visiting Tartu's points of interest. As an economist, Yakovlev was interested in Estonia's economic development under changing marketing conditions, and so a visit was paid to the Tarmeko corporation.

Alexandre Yakovlev said that it is not easy for anyone, these days, but one must learn to cope independently. He thought it essential that good-neighborly relations between Estonia and Russia be maintained, even though there are forces in Moscow, who would gladly see another trouble spot along Russia's borders.

During his interview with POSTIMEES, Yakovlev remarked that one of his reasons for coming here was to see, with his own eyes, what relations between nationalities were like in Estonia. During his meeting with members of the business community, he expressed surprise at the statement made by Narva Mayor Vladimir Mizhui, who had complained that the language requirements were too hard to meet.

"How is it possible that after living in Estonia for 20 to 30 years, some people have not managed to master the local language?" Yeltsin's advisor asked Narva Mayor Mizhui. He is convinced that stories about human rights violations against the non-Estonian speaking population are vastly exaggerated.

Yesterday, Alexandre Yakovlev spent the day in Tallinn. He met with Edgar Savisaar, and paid a visit to Lennart Meri, president of the Republic of Estonia. After taking a look at Old Town, Alexandre Yakovlev gave an interview to Estonian Television. He returned to Moscow in the evening.

Yakovlev Visit to Estonia Questioned*934K0054A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 12 Jan 93 pp 1, 3*

[Article by I. Nikiforov: "Personal Visit in State Interest. What Is Behind Aleksandr Yakovlev's Trip to Estonia"]

[Text] "I was awakened at five in the morning. First the border and customs officials came into the compartment, checked my papers. A little later the Estonian border officials visited me. I lay down again and tried to go to sleep but was unable to do so." Aleksandr Nikolayevich Yakovlev, a former member of the Politburo and the Presidential Council and presently vice president of the Gorbachev Foundation said in describing the circumstances surrounding his arrival in Estonia.

At the press conference and on other occasions Aleksandr Yakovlev never tired explaining that he came to Estonia as a private individual on invitation of the Tartu University. The ritual of an academic visit was observed without deviations, and the esteemed guest's first meeting was with Juri Kärner, rector of the university and professors of the Faculty of History. Aleksandr Yakovlev delivered a truly regal gift for the historians consisting of copies of all the secret supplements to the Molotov - Ribbentrop pact. The number of these supplements, according to the guest, turned out to be rather large,—as many as eight.

The itinerary of the three-day private visit of Aleksandr Yakovlev (from 8 to 10 January) allowed two days for meetings with university instructors, the city mayor, and representatives of Tartu society as well as businessmen (a narrow circle), as well as for a public lecture entitled "Certain Thoughts on the Present and Future of Russia." The apotheosis of the visit, however, was the meeting on Sunday with Lennart Meri, the president of Estonia, and with Edgar Savisaar, leader of the opposition and vice speaker.

As discovered by a NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA correspondent, the Tartu visit of Aleksandr Yakovlev in the first few days of the New Year turned out to be almost a surprise both for the rector of the university and for the mayoral office, and particularly for the university historians. It must be assumed that the private visit was not as great a surprise for the president of Estonia.

Estonia is seeking contacts with Russia. After the elections of 20 September there were almost no people in the new government of Estonia with more or less close ties with the political leadership of Russia in the past. Even the president of Estonia had no close ties in the past with circles near to the current political elite of its eastern neighbor. Establishment of contacts and shuttle visits of people close to the leadership of influential political forces in Russia is more than important for Estonia at the present time, regardless of how personal such visits may be in character.

Commenting on the forthcoming meeting with Estonian leaders, Aleksandr Yakovlev, informed the NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA correspondent that the talk with Edgar Savisaar will be devoted to "general recollections" and that "we will be reminiscing." With regard to President Lennart Meri, the Estonian guest was more effusive. "We are in an unequal position," he stated, "Lennart Meri is the president, and I am a private individual. As a private individual I can only say what I think. Therefore there will be topics to discuss. It is a difficult time and there are many problems. There are no state figures who would want to worsen their relations with neighbors. I believe that both the leadership of Russia and that of Estonia would like to improve those relations."

Aleksandr Yakovlev assured the journalists that, returning home, he plans to discuss results of the trip with all, particularly the aspects pertaining to economic ties. "Volskiy, for instance, is well acquainted with the economy of Estonia. Of course I will have a talk with Viktor Chernomyrdin, an appointment has already been made," Aleksandr Nikolayevich, said, outlining his circle of interlocutors.

Replacement of the head of the Moscow Cabinet of Ministers brought despair to Estonian observers and there is no shortage of the most pessimistic forecasts concerning the future economic and political development of the eastern neighbor. Aleksandr Yakovlev readily discussed the position of the "Civic Union" attempting to convince local journalists that this organization occupies reformist positions and advised against attaching too much significance to certain statements by the prime minister. "I heard that Chernomyrdin is a great specialist and a decent person with a strong character," Aleksandr Yakovlev said in describing the head of the Russian government. "In the political sense the appearance of Chernomyrdin means nothing, after all he was not appointed to that post, but elected by the congress on an alternative basis. We must have a prime minister with powers and I am not a supporter of strong presidential power nor of shock therapy."

The prospects of the policy of Russian administration with respect to neighboring countries and, in particular, with regard to the Baltic states, were placed by Yakovlev in direct dependence on the fate of reforms in Russia itself. "Thus far," he said, "there are no programs in that area. Rather, there is the desire. After signs of economic stabilization appear it will be possible to expect some intelligent policies." The guest was directly convinced that the lack of such a policy brings about bewilderment and irritation among the local Russians. Vladimir Mizhui, the mayor of Narva, does not understand why authorities of Leningrad Oblast are carrying out a different policy toward various categories of citizens of Russian origin. All of that exacerbates an already complex situation in Narva. The introduction of customs duties, however, greatly undermined local industry which employs mostly ethnic Russians. The opinion was also heard that direct and indirect organizational and arbitrary economic sanctions or limitations harm primarily those whom they are designed to protect.

Max Van Der Stoel, the CSCE commissioner for minority affairs and former Dutch minister of foreign affairs, arrived in Estonia on an official visit the day following the departure of Aleksandr Yakovlev from Tallinn for Moscow. Mister Stoel intends to meet with all key officials of Estonia as well as the legislators and visit Narva.

By contrast with the visit by the commissioner the trip to Estonia of Aleksandr Yakovlev was not as transparent and predictable. Local observers assume that the vice president of the Gorbachev Foundation and Yeltsin's adviser was attempting to beat a path between the new Kremlin administration and the masters of Tallinn Vyshgorod, to once again draw an outline of the relation with Estonia that formed at the Russian summit and, probably, feel out the possibility of compromise with regard to disputed issues. The Estonian side is just as interested in this. It is also not surprising that it was primarily the opposition which became active. The public opinion poll among Estonian citizens in December indicated the exceptional unpopularity of the current government and the opposition has ample ground to become animated. I would therefore not be surprised if it is not Mart Laar, the premier of Estonia, who is the first to arrange a meeting with Chernomyrdin, but Edgar Savisaar, leader of the opposition. This has happened before.

Officials Discuss Myriad Border Problems

93UN0675A Tallinn PAEVALEHT in Estonian
5 Jan 93 p 2

[Article by Toomas Sildam: "Border Guards Up Against Refugees, Bribes"]

[Text] The leadership of the Border Guard Service gave a press conference yesterday. Topics covered included Kurdish refugees, bribe-taking border guards, invalidating some of the foreign passports of the Soviet Union, construction of the border check-point at Narva, crossing the Estonian-Russian border, and the tragic accident that took place at the Narva railroad station on January 2.

The Network Originates in Russia ...

Andrus Oövel said yesterday that it is now clear how the Kurdish refugees staying in Estonia illegally, and discovered in Pärnu on the night of December 22, had entered the state. Presumably, they had first travelled from Moscow to St. Petersburg where, on December 10, 104 Kurds boarded two buses and arrived at Ivangorod on the same day. "There they had to wait around the clock, because none of the friendlies' were on duty at the border."

The friendlies' are Russian or Estonian border guards who have been bribed. The Kurdish refugees said that they had paid one middle-man \$14,000, out of which presumably only \$100 went to Estonian border guards. The Russian border guards who were bribed had been told that metal was being taken across the border.

"When they saw that people were being taken across, a little panic ensued, but the buses drove through both the Russian and the Estonian check-points without ever stopping," Oövel said.

He refused to reveal any actual names yesterday, but explained that two people had been bribed on the Estonian side, one of whom was a border guard (by now dismissed from service). On the whole, the Border Guard Service has filed complaints at the prosecutor's office on 27 of its employees or servicemen, who are suspected of taking bribes.

A few days ago, inspectors serving on the bridge of Narva were replaced with new ones. The leadership of the Border Guard Service maintained that not all of their colleagues are suspected of taking bribes. Their prime objective is to make the border guard service at Narva more effective than before.

This was the fourth attempt at taking illegal refugees to Scandinavia through Estonia. The first incident occurred in October of last year, when two ships belonging to the Poseidon company took 129 refugees from Iraq and Iran to Denmark's Bornholm island. Then approximately 40 of the refugees went to Stockholm aboard Vironia and, in December, roughly 70 Kurds were taken to Gothland on Santa.

Aare Evisalu, chief of the Border Guard administrative center, said that first the refugees were using falsified passports and travelled on big passenger ships or planes. "Then controls were tightened at the Tallinn port terminal. Besides, using falsified documents is expensive and cumbersome. The groups dealing with the transport of illegal refugees took advantage of the limited technical equipment of Estonia's border guards, and of the fact that we don't have radar guard and patrol boats. These groups turned to several small firms or stock companies who were eager to make a fast, tax-free profit, and who agreed to secretly take the refugees to Scandinavia," Evisalu explained.

This illegal trade, Evisalu maintained, will be made even more difficult in the near future. The Irben Straits are going to be controlled by Border Guard vessel Number 101, whose radars will be causing serious problems to those engaged in illegal transit.

The Border Guard Service with the help of investigators, is trying to find out just who is dealing with the illegal transport of Kurds, and how. All Andrus Oövel could say yesterday was that "the network originates in Russia and ends in these countries where the refugees are headed."

The Kurdish refugees caught in Pärnu, however, are still waiting at the special commando headquarters on Männiku Tee for their case to be resolved. The UN representative who met with them said that conditions are not comparable to those at Swedish refugee camps but, considering the situation in Estonia, very good. The Kurds are supposedly even willing to go back to Russia,

if Moscow will guarantee to protect their refugee and human rights, and their life and health.

Will There Be a Check-Point at Narva?

Up until now, the state border at Narva lacks even the most elementary technical facilities, Andrus Oövel stated. Cars and pedestrians are checked, under abnormal conditions, on the Narva River bridge...

Henn Karits, Border Guard engineer and chief of technical services, recalled how, on June 31 of last year, it was decided to build a contemporary check- and crossing facility at Narva. This was also agreed to by the Narva City Council, upon which, on November 12, the city's mayor approved the plans for the facility's architectural design. The government also appropriated the necessary funds to start construction work (total cost of the facility was to be 3.5 million kroons, the Estonian-Finnish joint firm Haka OY was to be the builder). On December 28, quite unexpectedly, the Narva City Council passed a resolution to block the city government from making the land appropriation for the check- and crossing facility planned for Peter's Place. The reason: Putting up classical border structures "does not blend with the needs and interests of residents of the surrounding territories, and will result in additional and substantial difficulties."

The Border Guard Service is proposing to the government and to the State Assembly that the Narva City Council resolution be annulled, because it "failed to consider the interests of the Republic of Estonia, as a sovereign state." Henn Karits said that "a strategically important border town cannot be left without a normal international check-point." Currently some 20,000 to 30,000 people are crossing the border at Narva during a 24-hour period.

No More Border Crossings With 'Blue' or 'Green' Passports

Viktor Hansen, chief of the passport control department of the Border Guard Service, told the media yesterday that a letter was received from the Foreign Ministry on December 27, according to which the "blue" (employment-related) and "green" (diplomatic) foreign passports of the Soviet Union will not be valid after January 1. These documents can still be used to enter Estonia, but not to leave the state. If someone has, for example, a long visa or a living permit in the "blue" passport, then that person should also be able to show his or her Estonian passport or the "red" passport of the Soviet Union at the check-point for border crossing. "This way, we can decide on each case individually," Viktor Hansen promised.

The letter from the Foreign Ministry caused its share of confusion on the border. The decision to invalidate the foreign passports of the Soviet Union was a complete surprise, even to the border guards. Yet, the government decree on this had been signed as early as November 24.

There Should Be a Check-Line in the East

The task forces assigned to discuss border issues for the Estonian-Russian negotiations will be meeting in Pskov tomorrow. One of the basic issues to be covered will be the location of the check- and crossing-line, its status, and the procedure for checking through it.

"The check-line between Estonia and Russia is not the state border, geographically, but the procedure for crossing it must be the same as that on Estonia's western, northern or southern borders," said Endel Aaro, chief of the service department at the Border Guard office. He said that tomorrow at Pskov, the Estonian side will propose a simplified crossing procedure for the residents of parishes along the border. The same topic is scheduled for the meeting to be held between the Estonian and Russian delegations on January 12 and 13.

A Border Guard Killed His Companion

Andrus Oovel spoke briefly of the tragedy that took place at 15:10 on January 2, in the check-point office at the Narva railroad station. "For reasons hitherto unknown," a 19-year old border guard fired at his contemporary from an automatic weapon. The bullet struck the young man in the head...

Although the incident was witnessed by three border guards in the same office, many questions still remain unanswered. An investigative team from the Border Guard's legal information department went to Narva, and materials gathered by it have been turned over to the prosecutor's office.

On the same day, Andrus Oovel sent a telephonogram to all check-points. He reminded the recipients that "border guards are given weapons to protect the state and the people of Estonia," and not to cause "irreparable losses" through criminal negligence.

Talks With Russia Fail To Bring Results

934K0035A Tallinn INFO PRESS EESTI
RINGVADE in English No 85, 11-18 Jan 93 p 1

[Text] On January 13, the Estonian-Russian working parties for military, humanitarian, economic and border issues met in Nakhbino near Moscow, and a plenary session of the delegations took place on January 14-15, but resulted in no breakthroughs. "The delegations remained certain of their hereto official standpoints," said Estonian Minister without portfolio (of Estonian-Russian negotiations) Ju"ri Luik.

Estonia hoped to concentrate on establishing a deadline for the withdrawal of foreign troops in Estonia. Mr. Luik, in this respect, said Estonia would not let itself be pulled into disputes on "less important problems" and leave the main issue hanging. Estonia has repeatedly stated that Russian troops should be withdrawn by the middle of this year. The Russian position, however, is that troops must stay until the end of 1994, pending the construction of housing for their return.

The working party for economic issues focused on the former Soviet Union's foreign debt as well as on the USD 80 million of Estonian assets frozen by the Vneshekonombank in Moscow. Discussions regarding appendices to a free trade agreement between the two countries and an accord on investment protection were at a stalemate. "Disagreements are due to the different interpretation of the free trade regime," Mr. Luik added. While the appendices to the free trade agreement are incomplete the agreement cannot be put into effect. The group for humanitarian issues on January 13 discussed topics concerning the protection of cultural and historic heritage. After his return to Estonia, Mr. Luik said that Russian positions have become more rigid. Mr. Luik attributed this to changes within the Russian government, resulting in the strengthening of some departments and the connection of questions with political interests. The leader of the Russian delegation's military work group, Admiral Gromov, declined to allow international atomic experts to review the atomic reactor at Paldiski as previously agreed to, stating that it is a military secret.

An agreement on deporting persons illegally staying in the territory of the other state was also discussed. According to Mr. Luik, the positions differ on the date from which persons illegally staying in another state are subject to deportation. "Russia is of the opinion that the agreement should concern only those who have arrived after the conclusion of the agreement," Mr. Luik said.

CSCE Minority Representative in Estonia

934K0035B Tallinn INFO PRESS EESTI
RINGVADE in English No 85, 11-18 Jan 93 pp 2-3

[Text] On January 12, CSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, Max van der Stoel, arrived in Estonia in order to review and gain an objective picture of the present condition of minority relations in Estonia. Foreign Minister Trivimi Velliste described the problems of Russian troop withdrawal from Estonia, and informed him of the nuances in present negotiations with Russia. Mr. van der Stoel stated his interest in Estonian citizenship issues, and the status and integration of immigrants who arrived in Estonia during Soviet occupation. Mr. Velliste expanded on the problems posed by former Soviet Army and KGB officers in Estonia and the participation of non-citizens in local elections.

Mr. van der Stoel, accompanied by his assistant Rob Zaagman and professor Alan Rosas, also met with Estonian President Lennart Meri, who spoke about the present condition of the economy and foreigners in Estonia. The president stressed that a difference must be made between those individuals applying for Estonian citizenship and those individuals who were sent here by Soviet colonization policies. Mr. Meri also explained the plight of Finno-Ugric peoples in Russia. Mr. van der Stoel expressed his hope that the CSCE delegation will

obtain an objective picture of Estonian national minorities. On January 15, Mr. van der Stoel travelled to Narva and met with members of the Narva city council and government, deputy director of the Kohtla-Järve Oil Shale Processing factory and visited the Viru Information Centre. On the last day of his visit, Mr. van der Stoel also met with the leaders of the Russian Orthodox church in Tallinn.

Pension Law Drafted Despite Protests

934K0035C Tallinn INFO PRESS EESTI
RINGVAADE in English No 85, 11-18 Jan 93 pp 3-4

[Text] The Estonian government has submitted a draft pension law to the Riigikogu on January 13. According to it, pensioners will be paid 85 per cent of the minimum monthly wage (300 kroons), plus 0.6 per cent of the minimum wage annually, for each year of their entire service record. The government's press service asserted that if the law is approved, the average old-age pension will amount to 322 Estonian kroons, while the average size of all kinds of monthly pensions—236 Estonian kroons. Working pensioners will receive their pensions in full.

The government has also drafted a law on surplus payments to pensioners over 80, to war veterans, to participants in the resistance movement, to former labour camp prisoners and other categories of pensioners, amounting to 10-12 per cent of the minimum wage. Both laws are expected to go into effect on April 1.

On January 12, several hundred pensioners continued to picket the building of the Estonian government and parliament, demanding that the subsistence stipends, paid to them instead of the pension, be increased from 260 to 400 Eesti kroons. The subsistence stipends, whose size does not depend either on the service record, or on the wage or salary a pensioner once received, has been paid to pensioners since the beginning of 1992, when the law on pensions was suspended.

Minister for Social Welfare Marju Lauristin believes that the current economic situation does not allow the authorities to increase pensions considerably. She said that the ratio of the working citizens and pensioners is 2 to 1, and that the size of the social tax coming to the state budget limits the government's opportunities in the sphere of pension policies.

Commissions for Takeover of Ex-Soviet Bases Formed

934K0035D Tallinn INFO PRESS EESTI
RINGVAADE in English No 85, 11-18 Jan 93 p 6

[Text] Leaders of Estonia's northwestern Laanemaa county and its capital Haapsalu, together with representatives of the local Russian military garrison, met on January 13 and ruled to set up bilateral commissions for the takeover of military objects around Haapsalu. Russia still maintains an air force garrison and hydrographic service unit at Haapsalu, and an airfield and housing complex at Ridaia. "The garrison leaders expressed readiness to run the objects

over to local authorities as soon as possible," said the mayor of Haapsalu Tiit Beeren. The meeting was also attended by Estonian Defence Ministry, local police and Defence League representatives.

125 Illegal Refugees Detained in Estonia

934K0035E Tallinn INFO PRESS EESTI
RINGVAADE in English No 83, 21-30 Dec 92 p 2

[Text] On December 21, 125 Kurds illegally residing in Estonia were detained in the resort coastal town of Pärnu, Estonia. They had arrived in the hopes of illegally immigrating to Sweden or Finland as political refugees. Head of the Command Centre of the National Border Guard, Aare Evisalu, believes that there are at least two groups that deal in the smuggling of refugees to Scandinavian countries.

The refugees, comprised of 60 men, 25 women and 40 children, were brought to Tallinn on December 22 and given shelter under police supervision, where they continue to be held. The majority of the Kurds demanded asylum in either Estonia or Sweden, and have refused to leave Estonia. As of December 30, 14 have left for Latvia. Since Estonia does not have the facilities or the experience to deal with such issues, the government contacted the Nordic representation of the UN Commission on Refugees in Stockholm, who sent a representative to Estonia and have promised material aid to establish an internment camp in Estonia. The Estonian government has decided to deport the Kurds back to Russia and Latvia, states from where they entered Estonia. Negotiations will be undertaken in order to coordinate this act.

The Estonian Migration Board has restricted the entry to Estonia of individuals carrying Iraqi, Iranian or Somali passports. In accordance with a decree by the director of the Migration Board Andres Kollist, only three individuals a day from the above mentioned category will be allowed to enter Estonia. Individuals travelling with an Iraqi, Iranian or Somali passport who have Latvian or Lithuanian visas and attempt to enter Estonia must now, in addition, have an Estonian visa. Border officials will also strengthen checks for the authenticity of documents.

LATVIA

Statutes of Latvian People's Front

93UN0587A Riga ATMODA in Latvian
No 25, Nov 92 p 3

["Fifth Congress of the Latvian People's Front: Statutes of the Latvian People's Front"]

[Text]

1. General principles

1.1. Latvian People's Front (LPF) is a political organization, which realizes its Program through the parliamentary process.

1.2. The main goal of LPF is the renewal of democracy and the independence of the Latvian nation, as proclaimed on November 18, 1918, and its fortification, the spiritual rebirth of the citizens and promotion of economic activities, as a prerequisite for economic and cultural growth, a fair resolution of national problems, and the insurance of the sovereign rights of Latvians as a nation, in their own fatherland.

1.3. In order to realize its goal, the Latvian People's Front:

1.3.1. Participates in the Saeima and municipal elections;

1.3.2. Through the intermediary of its deputies and officers, it becomes involved with the national and municipal systems, realizing LPF goals;

1.3.3. It prepares LPF members for work in the national institutions and municipalities;

1.3.4. It assists the deputies by carrying out public opinion surveys, by providing them with conclusions drawn by experts, and organizing meetings with the voters, while ascertaining how well their activities conform with the LPF Program;

1.3.5. It works out projected bills, acts as their proponent, and presents them to Parliament in accordance to legislative proposal procedures.

1.3.6. It discusses projected bills, and expresses its viewpoint on these and other current political questions;

1.3.7. It organizes demonstrations, meetings, and picketlines, and celebrates national remembrance days and holidays;

1.3.8. It works in cooperation with other political organizations in Latvia and abroad;

1.3.9. It uses its own means of mass communication.

1.4. LPF bases its activities on the Latvian Satversme, respects Latvian laws, operates through democratic, non-violent methods, adhering to the principle of openness. LPF rejects any sort of discrimination or promotion of hostility and violence.

2. LPF members

2.1. Any person, whomsoever, who has reached 16 years of age, can become a member of LPF, regardless of nationality, social status, religious convictions, or membership in a political party or other social organization, provided that the LPF Program is recognized by the former, who complies with its statutes and promotes the fulfillment of LPF goals. Members of LPF who are members of a political party cannot be elected to, nor work in LPF institutions in an elected office. Members of a political party cannot be included in LPF electoral ballots.

Youths under 16 years of age may participate in LPF initiatives or may form their own youth organizations.

2.2. Membership in the Latvian People's Front is not compatible with the voicing of any communistic, national-socialistic nor other totalitarian views, nor with the proclamation of racial, national, nor any other form of animosity and intolerance, nor with the support of violence.

2.3. Persons who wish to join LPF may participate in or form a group. Acceptance is based on a simple majority of votes. Newly formed groups must be registered with LPF chapters or chapter associations.

2.4. LPF members have the right to:

2.4.1. Participate in all LPF initiatives and the organization of these, express their views, submit proposals and participate in the discussion of these;

2.4.2. Vote for LPF institutions;

2.4.3. Be elected to LPF institutions, if, prior to this, the "Political declaration" on respecting points 2.1. and 3.1.1. of the Statutes is signed.

2.4.4. Resign from LPF by written notification to the group.

2.5. LPF members fill out membership survey forms and regularly pay membership dues, the amount of which is determined by the LPF Council. Half of the minimum amount is given to the LPF administration. With respect to dividing the resources among the groups and chapters, this is determined at the chapter (chapter association) conference.

2.6. The LPF member is registered in only one group, but can freely participate in any other LPF structural unit.

2.7. The LPF member who does not observe the statutes, or acts against the Program can be expelled from LPF by a resolution initiated by the group or chapter. Such resolutions can be appealed in a higher LPF institution.

LPF Council members can be expelled from LPF only by LPF Council resolution, if there is a two-thirds vote of the full membership of the Council in favor of this.

3. Organizational structure

3.1. The basic organizational unit of LPF is the group. LPF group:

3.1.1. The group must have at least 3 members. The group has the right to develop and implement its activity program and regulations on how the group functions, which cannot be in contradiction to the LPF Program and Statutes.

3.1.2. The group's highest decision making body is the general assembly. At the general assembly, the group, as per their own discretion, elects a representative and governing board, defining their scope of authority and

term in power. The group's representative and governing body work with their resources, in accordance with the group's resolutions, regularly presenting an activity report, and can be reelected before the term expires.

3.2. LPF chapter:

3.2.1. Groups, whose members work in the same workplace, live in the same area, or have some other type of mutual interests, can form LPF chapters. Territorial chapters are formed by LPF groups from the same district, city or city district. The chapter can have no fewer than 100 members.

3.2.2. The highest decision making body of the chapter is the chapter conference. The conference elects the chapter's governing board and auditing committee, defines their scope of authority and term in power.

3.2.3. The chapter has the right to develop and implement its activity program and regulations on how the chapter functions, which cannot be in contradiction to the LPF Program and Statutes.

3.2.4. The chapter's governing board coordinates group activities, organizes implementation of LPF programs and chapter activity programs. Newly formed chapters are confirmed by the board.

3.2.5. In accordance with vocational interests, extra-territorial LPF chapters can be formed, which must have no fewer than 200 members.

3.3. LPF chapter associations:

3.3.1. LPF groups and chapters in one region can form a chapter association, which must be confirmed by the LPF Council. In special cases, if the success of activities is dependent upon coordination throughout the entire country, the Council can allow formation of chapter associations which are located in various regions.

3.3.2. The highest level of the chapter association is its conference, which elects its empowered members of the LPF Council, confirms its regulations, and in cases where it is necessary, forms its own governing board.

3.3.3. Empowered members of the Council must inform the leadership of the chapter association about what transpired at a Council meeting no later than a week after such a Council meeting.

If the LPF Council member empowered by the chapter association cannot fulfill his duties because of illness, or has not attended more than 3 LPF Council meetings without a proper excuse, or has changed his place of residence and has lost contact with his chapter association, he will be recalled by the conference and a new LPF Council member will be elected.

3.3.4. If a Council member resigns from fulfilling his duties, then, until the conference elects a new councilman, the former's duties will be performed by the candidate for

councilman who had received the greater amount of votes, if the conference has not ruled otherwise.

3.4. If the region or the city mentioned in the Council resolution has more than one LPF chapter, then it has the official status of a chapter association.

3.5. The highest governing body of LPF is the LPF Congress. It convenes not less than once every three years, before the regular Saeima elections. Extra congresses are convened by a Council resolution, or by request by no less than one-third of the LPF chapter conferences. Extra congresses are convoked within one month's time.

3.6. Only the LPF Congress:

3.6.1. Adopts the LPF Statutes and Program, makes changes and amendments, and confirms LPF symbols;

3.6.2. Defines the basic principles for the formation of the LPF Council and the number of its members.

3.6.3. Elects the chairman of the LPF and permanent members of the Council;

3.6.4. Elects the auditing committee, whose members cannot have a work relationship with LPF;

3.6.5. Can adopt the resolution for the disbandment of LPF.

3.7. The LPF Council consists of permanent Council members elected by the Congress, who make up one third of the total Council membership, and council members empowered by the chapter associations, who are elected by the chapter association conferences. In the period between congresses, the Council is the highest governing organ, which reviews and rules on the most important LPF activity matters, with the exception of "those" that are only within the jurisdiction of the Congress.

3.8. LPF Council:

3.8.1. Convenes the LPF Congress and determines the order of representation within it, realizing the LPF Program and resolutions by the Congress;

3.8.2. In accordance with the recommendations by the LPF chairman, it confirms his deputies from among the councilmen;

3.8.3. It creates the LPF board, one half of which is made up of members elected by the Council, and one half by board members recommended by the LPF chairman; it confirms the LPF commission and working group leaders, as well as listens to their reports and evaluates their activities;

3.8.4. It adopts the resolution on the LPF ballot of candidates for the Saeima election;

3.8.5. In accordance with the recommendation by the Saeima LPF faction deputy, it confirms the faction leader, who, along with this, becomes a member of the LPF board;

3.8.6. In accordance with the recommendation by the LPF chairman, it confirms the editors of LPF publications; it confirms the Regulations and Statutes of LPF activities in business, publishing, manufacturing, and other forms of activity;

3.8.7. It develops the Saeima LPF faction strategy, legislative priorities and basic principles;

3.8.8. It adopts resolutions on the formation of the administration, administrative coalition, or the opposition, discusses administrative programs and evaluates the activities of the governing body.

3.8.9. Not less than once every quarter, annually, it hears the report by the Saeima LPF faction chairman on the faction's work in implementing the LPF Program;

3.8.10. It discusses and approves the LPF economic activity direction and budget;

3.8.11. It evaluates the activities of LPF deputies, elected at all levels;

3.8.12. It submits projected bills to the Saeima, proposals to the administrative institutions, empowers LPF representatives in other countries and international organizations;

3.8.13. It presents reports on matters of political life.

3.9. Council meetings are convened by the chairman of the LPF, and while he is away or on assignment, by his deputy. The activity and formation of the Council are determined in accordance with the regulations.

3.10. The LPF chairman or his deputy:

3.10.1. Expresses the standpoint of LPF in accordance to the resolutions by the LPF Congress and the Council;

3.10.2. Convenes and leads LPF Council and board meetings;

3.10.3. Recommends one-half of the board members for approval by the Council;

3.10.4. Together with the board and commissions, prepares questions for discussion by the Council;

3.11. The LPF chairman and his deputies are members of the Council and the board. They cannot be elected for more than two consecutive terms;

3.12. A member of another social organization cannot be elected as LPF chairman or deputy, if he has political aims, or participates in elections on his own ballot.

3.13. The LPF board:

3.13.1. Organizes the implementation of LPF Congress and Council resolutions;

3.13.2. Presents reports and adopts resolutions on matters that cannot be postponed;

3.13.3. Creates commissions for the main LPF activity directions, elects chairmen for these and proposes them for confirmation by the Council, and also creates working groups, commissions of experts, etc.;

3.13.4. Coordinates LPF and Saeima LPF faction activities;

3.13.5. Coordinates LPF commission and structural unit activities;

3.13.6. Within budgetary guidelines, uses LPF resources to carry out Council resolutions;

3.13.7. Resolves questions about the establishment of LPF businesses, publications, and manufacturing, and the joining with other economic structures, and adopts resolutions about their disbandment;

3.13.8. Presents a report on its work to the Council.

3.14. LPF commissions, in accordance with regulations confirmed by the Council:

3.14.1. Develop activity programs and proposed documents for the LPF Council;

3.14.2. Discuss current questions within the scope of their activities, and develop suggestions and conclusions concerning these;

3.15. The LPF auditing commission inspects the utilization of LPF financial resources, reviews the Council, the board, and communications resources, LPF business and other economic unit financial activities, as well as the observance of LPF Statutes and implementation of resolutions. Its members have the right to attend all Council and board meetings. The LPF chapter (chapter association) financial activities are inspected by its auditing committee; the inspection of group financial activities is determined by the group's general assembly. The work of the auditing committee is defined by the Regulations.

3.16. Elections on all levels of the LPF take place openly, if this is requested by not less than one tenth of those eligible to vote. The election results in an administrative unit are determined by the relative majority of votes.

3.17. LPF administrative units on all levels have the power to make decisions, if the meeting is attended by not less than one half of those eligible to vote. Resolutions are adopted by a majority of votes of those present. Procedural questions are resolved by a majority of votes of those voting, unless otherwise specified by the Statutes or LPF Council activities regulations.

4. LPF property, finances and employees

4.1. The Latvian People's Front owns has its own property and financial resources. These resources consist of:

4.1.1. Membership dues;

4.1.2. Donations by physical and legal persons, with or without instructions on how to utilize the donation;

4.1.3. Legally determined state subsidies for political organizations and party activities;

4.1.4. Profits from the sale of LPF attributes, from publications, manufactured goods and other forms of economic activity.

4.2. LPF resources, in accordance with the budget, are used in order to financially insure LPF political, organizational, economic, or other type of activities.

4.3. LPF businesses, printing presses, manufacturing units and other economic concerns are the property of the LPF.

4.4. The Council can determine the compensation for the LPF chairman, his deputies and board members; but if they perform their duties on a public level, the LPF will reimburse them for actual expenses related to the performance of these duties.

4.5. The Latvian People's Front has its own salaried employees.

5. The legal status and attributes of LPF

5.1. The Latvian People's Front, its chapter associations and LPF publications are legal persons. They have a seal bearing their name and bank accounts.

5.2. LPF has its own attributes—the letters LPF and the "Jumis" symbol. LPF attributes can only be made and used with the approval of the board.

5.3. The resolution on disbandment of the LPF by a two-thirds vote of the voters can only be accepted by the LPF Congress, which also determines the procedure for LPF property utilization.

5.4. The legal address of LPF is: Vecpilsetas iela No. 13/15, Riga, 1419, Latvia.

Statistics for Murders, Suicides Reported

93UN0587B Riga LATVIJAS JAUNATNE in Latvian
28 Nov 92 p 6

[Article by Dainis Berzins: "Corpses Have No Place To Live...]

[Text] ADVENT The quiet, dark time of year is still with us, when we just don't want to do anything. The season of the souls of the dead is over, Memorial Day has passed, the candles on the graves have burned out.

A new church year has started with its long period of waiting—Advent. There are still four weeks before the lights of Christmas. We experience three different types of emotions—Latvian, which is the most ancient; religious, which is felt by some more than others; and each person's period of inner peace. For many, the waiting

period started already quite a while ago—they lit candles not only in their windows, but also in their souls. When starting over again, all of the old has to be dismissed. We are still alive (for now), but for how long?—People say that we can no longer help the dead.—Is it true that we can't?—Or is it that we don't want to, or don't know how to; or are we unable to think about them, pray for them, or even help them find their rest under the soil?

Corpses have no place to live...

... Even in their legal residence on this earth ... the morgue. And they are becoming increasing unwanted by everyone. Children are refusing to bury their parents, and vice versa, not to mention what happens to more distant relatives. Each corpse, stored in the cold, is on his own gurney, and is covered with a white sheet—that is only the figment of a naive imagination. The fact that there is a shortage of gurneys, and that they frequently break, which is why numerous corpses are thrown one on top of another on one gurney, and that the freon refrigeration units are not operating properly, and much, much more, I already knew before going to the largest storage place of corpses in Riga—the Latvian Court Medical Examiner's Central Morgue, where almost all of the violent deaths end up. Five years ago, looking for my place in life, I happened to work next door for a short while. That is why, for instance, a ward full of rotting corpses, which no one seems to be missing, no longer brings out any sort of emotion in me. There has been a great deal of talk in the mass media about unburied corpses and mass graves in Jaunciems; and, supposedly, some horrifying photographs have even been published, which people with weak constitutions are warned not to view. For me, however, this has just been a sort of "sanitized" version, used for display purposes.

We need Antigone

On the morning of November 19, I arrived at the Latvian Court Medical Examiner's Central Morgue to meet the same workers who I had encountered there many years ago. A staff turnover is not a characteristic of the morgue. I did not expect to see anything new, but before the interview, I unwillingly climbed down into the morgue to look around, and what I saw was on par with the daily scene at the Oswiecim and Buchenwald camps—a pile of corpses on the floor in the hallway. Shakespeare said that **death is like a mirror, showing how short the course of life is ...**

All of our incomplete lives are reflected by this pile. The new arrivals from November 18—21 bodies. There is a carbonized body—a shell, wrapped in a dirty blanket, whose soul has long since departed; an old lady with legs spread wide apart, who, not being able to manage herself, nor life, has hung herself; and there are many more. Yes, the influx of corpses is three times the expected volume. But then, I think about the Greeks, who are probably a

bit more temperamental than we are, and about an ancient myth, in which the heroine is a girl named Antigone, who was headed for death, but who stood by her conviction that her brother must be buried, in defiance to the ruler's orders; and then, all of our rivers of dead souls and deities seem so weak and powerless. God forgive us, for we know not what we do (or are not doing)! But it is all so simple—from the ground you have sprung, the ground you must become.

According to what the long-term Secretary of the Court's Medical Morgue told

* This year alone, 244 deceased persons were buried by the state. In the past six months, there were almost ten every week. The day after tomorrow, 43 bodies, who have collected over the period of a month, will be buried.

* A great many lonely people die. I have an entire stack of requests by relatives, who, due to a lack of material resources, decline to bury their brothers or sisters, parents decline to bury children, and children their parents—all levels of relationships are included. And then, there are many bodies who have not been identified, much more so than before. There are also forty, fifty year old people, and young men (about 18 to 25 years of age), who are not missed by anyone.

* The suicide rate is 25 times higher this year than in other years. It is particularly high among older people. Yesterday, three women were brought in, who had hung themselves, and their years of birth were either 1901 or 1909.

* Not a day goes by without a murder. August was a "bumper crop" month—every day. It's the same for October and November.

* Right now, we are getting fewer murdered infants and small children. This year, there have been five or six. That's not a lot.

* Varying levels of blood alcohol have been measured—in almost all of the corpses, regardless of how they died.

* This year, there is a significant number of young men, previously healthy, who have died of cardiac insufficiency. Even those born in 1962 - 1968. Naturally, alcohol is involved, but not at such a level to cause poisoning.

The morgue's "black" humor

* We still have not noticed any rats here, but there are the white worms, which would be very useful for fishing. We could make quite a business.

* No long ago, I was asked—Don't we have a diagnosis: starvation death!

* A few years ago, when someone was shot dead—that was an exceptional situation. Now, we come to work everyday and ask: Are there any gun shot victims? No—too bad.

* Everyone is now drinking the "piano" like crazy. We call "Royal" spirits the "rojal" (in Russian), or piano. In about five cases, we suspect that this may have been the actual cause of death.

* Often, a party of heavy drinkers "chugs" along, while a corpse lies next to them, with one of the drinkers passed out on top of the corpse.

* We get no less than 10 corpses a day. If there are five or six on a certain day, we consider it a holiday.

* An acquaintance of mine called and asked me: Do you rent coffins? What—rent? To take to the cemetery, and then we'll bring it back. My God! We still hadn't thought ahead to such an eventuality.

Photo captions: p. 6, top: New arrivals after the national holiday—21 bodies. Photo by Valdis Semjonovs (LETA, LJ special).

p.6, bottom: Somewhere, there are also angels ... Photo by Maris Bersons (LETA).

Diplomats Threatened Over Embassy Dispute

934K0055A Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY
in Russian No 45, 5 Dec 92 p 10

[Article by Sergey Tsekhmistrov: "The Latvian Embassy in Moscow Could Lose Its Building: A Dispute Over the Russian Embassy's Building in Riga"]

[Text] Yesterday Aleksandr Udaltsov, deputy chief, Second European Administration, Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stated that unless the Latvian authorities accelerate their solution of the problem concerning the return to Russia of the building which was formerly occupied by the USSR in Riga, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs would be compelled to take certain measures. The aim of these measures would be to create "adequate conditions" for Latvian diplomats in Moscow.

Right after the establishment of diplomatic relations between Russia and Latvia in 1991, the Russian side counted on the return to itself of that building located in the center of the Latvian capital in which the Embassy of the USSR had been situated up to 1940. Under various pretexts, however, the Latvian authorities delayed reaching a decision on this matter.

As a result, the Russian Embassy in Latvia has been housed in one of the pensions owned by Russia's Ministry of Defense on the Gulf of Riga, not far from Jurmala. Moreover, as correspondent "B" has been told by an informed source within the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the staffers lack the basic conditions for performing their work. In particular, communication with the ministry's headquarters on Smolensk Square in Moscow is a one-way matter, and the ministry is often unable to effectively transmit instructions to its diplomatic mission in Latvia.

parliament endeavored to do everything possible to turn things back by protesting and calling for the previous decision to be rescinded. They were successful in this endeavor: The "Russian Latvians" will not obtain citizenship before the elections to the Sejm and will not participate in these elections. Observers have noted that the reason for the furious resistance on the part of the National-Radical circles lies in the fact that they have a panicky fear that the circle of voters might expand before the elections to the Sejm. And the National-Radicals understand that the persons subjected to discrimination would not vote for them.

The history of the "Russian Latvians" has allowed many political forces to express themselves openly and explain their positions on the eve of the election campaign. Opposition to the decree giving citizenship to the "Russian Latvians" has been stated by the Latvian People's Front, the Movement for Latvian National Independence, and the Citizens' Congress. In its own statement, however, the Council of the Democratic Center Party noted that the behavior of those opposed to an equitable solution threatens the unity of the Latvian nation and democracy in Latvia.

The Centrists reminded people that a year ago the Supreme Council reached a favorable and positive decision on the matter of citizenship for those Latvians living in the West, regardless of whether they plan to return to Latvia or not; and it also permitted them to retain citizenship in their countries of residence. By the way, the Latvian emigrants intend to campaign actively for seats in the Sejm.

Although the struggle for seats has not yet begun (the Central Electoral Commission will officially proclaim the beginning of the election campaign three months prior to the date of the election itself), it is already beginning to determine and define a great deal in this republic's political life. Just what does the deployment of forces look like on the eve of this event, which is so important in the life of Latvian society?

In contrast to Lithuania and Estonia, where blocs of right-wing and left-wing forces have fully taken shape, in Latvia there are many names of parties and movements, but it is hard to say whether they represent genuinely large groups of the population. There are almost no left-wingers in the political spectrum. The right wing is represented by the National-Radicals, who strictly and rigidly defend the realities of more than 50 years ago, that is, the period of the Latvian Republic formed in 1918. Their fundamental position with regard to the "Russian Latvians" has demonstrated that they will not forego their principles not only for the sake of "migrants" and "colonists," but even for the sake of their brothers in blood and language. Some 88 organizations of the National-Radical type have consistently advocated the policy of the three "D's"—the debol-shevization, decolonization, and deoccupation of Latvia. They regard all persons who moved to Latvia after 1940 as foreigners living in Latvia illegally. They do not

exclude the possibility of deporting these people. For example, in the event of unemployment they propose to establish legal priorities for citizens in obtaining jobs.

Oil will be poured on the flames in the case of debol-shevization: What is being proposed here is restricting the political rights of former CPSU members, as well as former KGB staffers and agents. In a note concerning the election law the authoritative newspaper DIENA remarked as follows: "If prior to the Sejm the deputies succeed in adopting the draft proposed in due course by the Council of the Latvian People's Front—a draft which bans the holding of important posts by...leading members of the former Communist Party, then it may turn out that many well-known politicians (for example, A. Gorbunovs, chairman of the Supreme Council, or I. Daudis, secretary of the Supreme Council) will not be able to set forth their candidacies for future elections."

The Centrist forces, which are in the process of taking shape, have placed their bets on another political steed—in contrast to the horse which has already been saddled by the National-Radicals. The Centrists declare that the most important thing is a citizens' consensus. The following parties and organizations are included among these forces: The Democratic Center Party; the Fund for Promoting Latvia, led by Janis Jurkans, a former minister of foreign affairs; and—perhaps—the Democratic Labor Party, an organization dedicated to protecting rights. Janis Aboltins, one of the founders of the Fund for Promoting Latvia and a former minister of economics in the Godmanis government, stated in his recent interviews that he views the formula for success as follows: Intellect plus money minus radicalization. To J. Aboltins's way of thinking, there should be no differences in economic rights between citizens and permanent residents, whereas the problem of citizenship ought not to be dragged out, but rather solved in a liberal manner. Janis Jurkans himself—although now retired—is still a popular politician among Latvians and non-Latvians. He also stated the following with complete specificity: "We are not a party, but we want to create an aggregate of Latvian democratic forces regardless of these people's party affiliations."

If we could somehow set up a tuning fork, whose political voice would sound least off-pitch? And whom would the people trust? But the situation is such that even experienced observers are having a hard time making predictions. Opinions are widely scattered—ranging from the most pessimistic (the National-Radicals will come to power) to completely optimistic (new, moderate forces of a completely democratic persuasion will be elected to the Sejm). They agree—perhaps—on one thing: The outcome of the elections will be influenced, to a large extent, by the position taken by rural inhabitants, who are now listened to very, very rarely. The situation in the villages is critical. Will rural Latvians elect some organization with a new way of interpreting things?

After receiving several reminders and protests, the Latvian government took a decision at the beginning of October. This decision was signed by Prime Minister Ivars Godmanis and provided for handing the building of the old Soviet Embassy in Riga over to Russia. But for two months now the government's instruction have simply not been carried out.

Observers do not consider it a random chance that Aleksandr Udaltsov's statement was made at precisely this time. While the dispute concerning the Embassy building was taking place, there was a noticeable change in Russia's tone in its bilateral relations with the Baltic countries. After Boris Yeltsin's directive calling for a halt to the withdrawal of troops from these countries, Russian diplomacy was able to seize the initiative and to achieve solutions at the negotiations which were advantageous to itself. It seems as though that will also be the case with regard to handing over the building in question.

In his statement Aleksandr Udaltsov warned Riga—in effect—that unless the Embassy building in Riga is returned to Russia, “Latvian diplomats in Moscow will suffer.” He emphasized that “the Latvian side should have no doubts regarding the firmness of our intentions in this matter.” Along with this, however, on 27 November the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs proposed to the Latvian side that an agreement be drawn up and formalized as of 1 January 1993 regarding the leasing of a complex of buildings to the Latvian Embassy on conditions normal and customary for the diplomatic corps in Moscow. At the same time, it was noted that—from the above-mentioned date on—there might be a review or revision of the list and conditions of services to be rendered to the Latvian Embassy by the Administration for Servicing the Diplomatic Corps—an Administration which is under the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. So far, however, there has been no reaction to this proposal on the part of the Latvian side.

Ethnic Tensions Rise With Coming Elections

934K0055B Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
16 Jan 93 p 4

[Article by Irina Litvinova: “National-Radicals Fear Expansion of Circle of Voters in Latvia”]

[Text] Latvia—the latest of the Baltic republics—is prepared to begin its first election campaign after the restoration of independence.

Passionate disputes regarding such issues as how long the present Supreme Council should be “drawn out” are over and done with. The National-Radicals have always been in a hurry because they consider that the present-day system in the state can lead only to new forces coming into power—those with an unconcealed communist past. These ideas have been expressed in the parliament by the faction entitled “Satversme” (that was the term used to designate the constitution of the Latvian Republic formed in 1918—a constitution whose borders, citizens, and laws the national-patriots want to restore

point for point), which has declared on several occasions that it is prepared to vacate posts as early as this coming spring. There is a reason for the haste shown by the radical wing, for example, which is in opposition to the present government: Economic matters are going quite badly, the crisis will reach its peak in April or May, and it is precisely at that time that it would be simplest to convince voters worn out by a hard winter that only the “new forces” know a way out of this crisis.

Elections to the Sejm will be held on 5-6 June. These dates were approved by the parliament, which decided against postponing the elections until the autumn. No matter how strange it may seem, most of the deputies' factions and groups supported these dates. They were opposed only by those deputies who have consistently advocated equal rights for all of Latvia's inhabitants (basically this was the former “Equal Rights” faction). In their opinion, what need to be settled first are the problems regarding citizenship; those persons expressing a desire to become citizens should be given the opportunity to be naturalized, then—and only then—can elections worthy of a democratic state be held. Figures show that, otherwise, hundreds of thousands of people who have lived in this republic for many long years will be deprived of the right to vote. Let me remind you that only those persons who were Latvian citizens prior to 1940 and their descendants are so considered as of now. The National-Radicals are insisting on the purity of this aggregate of “true” citizens. The latest round in this fight was successful for them. What we are talking about are the so-called Russian Latvians: They have been deprived of citizenship in their native land.

Just who are these “Russian Latvians?” This is the term used by politicians and journalists to designate those persons who—by the will of fate—were taken to Russia at one time. Before World War I whole villages of landless Latvians were settled in Siberia, near Rostov, or in other regions of Russia, where there was a possibility to begin farming. Some Latvians suffered the fate of refugees during World War I. Among the “Russian Latvians” and their already grown-up children and grandchildren there were many who made a conscious choice to move to Russia after the Revolution. Many of them suffered during the period known as the Cult of Personality. Some of these families—though far from full—returned to Latvia after the Soviet regime was established here in 1940.

No matter how many reasons or causes may be enumerated, the fact remains that approximately 40,000 full-blooded Latvians living in Latvia are unable to obtain citizenship in this country. It seemed that common sense as well as the authority of such a person as Viktors Kalnbers—a surgeon and deputy well-known in Latvia—would make an exception for this group of the population; and a special amendment was introduced to the law in question. But it just did not work out that way; the registration centers were boycotted by the fighters for purity in the ranks of citizens. Meanwhile, the radicals in

One of the harsh critics of the diseases characterizing the post-national revival is the playwright Vladlen Dozortsev, an active founder of the People's Front and a deputy to the Supreme Council (he has stood shoulder to shoulder in the new Fund for Promoting Latvia). He makes the following diagnosis of the present-day regime, which is threatened with serious complications in the future: "Who holds power nowadays at court? To whom does it belong? To the government? But it is enmeshed in the wheels of parliament. To the parliament? But its decisions are spat upon in the localities. The 'Satversme' faction? But it has lost all its confrontational initiatives. The Latvian People's Front faction? But it does not control a quorum. Some party or other? But such parties

simply do not exist here in our country. The Citizens' Congress? It is almost outside the law. Certain individuals? To whom? Godmanis? The parliament would not allow it. Gorbunovs? The faction would not permit it. The rule of law? But one law does not go into effect because another law is not passed. The budget? But it has a deficit. There is a tie or gridlock of power. It has been dissolved in the air—so to speak—like moisture or humidity. Now here, now there, a national condensate accumulates and then falls on our heads."

Be that as it may, somewhat will take over this "gridlock of power" within a few months. And the fight for it will be uncompromising—there is no doubt about that.

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12 February 1993